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Abstract 
 
 
Based on 15 months of ethnographic field work in a small factory in southeast 
China, this thesis is about a new population and a new media. Described as the 
biggest migration in human history, an estimated 250 million Chinese peasants 
have left their villages to live and work in urban areas. The vast Chinese rural 
migrant population that did not exist three decades ago is taking on its new form 
alongside the rise of social media in contemporary China which itself did not exist 
two decades ago. 
 
The ethnography included intense interaction with a broad range of factory 
workers both online and offline. One of the most significant findings is the way in 
which this population challenges the full range of preconceptions commonly held 
about Chinese people – their relationship with family, with education, with politics, 
with religion and with ‘home’. The thesis argues that a population of 250 million 
cannot be regarded as a mere exception and should assume a central role in our 
understanding of contemporary Chinese people. 
 
As well as social media providing a route for the ethnography of this population, 
the study is equally addressing claims and generalisations made about social 
media itself, and its use and consequences. In many respects it was online 
sociality that had become central to these people’s lives, rather than the direct 
relationship to fellow workers. So the overarching argument of this thesis is 
alongside the rural to urban migration, there is a second migration taking place: 
a movement from offline to online. The ‘dual migration’ is not simply a convenient 
analogy but represents the convergence of two phenomena as profound and 
consequential as each other, where the online world now provides a home for the 
migrant workers who feel otherwise ‘homeless’. 
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Preface 
 
 
The bad news finally arrived. At the other end of the line Dong’s niece told him 
that his old grandfather (lao ye zi) had died.  
Three days later, with his parents and other two relatives who worked in 
the same factory, Dong was on his way back to his village in a mountain area of 
Yunnan province to join the funeral. It was a long trip: 2 hours on a minibus, 
followed by 48 hours on the train, then 3.5 hours by bus, and finally 1 hour on 
foot. Before the smartphone battery ran out, Dong had a last check of his QQ (a 
Chinese social media platform). When the train left Zhejiang province, he deleted 
the GuanYin (the mother Buddha) deity image that he had posted on his QQ a 
week ago in the hope that his grandfather would recover from his stroke. 
‘GuanYin didn’t do me the favour,’ he told me later on QQ.  
Dong had mixed feelings about this old man. Left behind by his parents 
who had worked outside of the mountain village more than 20 years ago, Dong 
was raised up by his grandparents. Ten years ago his grandfather suffered an 
attack by a snake in the field, which left him unable to do any more heavy farm 
work. The only job he was offered was that of a public toilet attendant in a nearby 
town centre. Dong thus accompanied his grandparents to the single room 
attached to the public toilet, and there he lived. ‘My classmates called me shiwa 
[shit boy] since then on, and I hated my childhood and my schooling time … my 
grandparents really couldn’t help me … I mean for them to make sure I was not 
ill or hungry or lost was the best thing they could do.’ Both Dong's grandparents 
17 
 
were illiterate and could hardly give him any advice on school problems. The 
experience of being left behind as a child and the bullying in school partially 
pushed Dong to drop out of education at the age of 16. He left his home village 
and became a migrant factory worker. Since then he had only visited his 
grandparents twice in four years. 
‘Everybody was coming back and saying the outside world was full of 
beautiful things, and I was so looking forward to a new life outside at that time … 
couldn’t wait to escape the desperate village life and my grandparents,’ Dong 
once recalled. After four years of hard work in various factories, he would not 
necessarily agree with his initial dream about working as a migrant worker (da 
gong) any more. Nonetheless, as he said, ‘Even though life outside was truly not 
as easy as I thought, struggling outside is always better than waiting for death in 
the village’. Dong believes in the saying ‘the real man travels the world’ (hao nan 
er zou si fang). At least that is something he can boast about one day in front of 
his children: that their father once visited many places. Dong planned one day, 
when he had finally saved up enough money, to start his own business in the 
town centre – no longer just labouring work, but a real business. Much of what he 
shared on his QQ profile were stories of successful entrepreneurs who had 
started from scratch, some of them from an even worse situation than his own. 
After all, most of the factory owners for whom he worked were once peasants like 
him. If they could succeed, why not him? ‘I just need a bit of luck and maybe 
some patience,’ he once observed. 
Two days after his return to his home village, Dong updated his QQ status: 
‘Farewell grandfather, sorry for being so buxiao [unfilial].’ Two weeks later Dong 
had still not returned to the factory. One day I got a message from him on QQ: ‘I 
18 
 
am not coming back; I am going to marry a girl in our village soon.’ The marriage 
was arranged by fellow villagers, and after the wedding the young couple were 
going to work together in another factory town in southeast China. As for Dong’s 
current job, a relative working at the same factory would help him to sort 
everything out. Hopefully Dong would still get a proportion of his final month’s 
wage, but to be honest he did not expect to receive it.  
I realised that the moment when I saw him off to the local bus station would 
be the last time I ever saw Dong. ‘Oh, my poor nv boshi [female PhD], I think that 
is something you can never learn,’ Feige, a forklift truck driver, remarked. ‘Things 
happen like this all the time; there’s nothing unusual in saying goodbyes. You 
know, I have seen so many new faces appear and disappear in factories and 
nobody really cares … except for you.’   
During my fieldwork, I got to know Dong, this 21-year-old rural migrant 
factory worker, rather well. In 2013, following an assumption that those Chinese 
migrant workers would be highly dependent on the boom in Chinese social media 
to remain in contact with the families they had left behind, I went to study social 
media usage in a small factory town in southeast China, a site for tens of 
thousands of migrant workers. However, during the subsequent 15 months of 
field work, mostly spent living inside one of these factories, I began to understand 
that the reality is very different from what I had assumed before the field work 
started. 
First, I was surprised about the motivations for migration among the new 
generations, which shows a very different pattern from the previous rural-to-urban 
migration. Second, I was largely wrong about what kind of social media use I 
would find among what is known in China as a ‘floating population’ (liudong 
19 
 
renkou); it was not mainly about retaining links to users’ places of origin. Most of 
all I had not anticipated my primary finding, which was that this would be a study 
of two migrations conducted in parallel: one from rural to urban, and another, 
undertaken simultaneously, from offline to online.1 We can call these parallel 
because both, in their own ways, were journeys to the same destination of an 
imagined modern China. Finally, this thesis will make a surprising claim as to 
which of these migrations seems to have been more successful in reaching this 
goal. 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
1 In this thesis, demarcation of ‘online’ or ‘offline’ follows a simple rule: online refers 
to using the internet or other digital mobile platforms, and accordingly, offline refers to 
activities without the internet involvement.   
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Chapter 1  
Contextualising rural migrant workers   
 
 
1. 0 Introduction  
In the last three decades since the de facto Chinese leader Deng Xiao Ping ended 
the cultural revolution and opened up the economy towards more capitalist 
forces, China has witnessed the largest ever human migration (Chan, 2013). 
Such an unprecedented flow of labour from China’s rural interior to more coastal 
factories and cities has resulted in vast economic growth, urbanisation and the 
proliferation of labour-intensive industries. By 2015 the number of Chinese 
peasants who had left their hometowns to work in these factories had risen to 
277.47 million.2 If Chinese rural migrants were the population of a country, it 
would be the fourth largest in the world.  
This thesis3 is about a ‘new working class’4 and a new media. It depicts a 
situation in which a very particular group of people has emerged as an adult 
working population alongside the rise of social media in China. The Chinese rural 
                                                     
2 National Bureau of Statistics of China. 2016. ‘China’s Economy Realized a Moderate 
but Stable and Sound Growth in 2015’. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/201601/t20160119_1306072.html  
3 The popularised version of this thesis has been published by UCL Press (2016) with the title 
Social Media in Industrial China. 
4 The concept of ‘working class’ has gone through profound change from the Mao era to 
post-Mao era. During the Mao era the working class was closely linked with revolutionary 
sprit and class struggle, whereas in the neoliberal context of the post-Mao era, ‘working-
class’ mainly refers to socioeconomic status rather than political consciousness. In the 
analysis of the social status of rural migrants, this thesis applies the term ‘new working 
class’ as suggested by Wang (2005). See Wang, C.2005. ‘Nongmingong: Yige zhengzai 
jueqi de xingongren jieceng.’ [Migrant workers: An emerging new working class] Xuexi 
Yu Tansuo [Study and Exploration] 1: 38-43. 
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migrant population that did not exist three decades ago is taking on its new form, 
very much facilitated by the capability they find in social media. At the same time 
social media, a new media that did not exist two decades ago, has rapidly come 
into daily use for a large proportion of the population. We can only make sense 
of both modern China and social media if we appreciate the dynamic, dialectical 
context within which both are being formed.  
This chapter outlines the economic and social transformation in 
contemporary China as well as changes which are taking place in the rural 
migrant group, providing the context within which the rural migrants live their 
everyday lives. The aim of this opening chapter is to introduce the field site and 
the background of the population who forms the subject of this thesis as well as 
the framework of ethnography which shapes the findings and arguments of this 
thesis. When other specific issues are involved in the following chapters, there 
will be further detailed literature review and background introduction.  
 
1. 1 Social context of Chinese rural-to-urban migration  
The economic reform of China would not have been possible without massive 
domestic migration. Migrant workers from the low-income rural areas make a vital 
contribution to China’s rapid economic growth which has led to rising prosperity. 
However, the great social transformation in contemporary China as a result of 
economic development also manifests itself in the forms of an increasing gap 
between the rich and poor (Wang & Fan, 2005) and deteriorating social inequality 
in general (Zhang & Kanbur, 2005). A 2015 report shows that China has one of 
the world’s highest levels of income inequality, with the richest 1 per cent of 
households owning a third of the country’s wealth whereas the poorest 25 per 
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cent of households only own 1 per cent of the country’s wealth.5 The social 
inequality that rural migrants suffered, from being either viewed as uncivil or dirty, 
or as scapegoat for all kinds of social problems in contemporary China (Chen, 
2008; Hu & Luo, 2001), to being deprived from equal access to social benefits 
compared to their urban counterparts, has been extensively noted by many 
researchers (Rofel, 1999; Pun, 1999, 2005; Jacka, 2006).  
Meanwhile, with the largest internet population, China has by far the 
world’s most active social media users6 even though China is almost unseen on 
Facebook, or other global social media such as Twitter and YouTube (Wallis, 
2011; Mandiberg, 2012).7 By June 2015 China had 668 million Internet users, 
and the rural internet users,8 accounted for 186 million, i.e. 27.9 per cent of the 
national total. (CNNIC, 2015). It is important to note that most of the growth is 
based on the popularization of mobile phones as a means to access the internet 
                                                     
5 See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3c521faa-baa6-11e5-a7cc-
280dfe875e28.html?siteedition=uk#axzz4IWesnwDj 
6 See http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/marketing-and-sales/our-
insights/chinas-social-media-boom  
7 The detailed discussion of Chinese social media landscape is given in Chapter 2. 
8 It is worthwhile to note that the definition of ‘rural’ in ‘rural internet users’ is different 
from the definition of ‘rural population’ in national censuses. In Chinese national 
censuses, ‘rural population’ refers to people with rural hukou, regardless of their current 
residence. However here in the CNNIC report, the term ‘rural internet users’ refers to 
‘internet users who have been living in rural areas of China in the past 6 months’ (CNNIC, 
2015: 6). In which case, it is actually difficult to tell how many rural migrants were 
accounted for as rural internet users as this ‘floating population’ does not necessarily 
continually stay in either rural areas or urban areas in the past 6 months. Having said so, 
the report sill has significant reference value because it shows the general picture of rural-
urban divide in terms of internet penetration as well as the latest trend of internet 
development in China. On top of it, as this thesis shows, the rural migrant group is 
regarded as pioneer in rural communities who in many cases brings the new technology 
back to the rural communities and plays an important role in the wide diffusion of digital 
technology in rural China. Therefore, the growth of internet use in rural China indirectly 
reflects the activity level of rural migrants’ internet engagement. Also see Oreglia, 
E. 2013. ‘From farm to farmville: Circulation, adoption, and use of ICT between urban 
and rural China.’ PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley. 
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and 69.2% of the new rural netizens are mobile internet users (CNNIC, 2015). 
Whilst today there is still a noticeable gap between the rural and the urban in 
terms of internet penetration (64.2 per cent vs 30.1 percent respectively), it is 
forecast that this gap will close relatively soon due to the nation-wide coverage 
of mobile phones.  
The massive migration, the increasing inequality, along with the booming 
of internet and social media construct the basic factorial aspects of the specific 
social context where hundreds of millions of Chinese rural migrants live. 
Meanwhile, there are three more specific key historical questions that provide the 
foundation for the situation encountered in this thesis: 1) Where do these migrant 
workers come from? 2)  Why have they had to take up a ‘floating’ life?  And 3) 
Who are they now? 
 
1. 1. 1 Chinese people and Chinese family: the anthropological approach 
The first question is an inquiry into a traditional agricultural society in which not 
only these migrants but also the vast majority of Chinese people used to live – 
merely half a century ago. Here we can find answers in the anthropology of a 
more traditional China. The scholarship is simply too rich to review here, but a 
few key concepts will be briefly mentioned as a starting point. In Chinese the word 
‘family’ (jia) actually refers not only to kinship, but also to a group of people, an 
estate of property or a set of economic activities (Freeman, 1970). The Chinese 
institution of family is regarded as the nucleus of society. No one who has delved 
into the intricacies of Chinese social relations would deny the leading role kinship 
plays in Chinese political (Esherick & Rankin, 1990) and economic (Sung, 1981; 
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Cohen, 1976) affairs; this further sets the foundation for Chinese cosmology, 
where ancestors were worshiped as deities by descendants (Freeman, 1967; 
Ahern, 1973). Patrilineal descent, or agnate kinship (Cohen, 1969; Baker, 1979), 
in which only men can inherit family property and a child’s lineage is only 
calculated from the father’s side, constitutes the social order of both the domestic 
and public domains (Freeman, 1957).  
Age, generation and gender served as the three hierarchical principles 
within a Chinese family: that is the old is superior to the young, the male is 
superior to the female, the older generation is superior to the younger (Baker, 
1979). The senior male members usually control family affairs, and were 
regarded as the maintainers, providers and protectors of the family. Parent–son 
relationships are the most important in a traditional family. In an extended family 
a married son is supposed to stand firmly by his parents’ side, regardless of what 
he thinks was right. Filial piety requires children to ‘show respect and obedience 
to their parents under all circumstances and a daughter-in-law is always in the 
wrong if she dares to talk back to her mother-in-law’ (Yan, 1997).   
In traditional Chinese society, human relationships start with the 
immediate family as an in-group and then radiate to encompass the extended 
family, village and wider social connections — the so-called ‘cha xu ge ju’ 
(differential mode of association) (Fei, 1939). With Confucianism providing the 
philosophical basis of Chinese family and society (Hwang, 2005), the country has 
long been seen as a typical collective or ‘low-individualism’ society – placing the 
needs, interests and objectives of in-groups at a higher priority than those of 
individuals (Kim et al., 1994). Other traditional Chinese ethical concepts, such as 
the importance of interpersonal relations (guanxi) and face (mianzi), which refers 
25 
 
to one’s own sense of dignity and reputation in a community, are all closely 
related to these collective features of Chinese society. These emphasise the 
distinction between in-groups and out-groups (Stafford, 2000), the importance of 
engaging in co-operative tasks, and a focus on avoiding conflict in the ultimate 
pursuit of communal harmony.  
The brief description of Chinese traditional family and sociality at this point 
is necessary because in the rest of this chapter and the following chapters we are 
going to discuss the continuity as well as the transformation of being Chinese by 
focusing on rural migrants as a specific segment of the Chinese population.   
  
1. 1. 2 The household registration system (hukou) 
In regard to the second question, the reason why Chinese peasants had to take 
up a migrant life, rather than settling down in cities, lies in a policy called hukou. 
Established in the late 1950s (Li, 2004), the Chinese household registration 
system (hukou) plays an important role in migrant workers’ life. A person’s hukou 
is linked to the place where that person is registered and it cannot simply be 
changed when that person moves.  A child’s hukou is inherited from his or her 
parents regardless of the child’s birthplace. Social benefits, including health 
insurance, pension, education, and unemployment compensation, land, etc. are 
all tied to one’s hukou.  And people were formerly only permitted to work and 
reside at their place of hukou registration. Because of hukou, mainland Chinese 
were divided into rural residents and urban residents. Urban residents enjoyed a 
range of social, economic and cultural benefits that rural residents did not receive 
(Cheng & Sedlen, 1994). With its strict rules against migration between rural and 
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urban areas, hukou tried to limit mass migration from the countryside to the cities 
to ensure social stability as ‘the system is designed to prevent unplanned 
urbanization and overcrowding’ (Li, 2004: 17) 
This situation started to change in the 1980s, when industrialisation of 
China needed more and more cheap labour. The control over rural-to-urban 
migration has been gradually relaxed, enabling a vast number of rural labourers 
to work in cities while remaining registered as rural residents (Chan & Zhang, 
1999). The hukou ‘had been modified significantly since 1984 when rural 
labourers were officially permitted to seek non-agricultural jobs and to run 
businesses in cities.’ (Huang & Zhan, 2005: 8-9) ‘Floating population’ (liudong 
renkou), a term in Chinese official discourse, describes the migration pattern of 
those rural migrants (Fan, 2008; Li, 2006). Peasant workers (nongmin gong), a 
combination of ‘peasant’ and ‘worker’, is another word used in colloquial 
discourse and official discourse to refer to the same group. As this term suggests, 
migrant workers are still peasants; they do not have access to the same welfare 
benefits as urban workers do under the allocation system of hukou. In such a 
rural–urban divide migrant workers usually find it difficult to establish roots in their 
temporary residential places – despite being the backbone of China’s economic 
miracle which is based on labour-intensive industries. Scholars pointed out that 
the unequal treatment at workplace, including informal work contracts, long 
working hours,9 meagre pay and social inequality in general are all related to the 
hukou system (Fan, 2004; Zhang, 2002).  
                                                     
9 The ‘long working hour’ is criticised especially in the service sector. However, in 
manufacturing industry the situation can be different. According to the field work, in 
practice the majority of rural migrants are looking for jobs with longer working hours. 
That is because, the temporary jobs in factories are paid either by hours (ji shi), or by 
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Having said so, the ongoing reforms of the hukou system cannot be 
neglected even though a lot of obstacles and difficulties remain. For instance, the 
new Social Insurance Law in 2010 aims to achieve the connection of social 
insurance attached to one’s hukou between different places (NPC, 2010). In 
addition, in 2014, the central government released a plan of creating a unified 
pension system before 2020 for both rural and urban population with a goal of 
reducing the inequality in the rural-urban divide. However, these well intentioned 
reforms face a lot of obstacles in the implementation process. In the field site 
many people, the majority being rural migrants, criticised the reform and the new 
insurance law as being unpractical and unreasonable. Very few of factory workers 
were willing to join the pension scheme at factories as the scheme will take a 
certain portion of monthly pay from them and they cannot take their pension along 
from one factory to another if they quit the job. Thus, given the high mobility of 
the rural migrant group, to join the pension scheme can mean, as the factory 
worker Da10 remarked, ‘losing money for nothing’.  
To conclude, the hukou system has a profound and persisting impact on 
rural migrants and their personal development. Hukou is the main source of 
inequality rural migrants have been suffering. Meanwhile, it also seems to 
motivate a huge number of migrant workers to seek opportunities in cities and 
factory towns as Chinese society’s dual structure of rural-urban consolidated rural 
people’s longing for urban life. However, in the past three decades the reasons 
                                                     
piece (ji jian), therefore many factory workers can only make enough money for a living 
if they can work and get paid overtime. If a factory’s business is not doing well and does 
not have enough orders, it is very usual to see a mass exodus of front-line factory workers 
because for them one day without work means one day without pay. Having said so, 
ultimately the factory workers’ preference for longer working hour reflects the deficient 
pay system and the lack of social insurance at the workplace.  
10 Please find the detailed introduction of the young factory worker Da in Chapter 6. 
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which drove Chinese peasants to leave their home villages and to work and live 
in cities and factory towns have changed.  
 
1. 1. 3 From the left-behind children to the new generation 
Three decades ago,11 when the first wave of Chinese migrant workers left their 
villages, they were leaving behind dreadfully poor agricultural communities and 
entire families that were desperate to be supported. Three decades later, the 
second, even the third generation has now become the main force of migrant 
labour, and it is important not to extrapolate our understanding of the first 
generation and assume that it applies equally to these later generations.  
 During the time of writing this thesis, the Economist published an article12 
about the children of Chinese migrant families left behind by their parents. This 
article rightly pointed out that such children were a damaged generation, suffering 
significantly higher states of anxiety and depression than their peers – a situation 
that may be connected to the lack of support following their early separation from 
parents. It is said that in 2010 there were 61 million children below the age of 17 
left behind in rural areas; in several provinces more than half of all rural children 
had been left behind (Démurger & Xu, 2015). Such children have truly become a 
severe social problem in modern China. However, even this latest article still fails 
to cover some of the most recent developments and consequences of such 
                                                     
11 The ﬁrst wave of migration started in the mid- 1980s. See Zhao, Y. 1999. ‘Leaving the 
countryside: Rural- to- urban migration decisions in China.’ The American Economic 
Review 89 (2): 281– 86. 
12 ‘Little match children: Children bear a disproportionate share of the hidden cost of 
China’s growth.’ The Economist. Dated 17 October 2015. 
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problems. In the town where I conducted my research most young migrant 
workers had once been ‘left-behind’ children; they had dropped out of school at 
ages ranging from 14 to 17,13 and then joined their parents to work in factories. 
Even as academics and journalists continue to discuss the population of ‘left-
behind’ children many of their subjects, like my informant Dong, mentioned 
above, have already made themselves part of a new generation of migrant 
workers. 
In 2012 the average age of Chinese rural migrants was 28 years old. More 
than half of today’s migrant population were born after the 1980s and around 75 
per cent had started to work outside their home villages before reaching 20 years 
of age.14 In this thesis, the new generation forms the majority of the factory 
workers. In the field site, more than 80 per cent of newborn babies came from 
migrant families, while migrant children also represent the majority at the local 
primary school.15 This new generation faces difficulties, however, as it is not yet 
integrated into the local society. Even though economic advantage of rural-to-
urban migration is no longer significant, migrant workers nonetheless are 
exposed to considerable risks and vulnerabilities given the social exclusion and 
labour market discrimination that still exists in cities (Wang & Cai, 2009). Today’s 
                                                     
13 It is found that children left behind by parents usually find learning difficult and boring, 
as a result of the parents’ absence. See detailed analysis in Zhou, M. et al. 2014. ‘Effects 
of Parents’ Migration on the Education of Children Left Behind in Rural China.’ 
Population and Development Review 40(2): 273–92. 
14 See 2013 Report of Chinese ﬂoating population development (2013 zhongguo 
liudong renkou fazhan baogao) http:// www.moh.gov.cn/ ldrks/ s7847/ 201309/ 
12e8cf0459de42c981c59e827b87a27c.shtml 
15 Data collected from two local clinics and primary school by the author in 2013. Also 
this seems to remain in line with a 2011 survey of migrant workers conducted by All-
China Women’s Federation (ACWF 2011). This survey reveals that 78.1 per cent of 
married new generation migrants work in the same city as their spouses, and 58.2 per 
cent of the married new generation migrants have brought their children to the city. 
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young migrants confront the same problems as their parents did. They may feel 
even more frustrated by social discrimination as the new generation of migrant 
workers feel more strongly than the older generation about rural-urban inequality 
(Li, & Tian, 2010), and they are usually keener to integrate into modern city life 
(Lan, 2014).  
In terms of motivation, poverty is no longer the only reason behind 
migration. The initial motivation of the rural-to-urban migration was economic 
necessity (Zhao, 2004). Low productivity in the countryside could not support the 
livelihoods of the Chinese peasants who constituted the majority of the country’s 
population; working in factories and cities seemed to be the only viable solution. 
Nowadays, however, the economic advantages of migration have become less 
clear. The combination of higher living expenses and increased consumption 
influenced by the general lifestyle in urban areas (Zhu et al., 2012) means that 
marginal improvements in migrants’ incomes hardly warrant the costs of, for 
example, being no longer able to care for their parents. For the new generation 
of rural migrants, the whole trajectory of rural-to-urban migration has shifted from 
the ‘push’ factor of economic necessity towards the ‘pull’ factor of aspirations 
towards modernity. For young migrant workers, migration means ‘to see the 
outside world’ (Wang 2001; Fang, 2011; Fan & Chen, 2014) and to gain 
autonomy from one’s family.16 In such a context, social media is less of a bridge 
that connects individuals with what they have left behind in villages and more of 
a projector illuminating an ideal modern life to which they aspire. Therefore, a 
study of social media was also a really effective strategy for understanding these 
                                                     
16 The situation of rural young people fighting for autonomy from their families is also 
observed and analysed in the study of Yan, Y. 1999. ‘Rural Youth and Youth Culture in 
North China.’ Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry 23:75–97. 
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young people; only through this inner but online world17 did it seem possible to 
best find out who they really are and what they really want from life.  
 
1. 2 Theoretical framework and methodology  
There is a temptation to view this research simply as a study of how the ‘Chinese’ 
use ‘social media’. The problem with such a view is that it fixes the two key 
components, ‘Chinese’ and ‘Social Media’ at two ends. Commencing the 
analysis from either end leads to similar problems: If we start from the Chinese, 
we seem to assume that ‘being Chinese’ explains the way the technology 
underlying social media was constructed. That is to say users have the absolute 
upper hand and decide the ways this technology can be used. If we start from the 
other end, then we assume there are well defined technology based tools called 
‘social media’, and the properties of such social media are what mainly lead 
Chinese people to use them the way they do. As neither of these approaches 
appear to lead to satisfactory and comprehensive analysis and conclusions, this 
study took a third path: the ‘objectification’ approach.  
 
1. 2. 1 Theoretical framework and research approach  
The concept of ‘objectification’ (Miller, 1987), was one of the theoretical 
foundations of modern material culture studies, which in turn was the basis for 
the study of digital anthropology. The ‘objectification’ path refuses to view the 
‘Chinese’ and ‘social media’ as two fixed ends. Instead we assume that we are 
                                                     
17 Chapter 3 is devoted to a detailed analysis of actual postings by rural migrants on 
their social media profiles. 
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studying a process which reshapes both the experience of being Chinese and 
the use of Chinese social media.    
It is worth reiterating that much debate about the consequences of digital 
technologies is derived from the assumption that in terms of human culture and 
social relationship there exists ‘pure internal homogeneity and pure external 
heterogeneity’, as if cultural differences were essentially a priori given by isolated 
developments of each given society (Miller 2012:17). To the contrary, more 
contemporary ethnographies (Wilk,1990; Miller, 2010, 2011) have acknowledged 
that cultural heterogeneity is often constructed in dynamic progress rather than 
merely given by history. 
Thus in this thesis the discussion of these two always go together because 
we can only understand one fully through the other. We understand the 
affordance, the nature and potential of social media through examining it in 
people’s daily life experience.  Meanwhile the understanding of social media has 
been a means to gain an enhanced understanding of what is happening to this 
population and the social transformation of their daily life.   
From the ‘techno-utopia’ belief (Winner, 1997; Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998) 
to ‘digital divide’ (Warschauer, 2004; Chen & Wellman, 2004) approach, there 
has been a considerable interest and debate about the capacity of the internet 
and social media in social transformation. More importantly, scholars point out 
that the real consequences of the internet and social media has to be examined 
in the different forms of access, the specific local context and personal usage 
(Zickuhr, 2013; Miller et al., 2016). Therefore, this thesis aims to address a range 
of questions of the use of social media based on contextualised knowledge of the 
local daily life. 
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Contextualised knowledge drawn from ethnography is the central tenet of 
this research. In the history of Internet study, scholars have long treated online 
interactions as taking place in a virtual realm unconnected to a broader social 
context and ‘the majority of research about the internet has been research in the 
internet’ (Hardey, 2002:571). Increasingly, scholars now have recognized that 
‘nobody lives only in cyberspace’ (Kennedy, 2006: 871) and thus started to 
highlight the interrelationship of online and offline (Wellman et al., 2002; Hine, 
2000; Postill & Pink, 2012). More recently, there is a growing literature paying 
attention to the practice of ethnography approach in internet study (e.g. Beaulieu, 
2004; Burrell, 2009; Kozinets, 2010; Pink, 2012) along with a corpus of 
ethnographic researches of the digital (e.g. Postill, 2011; Miller, 2011; Heather & 
Miller, 2012; Miller et al., 2016).  
In this thesis, the observation of people’s offline life is essential to the 
understanding of their online activities. Furthermore, the argument is that the 
boundary of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ has become much less clear when online 
activities have become an integral part of everyday life in the age of social media. 
Therefore, rather than simplistically regarding ‘online’ and ‘offline’ as a pair of 
opposites, this thesis recognises that ‘most people now engaged with a 
multiplicity of online and offline communication’ (Miller et al., 2016: 112).  
This thesis also aims to present what this ‘floating population’ felt, believed 
or mistrusted; what their fantasies, hopes and fears might be; how they 
understood situations and reacted offline and online. Therefore, this thesis is 
composed from hundreds of voices and images and fragments of individuals’ 
daily lives, but not one of them is trivial. In addition, a bigger, but also very 
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different and distinct picture of modern China appears in view when these 
individuals are brought analytically together. 
 
1. 2. 2 Research design and research questions 
This doctoral research is part of the project ‘WHY WE POST’ Social Media and 
Social Science funded by European Research Council (ERC), 18  a tightly 
integrated comparative study of global social media impacts which conducted 
extended ethnographic fieldwork simultaneously in 9 field sites of 8 different 
countries (the UK, Italy, Turkey, India, China *2, Brazil, Chile, and Trinidad). 
On the one hand, comparative study seems to be not a typical research 
approach of anthropology which usually conducts fieldwork by individual 
ethnographers insisting upon the integrity of a specific place; on the other hand, 
on the way of understanding what is true of all human experience and the 
meanings of culture, ‘anthropology’s only method is the comparative method’ as 
pointed out by Marilyn Strathern (Gingrich & Fox, 2002: xvii). Today’s 
globalisation and ‘information society’ implies a shift away from any purely ‘self-
contained’ culture genre to a stronger global connection in various aspects. 
Compared to other media technologies in history, social media, the very latest of 
the major digital media, seem to have been the fastest in terms of their ability to 
become a global infrastructure, which all together legitimatise a renewed 
comparative agenda of social media for anthropology. With a full awareness of 
cultural diversity, each individual research component of this WHY WE POST 
                                                     
18 http://www.ucl.ac.uk/why-we-post  
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project studied the contextualised social media usage in different given countries 
under a shared theoretical and research framework, which allows the whole 
project to address the question of whether such observed local usage of the 
social media is because of the culture or because of the affordance of 
technologies, or both. As the first outcome of this project, the comparative book 
How the World Changed Social Media (Miller, Costa, Haynes, McDonald, 
Nicolescu, Sinanan, Spyer, Venkatraman, and Wang, 2016) 19  offers a 
comparative analysis summarising the results of the research and exploring the 
impact of social media on education and young people, work and commerce, 
politics and gender.   
This particular study of Chinese social media is important in this 
comparative study of global social media given the mere number of Chinese 
social media users and the totally different dominant social media platforms (i.e. 
QQ and WeChat) used in China compared to the rest of the world. The 
overarching research questions of this thesis include: in the light of global 
comparative study, what is the daily use of Chinese social media? What do we 
learn about the social consequences of social media, the nature of Chinese rural 
migrants, and the social transformation taking place in contemporary China?  
More specifically, in order to gain a holistic contextualised knowledge as 
well as keep this research under the same framework as the other ethnographic 
researches carried in the other 8 field sites, there are 10 big themes guiding the 
field work as bellow.20 In addition, for each theme, a ‘question pool’ with a few 
                                                     
19 https://www.ucl.ac.uk/ucl-press/browse-books/how-world-changed-social-media 
20 The guideline is based on the research guideline (March 2013) collectively produced 
and agreed by 9 researchers, including the author.   
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more specific and follow-up questions was  prepared so that in practice it can be 
applied immediately whenever a chance arises.21  
1) anthropology and relationships  
How does the study of social media facilitate traditional anthropological 
discussion of Chinese kinship and other relationships seen as the 
fundamentals of social order and personal relations? Which relationships 
are strengthened and which weakened and what is the relationship to 
social media itself? How do new media impact upon the key relationships 
e.g. parent-child, sibling and couples? How does it impact on sex, intimacy 
and love?  
2) place, diaspora, migration  
How do new media impact upon the sense of ‘place’? Do rural migrants 
identify more or less with the place in which they live? Is there some kind 
of new third space derived from dwelling within the media itself? 
3) ‘Polymedia’ 
How do the various new media work as a package? How do people 
determine which media work best for which purposes? How do they relate 
to emotions and power?  
4) Individualism  
                                                     
21 An example of such ‘question pool’ is given at the Appendix 1. 
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Is this a form of networked individualism or does it represent a return to 
forms of group and the mixing up of relational fields that was true of earlier 
forms of sociality? 
5) inequality   
What are the welfare consequences of new media, and their impact upon 
rural migrants? What is the overall impact of new media on inequality?  
6) information and politics 
How do new media impact on the nature and source of information such 
as news? With what political consequences? How does it impact freedom 
and oppression and rural migrants’ relationships to the party-state and to 
commerce? Do people know more or less and about what?  
7) identity  
How does having a representation of oneself on social media transform 
people’s understanding of their self? How far do rural migrants think their 
online selves is a representation of what they regard as their true self?  
8) privacy  
How do new media relate or change local concepts of privacy? How 
concerned are rural migrants with commercial uses of their personal data? 
How are new media used for surveillance or control?  
9) spiritual 
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How do new media relate to local people’s concepts of religion and the 
spiritual, does it give any sense of immortality and enable us to converse 
with the spiritual world? 
10) unpresented 
What could be considered genuinely unprecedented about new media, 
what of significance has changed? What has changed and what is mere 
continuity? 
It is worthwhile to note that the research questions have been frequently revised 
during the field work. The research questions sorted out before the field work 
were more used as a reminder rather than a guideline. The real challenge in field 
work was not to follow the research topics but to, in a way, ‘forget’ these pre-
existing topics so that my inquiry can be sensible enough to catch the ‘holistic 
contextualised’ information that in some cases may appear totally irrelevant at 
the first glance but turned out to be the real answer. After all, ‘no one lives inside 
a topic of research. Holistic contextualisation means that everything people do is 
the context for everything else they do.’ (Miller, et al., 2016: 29) Therefore, the 
very nature of anthropological field work is very ‘opportunistic’ and the premise is 
that ‘we simply don’t know what factor in people’s lives will be influenced by this 
object.’ (Miller et al., 2016: 28)  
In terms of issues related to the ethics of research, this project follows the 
research ethical guidelines stipulated by the ERC22 as well as UCL.23  In practice, 
the principal rule for me was to ensure that all my informants were made aware 
                                                     
22 http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/fp7/89888/ethics-for-
researchers_en.pdf 
23 http://www.ucl.ac.uk/archaeology/research/ethics/ethical_guidelines 
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of my identity as a researcher in our early meetings and all the material I used for 
any forms of research reports and publications was highly anonymised so that no 
one mentioned in this research can be recognised.  
 
1. 2. 3 Field work methodology   
This thesis is based on a 15-month period of ethnography. The main methodology 
is participant-observation, that is rather than observing from a distance, 
ethnographers get involved in local people’s daily life. I gained data and insights 
by walking around, listening to what people say, observing what people do and 
being a participant as well as observer in their daily life. As the anthropologist 
Margaret Mead rightly pointed out, there are actually several layers of self-
representations in a person’s social life. ‘What people say, what people do and 
what they say they do are entirely different things,’ she observed. In many cases, 
simply doing questionnaires or interviews (that is, collecting what people say, or 
what people say they do), is quite different from observing what they actually do. 
Self-expectations, social norms and taboos may prevent people from saying what 
they really do and think in daily life, or sometimes people simply fail to express 
themselves articulately. Thus it is essential to observe what people do in their 
lives over a relatively long period of time. Another reason why long-term field work 
is so important is that it enables the researcher to become ‘taken for granted’ in 
the landscape and even to become friends with his or her informants. Nobody will 
behave naturally if they are aware of ‘being watched’. In my case, it happened 
several times that people came back to me after knowing me for six months or 
more and admitted that actually what they told me when we first met was not true 
as they had not really known me at that time.  
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There were also some specific and local issues. At first a key problem was 
the suspicion of factory owners that researchers can be undercover journalists. I 
encountered such hostility on the first day when I was taking photographs of a 
factory building. The security guard dashed out and urged me to leave: ‘Our boss 
said no journalist!’ It took people no time to spot me as somebody ‘unusual’ – 
somebody who was not a rural migrant looking for a factory job. 
A friend suggested me to work on relationships (gao guanxi), rather than 
regulations to gain access to factories. ‘The smaller the place is, the more 
important the social relations (guanxi) become.’ Just as she said, guanxi opened 
factory doors for me. After several twists and turns of social networking, I 
managed to get an introduction to a factory owner by his family friend, a previous 
student of a family member of mine. Thanks to that, my presence was finally no 
longer seen as an unpredictable threat. A temporary factory ID card was issued 
which allowed me to visit the factory plant without extra permission, and a room 
in the factory’s accommodation area where I could stay during my research was 
allocated to me. Before even entering the factory, I had learnt one of the most 
important lessons about my field site: in most cases, the local society is based on 
personal social relationships. I could therefore understand the strategy of migrant 
workers making a living in a strange place better, as so much of it depended on 
their personal social networks.  
Being a friendly and trusted outsider turned out to be a most rewarding 
thing. People shared their opinions freely with me without worrying that I would 
judge them, and confessed their secrets to me without worrying such secrets 
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would be revealed.24 Having said this, it was a constant struggle to try to explain 
to people that an anthropologist, a word they had never heard, was not a 
journalist who has a channel to report local problems, nor a philanthropist who 
has resources to help them, nor an official who has the power to improve 
conditions. Even though some turned their back on me after their requests for 
money or a job from me were turned down, in most cases relationships between 
local people and me were built on an emotional, rather than an instrumental basis.  
Curiously, my situation as an outsider seemed to draw a parallel when it 
comes to the role of ‘strangers’ on social media in migrant workers’ daily lives. As 
we will examine further in Chapter 5, among migrant workers, friendship with 
strangers established and maintained on QQ, has become an important part of 
their social lives. Unlike offline relationships which are usually constrained to fixed 
social roles and mingled with various practical needs, online relationships were 
viewed as ‘purer’ relationships based on feelings and emotions. 
In order to cover the diversity of local people, I applied various methods. 
For instance, I often had several different breakfasts on the same morning in 
various breakfast booths in order to chat with ‘strangers’ who shared the same 
table with me. I visited all the shops on the high street one by one to do interviews 
and questionnaires, and paid a regular visit to waiting halls of different banks, 
clinics and train or bus stations to observe and chat with people. I also helped at 
a local mobile phone shop, giving me access to the first-hand material of the local 
mobile phone market and the opportunity to know a lot of customers. On top of 
this, to avoid unnecessary suspicion, balance in different social networks had to 
                                                     
24 Many real stories in this book were collected in such a way. However, it will be highly 
unlikely that the reader can recognise the person involved, given the high degree of 
anonymity. 
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be carefully maintained. Few factory workers knew I had a good relationship with 
their bosses, and factory owners and senior managers did not know that I was 
very close to their workers. I helped with a birthday dinner for a factory girl with 
her big family within the budget of 400 RMB (US $67). I also helped with a 
birthday party at a luxury hotel for the factory owner’s daughter, hosting more 
than 200 guests, with the budget of 100,000 RMB (US $16,667). 
In terms of quantitative data, questionnaires25 were conducted online and 
offline. The problem in practice was unwillingness and inability to complete a 
questionnaire. For most people a formal academic questionnaire was challenging 
and even intimidating, given the limited education they had received.26 Thus 
questionnaires were usually finished helped by my explanations in colloquial 
language. In general research inquiries were integrated in casual chatting both 
online and offline, situations in which real thoughts were more likely to be 
revealed.  
Naturally an ethnography about social media was also conducted through 
social media. First of all, thousands of postings on social media profiles are vivid, 
original records of people’s thoughts and living experiences. For this reason, 
Chapter 3 is devoted to a discussion and analysis of the actual postings we find 
on personal social media profiles. This is not just a place of observation, however, 
but also one of engagement. In the field site, social life usually took place in noisy 
and public environments such as restaurants or open air markets. There are very 
few places which allow for relatively private, ‘one-to-one’ talks. Social media thus 
                                                     
25  During the fieldwork nine different surveys, standard or semi-structured, were 
conducted. The scale of various surveys ranges between c. 100–350 persons. See the first 
round and the most standard demographic survey at the Appendix 2. 
26 The averaged education level is below middle school. 
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became the place I talked with people privately about personal feelings and 
problems. Furthermore, social media helped me to overcome the communicative 
problem caused by the high geographic mobility of migrant workers. In 2014, after 
the Chinese New Year break, almost one-third of the factory workers I had got to 
know did not come back. A few women got married and stayed in their home 
villages, but most of the workers simply got a new job in a different factory town 
or city. In the factory where I stayed, half of the factory workers were newly 
recruited. In such a situation, social media became almost the only way in which 
I could retain contact with former factory worker friends. 
In addition to the ethnography in the factory town, in July 2014 I spent one 
month in Shanghai – the closest metropolis, a few hours away by train. I went 
there to conduct surveys and in-depth interviews among the urban Chinese. The 
trip to Shanghai was actually inspired by people in my field site. In the late stages 
of my research, the powerful longing to become urban and modern among 
migrant workers, clearly reflected in their social media postings, prompted me to 
have a look at the way in which urban Chinese use social media. In many ways 
the use of social media among this ‘control group’ in Shanghai27 presented a 
contrast with rural migrant usage of social media, which helped to resolve other 
questions – such as whether certain uses of social media are better explained in 
terms of the specific population or the social media platform, or both. 
On a last note, I also applied my artistic skills to record the ﬁeld work. As I 
became involved in this work, I decided to express my experience of being an 
ethnographer through a series of paintings. Using classical calligraphy, I wrote 
                                                     
27 In Shanghai 39 in-depth interviews were conducted. Access was gained to 109 personal 
social media profiles of people in Shanghai, for the purpose of analysing social media 
behaviour.  
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the ethnographic field notes that explain the scene or portrait that I painted. The 
result shows how a new form of 'fusion’ painting, that combines classical and 
contemporary art traditions, is able to express not only the fusion that 
corresponds to the changed lives of my informants, but also my personal 
experience as an ethnographer documenting these radical transformations in 
people’s lives. 
 All of the traditional Chinese paintings and translations of the calligraphy 
can be found at the ‘visual ethnography’ website.28 At the core of my work 'visual 
ethnography' is a traditional unfolding 'book’ called ‘field note’ that displays the 
ways in which I conducted field work and collected various data.29  
 
1. 2. 4 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 1 outlines the social context of the rural-to-urban migration which paves 
the way for further discussion of specific situations in the following chapters. As 
the opening chapter, chapter 1 also situates the thesis within the ‘objectification’ 
approach of understanding the dialectical and dynamic relationship between 
social relations and technology, where ‘holistic contextualisation’ is regarded the 
principal epistemology. Furthermore, participant-observation as the main 
anthropological data collection method applied in this research is introduced as it 
provides the basic methodology for the field work. The last part of this chapter 
depicts the field site where I conducted 15-months of field work, which situates 
the subjects of this thesis in their offline living environment.  
                                                     
28 http://www.visualethnographyxy.co.uk 
29 See this painting book ‘field note’ at the Appendix 3. 
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Chapter 2 moves to the online living environment of the subjects of this 
thesis where a detailed description of the Chinese social media landscape and 
the budget smartphone market is given. Equipped with illustrations of 
screenshots of different functions of the two dominant Chinese social media 
platforms, QQ and WeChat, the main body of Chapter 2 provides a panoramic 
overview of the material/ technological environment on which the use of Chinese 
social media is based. Chapter 2 is essential to the analyses and arguments in 
the subsequent chapters as such technology affordance of QQ and WeChat 
allows all the possible ways of applying social media in people’s daily life.   
Chapter 3 focuses on what people post on their personal social media 
proﬁles –  thus opening a window on to individuals’ aspirations and anxieties, 
expectations and social lives. The visual analysis in Chapter 3 is structured in a 
systematic way so that it is easy to follow the different genres of rural migrants’ 
social media postings. Based on the same system of visual analysis, in the end 
of Chapter 3, a comparison between two different social groups, rural migrants 
and middle-class citizens of Shanghai, is presented to showcase the striking 
features of the social media postings of rural migrants. 
 Chapter 3 highlights the explanatory capability of visual content on social 
media, and such argument is further elaborated in Chapter 4 where, in the light 
of the practice of Chinese folk religion, the efficacy of social media posting is 
examined. Chapter 4 is an example of the benefits of the ‘holistic 
contextualisation’ drawn from classic anthropologic field work. That is, the inquiry 
about Chinese folk beliefs and folk tales, which seemingly bear no relevance to 
digital technology, actually offers an explanation to the specific use of social 
media.    
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Chapter 5 maps out social life on social media, exploring in detail the ways 
in which people navigate various relationships. Why, for example, are 
classmates, neighbours and colleagues valued less than strangers online? Why 
and how does the mediation of social media constitute a ‘purer’ interpersonal 
relationship? The discussion in Chapter 5 depicts a comprehensive picture of the 
situation that the use of social media is deeply embedded in rural migrants’ social 
life and the social norms about the ‘appropriate use’ of social media have 
emerged very fast. 
Based on the discussion of the social life in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 provides 
a more detailed examination of the new generation of rural migrants. The 
importance of the understanding of young rural migrants and their use of social 
media in this thesis is based on the following two key aspects:   First,  this new  
generation constitutes the majority of the population studied in this thesis;  
compared to previous generations, this new generation possess many novel 
features which cannot be covered by a more general examination of the social 
group of rural migrants as a whole; Second, in many ways, this new generation 
of rural migrants takes its new form alongside the evolving use of social media, 
with the implication that the study of the use of social media amongst the new 
generation sheds light on both the nature of new generation of rural migrants and 
the nature of Chinese social media. 
Chapter 7 focuses upon the speciﬁc impact of social media on politics and 
gender, both closely examined through the online and offline behaviour of 
different groups of local people. Finally, Chapter 8 further explores how we can 
make sense of the dialectical relationship between ‘online’ and ‘offline’ – from 
postings of deity images to bring good fortune or QQ homeland albums, which in 
47 
 
a way ‘transport’ people’s home villages to their online profiles, to ‘recording the 
youth’ in salon photography or other forms of practising a modern life online. An 
understanding of people’s struggles and their negotiation between online and 
offline leads to one of the main arguments of this thesis: that a dual migration is 
taking place simultaneously in the daily life of Chinese rural migrants –  one from 
rural to urban, the other from offline to online. 
 
1. 3 The field site: GoodPath town 
1. 3. 1 The choice of the field site and a brief introduction 
Most of the research and reports about Chinese rural migrants focuses on the 
‘ﬁrst tier’ cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (Qiu, 2009; Wallis, 
2013; Wu et al., 2014). However, the 2013 national survey on ‘ﬂoating 
populations’30 showed that 47 per cent of Chinese rural migrants work and live in 
small and medium- sized towns. In this sense, the choice of GoodPath,31 a small 
factory town in Zhejiang province, is an effort to fill this gap in the research of 
Chinese rural migrants.  
Zhejiang Province not only boasts the second highest migrant rate in 
China,32 but also plays a leading role in China’s market-orientated economic 
reforms in the past 30 years – private middle and small businesses account for 
                                                     
30 The 2013 Report of Chinese floating population development (2013 zhongguo liudong renkou 
fazhan baogao). 
http://www.moh.gov.cn/ldrks/s7847/201309/12e8cf0459de42c981c59e827b87a27c.shtml 
31 As required by ERC research ethical guideline, the real name of the field site is anonymised. 
‘GoodPath’ is a pseudonym. The same principle is also applied to the names of all the informants 
mentioned in this thesis. 
32 Economist, ‘We like to move it move it’25/02/2012. 
http://www.economist.com/node/21548277 (accessed June 2013) 
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more than 90 per cent of Zhejiang’s economy (Law 2012), which has created the 
‘Zhejiang economic miracle’. Rural migrants in GoodPath account for two-thirds 
of the resident population (totally around 62,000). Such high rate of rural migrant 
population also presents GoodPath as an ideal site for this research.  
Many rural migrants chose to come to GoodPath because of the job 
opportunities introduced by fellow villagers or relatives. Here 79 per cent of local 
rural migrants live with at least one family member, with only around 5 per cent 
living alone.33  On the one hand, these figures are consistent with the 2013 
Chinese national census of domestic migration, which shows that across China 
70 per cent of rural migrants live with at least one family member.34  These 
numbers reject the cliché of Chinese rural migrants being totally isolated in their 
new locations.  
In GoodPath people do come and leave, day in and day out. GoodPath 
town for them is indeed a ‘path’ rather than a destination. Although others have 
talked of the town as a destination point, it is more accurately a ‘transitional’ place 
connecting village and city (Saunders, 2010). The town itself is not an enclave in 
a city, but a rural place in the process of ‘becoming’ urban.  
As a ‘transitional’ place, GoodPath provides everything for rural migrants 
— except the sense of belonging. ‘It (GoodPath) is just where I work … of course 
it’s not a home. Home is where you go back once a year to celebrate Chinese 
New Year.’ Guo Biao, 49, lived with the whole family in GoodPath. His three adult 
                                                     
33 Data from the local statistical bureau (accessed June 2013). 
34 The 2013 Chinese national census of domestic migration. http:// www.moh.gov.cn/ 
zhuzhan/ xwfbh/ 201309/ 12e8cf0459de42c981c59e827b87a27c.shtml (accessed 7 
October 2015). 
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children work in two different factories. GoodPath for him is still by no means 
‘home’, even though he has spent a good deal of time here.  
GoodPath has a long history as an agricultural village which dates back to 
the Tang Dynasty (610–907 BC). However, as a factory town it is very young. It 
was only in 2004 that the local government decided to develop industry. A decade 
of industrialisation has turned 76 per cent of the farm land in the centre area of 
GoodPath into 61 massive factories and 224 related companies. In 2004 
agriculture contributed 89.2 per cent of GoodPath’s GDP; in 2013 this figure has 
shrunk to 12.7 per cent.35 The population density of GoodPath has also jumped 
to 1,341 persons per km², compared to 142 per km² for China as a whole and 
255 per km² for the UK.  
Like many other Chinese ‘urban villages’, newly developed in the process 
of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation (Hao et al., 2013), the economic and 
social development in GoodPath is unbalanced. The co-existing urban and rural 
elements manifest themselves in complicated, often conflicting ways. The 
changes served to disrupt the existing social order; crime rates shot up and living 
conditions deteriorated, with local people blaming rural migrant workers for all the 
troubles. 36  The majority of rural migrants in GoodPath came from the least 
developed rural areas in inland China. Around 36 per cent of rural migrants came 
from villages in Guizhou, the province with the lowest GDP in China; 19 per cent 
Yunnan; 17 per cent Jiangxi; 13 per cent Guangxi, 8 per cent Anhui, 4 per cent 
                                                     
35 Data from the local statistical bureau (accessed June 2013). 
36 A similarly disordered situation was also observed in cities such as Beijing. See Zhang, L. 2001. 
‘Contesting Crime, Order and Migrant Spaces in Beijing.’ Nancy N. et al., eds. China Urban: 
Ethnographies of Contemporary Culture. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 201–27. 
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Shanxi, and 3 per cent from various other provinces.37 In GoodPath there is a 
very limited social bonding between local people and rural migrants. 72 per cent 
of rural migrants reported38 that they had no communication with local people 
apart from functional relationships such as ‘shop owner/customer’, 
‘landlord/tenant’ and ‘factory manager/factory worker’.  
The social and economic transformation of GoodPath described above 
has been taking place gradually. However, the change in this small factory town’s 
appearance seems to have happened overnight. During my stay in GoodPath, an 
advanced cinema which can show 3D movies popped up in the first six months.  
On the one side of a busy national motorway there is a freight parking lot, and on 
the other side, a large shopping mall with an advertising pillar like London’s Big 
Ben rose from the ground (Fig. 1.1). On the front facade of the mall a huge 
advertising hoarding depicts a foreign woman holding a box of Häagen-Dazs ice-
cream. A slogan beside the billboard recommends ‘keeping up with the world’ (yu 
shijie tongbu). Together with the heavy trucks and the long-distance minibus, the 
massive industrial area seems to give concrete form to the numerous abstract 
forces driving China’s ‘reform and opening-up policy’ over the last three decades 
– especially globalisation, migration and commercialisation. 
                                                     
37 Data from the local statistical bureau of floating population management (accessed 
May 2014). 
38 Data from a survey of 238 rural migrants and 75 local people conducted in GoodPath 
in June 2014. The survey was conducted via social media and all the informants were 
researcher’ social media contacts. 
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Fig. 1.1 The varied scenes of a freight parking area, farmland and a modern shopping mall in 
GoodPath 
   
The following section seeks to capture a greater awareness of GoodPath, 
a place within which all these transitions and transformations occur. ‘Walking’ 
around in the town and ‘talking’ with people as an ethnographer usually does may 
be the best way to get familiar with the town and its people, and so understand 
better all the stories in this thesis. A map of the town centre is to given (Fig. 1.2) 
to help anchor the discussion in this particular place. 
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Fig. 1.2 A map of GoodPath town  
 
1. 3. 2 A tour of GoodPath  
[The first stop: the high street] 
A mere country road a decade ago, the high street today has more than 100 
shops lining both sides. Along with the development of the factories, the local 
government repaved the road and sold the land on both sides to property 
developers to build residential buildings, four or five stories in height, with shop 
fronts. The high street is not a high-end market as most shops are dealing with 
useful household items and men’s and women’s clothes and shoes, as well as 
hairdressers and digital devices. As you walk along the street, all of one’s senses 
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are overwhelmed: loud music, bright colours, strong scents, flavours of food, and 
people everywhere.  
Even at first glance something is striking about the people here: young 
people and children are in the majority, and people seem to like being in groups. 
Around 22 per cent39 of the pedestrians are babies and children under the age of 
15; only 3 per cent of them are elderly; 79 per cent are walking in groups, and 38 
per cent of the adults are accompanied by children. One thing that distinguishes 
rural migrants from local residents is that many of them are young parents with 
more than one child, in apparent contradiction to the Chinese one-child family 
plan policy.40  This in turn explains the ‘graffiti’ on the whitewashed mortar walls 
of lanes off the main street. These graffiti are actually mobile phone numbers 
offering to provide all kinds of fake authorisations. One of them is ‘birth 
permission’ (zhun sheng zheng). Under Chinese family planning regulations, a 
pregnant woman will be turned down by a hospital unless she can show a birth 
permission document. Nor can a baby born without ‘birth permission’ be given a 
hukou, creating all kinds of problems in future life. For people employed in the 
public sector (government administration, education, hospitals, etc.), having more 
than one child will result in the loss of one’s job and income, a penalty imposed 
on unplanned birth (chao sheng). People who work in the private sector may not 
lose their jobs, but they still need to pay a huge fine 41  to obtain a ‘birth 
permission’. In rural areas, however, people are allowed to have a second child 
                                                     
39 Data collected by researcher by counting several hundred passers-by at various times 
(8am, 11am, 5pm, 9pm) on the high street in May 2014. 
40 See further discussion of China’s one-child policy at Greenhalgh, S. 2003. ‘Planned 
births, unplanned persons: “Population” in the making of Chinese modernity.’ American 
Ethnologist. 30(2): 196–215. 
41 The penalty varies in line with the economic development of different regions. Usually 
it is more than a couple’s annual income, sometimes few multiples of this. 
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if the first one is a girl. A decade ago, when ‘one-child’ policy was carried out 
strictly, rural mothers had to give birth in secret (tou sheng) to avoid the penalties 
imposed on unplanned births. ‘Years ago they [local officials] would chase you to 
the end of the earth if they know you have a baby hidden elsewhere, but now 
they can’t be bothered,’ explained Ma, a factory worker aged 29. His three young 
children were born in three different factory towns. 
On the high street, there is a mobile phone shop called ‘Wan Hua China 
Mobile Franchise mobile phone shop’.42  From time to time I helped at the shop. 
Wan Hua, the middle-aged owner, is a typical smart, shrewd and very hard-
working local man; he opens the shop at 6:30 am and closes at 10:30pm, seven 
days a week, 12 months a year, except for a ten-day break at Chinese New Year. 
Behind piles of mobile phone boxes, a double bed where Wan Hua and his wife 
sleep during the night. In the front of the shop is parked a brand new Ford car. 
Although he has little reason to drive, the car means a lot to Wan Hua. ‘It’s all 
about face (mianzi), you know. If I can’t even afford a car, people will think I am 
doing badly!’ As Wan Hua said, the concept of ‘face’ is truly important, important 
for understanding some aspects of social media use later in the thesis. Mianzi, 
known as ‘Chinese face’, is a sophisticated, self-conscious feeling with regard to 
                                                     
42 This kind of mobile phone shops are a privately-owned agency of China mobile, the 
biggest telecom company in China. Usually shops of this kind are named after the owner. 
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the opinions of others. It is a typical ‘front-stage’43 behaviour whose goal is to 
establish a particular favourable image in front of others.44  
[The second stop: Zhao village] 
Zhao village is a slum right in the heart of GoodPath, besieged by concrete 
residential buildings. The former busy pathway into the village is now an empty 
lane with scattered funeral supplies stores and blacksmith’s shops (Fig. 1.3).  
 
Fig. 1.3 The Old Street in Zhao village, GoodPath town (traditional Chinese painting 82 × 34.5 
cm; painter: Xinyuan Wang) 
Old people, the only local residents who continue living in this area, sit in 
bamboo chairs outside their front doors, looking at the world in which they no 
longer play a part. Nowadays their neighbours are often strangers who speak 
                                                     
43  Front-stage behaviour, is first suggested by sociologist Erving Goffman in his 
Dramaturgical model of social life. According to Goffman, social interaction is like a 
theater, and people are like actors on a stage, each playing a variety of roles. In social 
interaction, like in theatrical performance, front-stage behaviour is what actors do when 
they know they are being watched. Thus front-stage behaviour depends on the audience 
and is open to judgment by those who observe it. See detailed discussion of front-stage 
behaviour in Goffman, E. 1990. The Presentation of Self in everyday Life. London: 
Penguin. 
44 See detailed discussion of mianzi in Hwang, K. 1987. ‘Face and Favor: The Chinese 
Power Game.’ The American Journal of Sociology 92(4): 944–74. 
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totally different dialects. After a century’s wind and rain, most of the wood 
buildings previously owned by local wealthy families are in poor condition; they 
are occupied by around 300 rural migrant households. Few toilets and no proper 
rubbish bins exist, with the result that everywhere has become a possible toilet 
or rubbish bin. The rural migrants who live here are regarded the poorest, those 
unable to afford a better room. Rent for rooms in these those old wooden houses 
is 50 RMB (around US $8) per month, only one quarter of the cost of a room in 
concrete residential buildings.  
Located in long and narrow lanes, few illicit minibus service branches are 
the busiest area. Minibuses run from GoodPath to around 70 counties in Guizhou, 
the poorest inland Chinese province from which almost half of the rural migrants 
in GoodPath originate. Given the fact that the central provincial coach stations 
provide services to only two counties in Guizhou, GoodPath’s transport capability 
clearly reflects the high mobility of its population and the rural migrant 
population’s link with Guizhou province. Along with many declining villages in 
Chinese factory towns, Zhao village resembles a large, withered tree. The birds 
that used to live on its branches have left, one by one; only old birds who cannot 
fly any more remain. Gradually the tree becomes a big trunk of standing wood, 
covered by thick moss. Yet when you look at it closely, you are amazed at the 
diversity of creatures still living on the tree.  
[The third stop: peasant flats (nongmin fang) in the new villages] 
If Zhao village is a large, withered tree, then on the other side of the high street, 
in the new villages, are the clusters of trees in which most immigrant ‘birds’ dwell. 
Rural migrants account for two-third of the total number of GoodPath’s residents. 
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All the buildings are concrete houses, three to five stories in height, built in the 
past 15 years by the local peasants, from which derives the name nongmin fang 
(peasant flat). 
 
‘The reason for a five-floor house is mainly because my parents tried to 
build a taller building than our neighbours. Well it’s about mianzi. Now 
thanks to those migrant workers, all vacant rooms are full.’ Mr. Fan said. 
 
Mr. Fan’s family had built one of these buildings, in which eight rural migrant 
families now live. Chun’s family from Jiangxi province is one of them. In the corner 
of the room (Fig. 1.4) a pile of unpacked luggage seemed to indicate that the 
family is about to move out, or arrived only yesterday. Actually Chun has lived 
here for eight months.  
 
Fig. 1.4 Peasant ﬂats in the new villages 
 
A yard outside provides an extended living space. Here women cook in 
the open air on simple stoves; young men play cards around a short table; young 
mothers gossip with their female friends while breastfeeding their babies; children 
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play at hiding and chasing each other behind strings on which their neighbours’ 
underwear hangs. Many ‘indoor’ activities take place outside – not only because 
there is simply not enough room inside, but also because these residents, who 
came from a rural area, like to maintain their habit of ‘living in public’. 
[The fourth stop: the digital centre] 
Adjacent to the bustling new villages, the digital centre is another place full of life 
and colour (Fig. 1.5). The centre is a collection of 24 shops dealing with mobile 
phones, digital products and other digital services, for example digital 
photographic studios. Displays of newly launched mobile phones or internet 
payment structures are everywhere. One can find a range of smartphones 
varying from 300 RMB (US $45) to 4,000 RMB (US $600), as well as easy to use 
mobile phones for elderly citizens featuring larger buttons and louder sound (Fig. 
1.6).  
 
Fig. 1.5 The local digital centre                              Fig. 1.6 Mobile phones for elderly citizens 
 
Since early 2013 rural migrants have dramatically boosted the 
consumption of smartphones, especially budget smartphones. Ma Yu, a mobile 
phone dealer, rightly spotted the trend of smartphone use among rural migrants: 
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‘95 per cent of budget smartphones were sold to local rural migrants. 
Those rural migrants know clearly what they want … they care about the 
memory card, the quality of the mobile phone camera, and whether it can 
play games, take videos, etc.’  
 
For rural migrants, a smartphone has become the ‘everyday essential’ since it is 
their only private access to the internet and all the digital entertainment to be 
found there. Where demand exists, a market will supply. Cheap digital content is 
also available in the digital centre. For 5 RMB (less than US $1), you can get 50 
music tracks, while 10 RMB will buy you five full-length films. Catalogue books 
for music tracks, smartphone pictures and films pile up on tables for consumers 
to select their purchases. All the content is smartphone-friendly; in most cases, 
people bring their smartphone to the shop and download content directly from the 
shop owner’s computer. Mr. Zhu, a shopkeeper selling digital products, explained 
why the digital content business is profitable: ‘Most of them [rural migrants] don’t 
have a PC and they usually don’t have broadband at home, so they are willing to 
pay a bit money to buy them here.’ 
[The fifth stop: factory plants] 
From the digital centre, cross a provincial motorway to reach the industrial area 
of GoodPath. Here are more than 60 factories, many less than eight years old, 
though still older than the newly planted trees along the roads. The small trees 
and roads of equal width, with road signs marked in Arabic numerals, combine 
with the identical factories to give the whole area a bland uniformity.   
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These factories are massive. Each plant covers around 8,000 m², and 
holds 700–1,000 factory workers. Even in daytime there was no natural light 
inside the factory plants, and the air was full of incessant loud machine noise and 
pungent smells of paint. Steel is one of the main raw materials. Everyday 
hundreds of rolls of steel plate were shipped to the factory, where usually one 
worker worked with one machine to cut the original material into various shapes. 
The logic of the assembly line is ‘humankind as a part of the machine’, and the 
noise and the relentless assembly line certainly deprives people from any 
possibility of conversation (Fig. 1.7). There is only limited automation here: labour 
remains cheaper than a fully-automatic production line. Following the pre-set 
machine pace, a factory worker repeats his or her action roughly 20,000 times 
per day.  
 
Fig. 1.7 Scene from the assembly line in a factory plant 
Jing, a 19-year-old factory worker on an assembly line, told me the trick of 
‘not missing one punch’ is to ‘forget yourself’. ‘If you think things, your hands will 
slow down and you can’t follow the machine,’ she explained. Yet it is important to 
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recognise that these factory workers do have options. After working at the factory 
for three months Jing got fed up. She then left her job and found a new one as a 
shop assistant in an accessories shop on the high street.  
Labour work in a factory is divided into assembly line and heavy manual 
labour. Women are always welcomed as factory workers, since they are regarded 
dexterous, attentive and obedient. Compared to manual heavy labour, assembly 
line work is relatively light and dominated by women. Given the mechanisation 
taking place in the factories, more and more heavy manual labour will be replaced 
by the assembly line. As a result, young women can find a job easily in GoodPath, 
whereas young men find it more difficult to get a job, especially if they do not want 
to do the heavy manual labour. In the factories Jing earned 3,500 RMB (US $583) 
per month if she worked ten hours per day, 29 days per month. On the accessory 
shop on high street, by contrast, her month salary is 2,500RMB (US $417).  
‘They [factory managers] like young women to work on the assembly line 
you know; they thought we were obedient (ting hua) and attentive (zi xi). 
Young women are the best. Men are nothing compared to us. But it’s so 
tiring working in the factories. I prefer to work at here [the accessories 
shop] even though I earn less.’ 
Jing is typical of a new generation of rural migrants. She dropped out of middle 
school after a big row with close friends at school. At that time all she wanted to 
see the outside world, to escape. School was boring, and she felt lonely since her 
parents and all her relatives had left the villages to work in factories. Jing did not 
think twice before joining them. For Jing the job hopping from the factory to the 
accessory shop offered her a better chance to prepare herself to become an 
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articulate, fashionable urban citizen. The older generation shared the common 
Chinese aspirations based on achievement through education and hard work, but 
Jing’s generation pride themselves on ‘playing it cool’ and the motivation driving 
migration is more about a chance to see the world (Hu, 2012). The new 
generation change jobs more often than the old generation, and are more 
selective about jobs (Fan & Chen, 2014).  
[The end of the tour] 
We have looked around GoodPath, and what we have seen in the town centre 
has set the context for exploring social media usage in later chapters. As a result 
of this tour it should be clear why it would be quite misleading to imagine this 
thesis as simply situated in ‘China’. Rather we should start with a very open mind 
as to who these people might be, and not make assumptions about their values 
or concerns. 
As we shall see, this new generation of rural migrants are very different 
from their parents; they are motivated more by interest and have stronger 
aspirations to ‘see the outside world’. This very particular population has emerged 
as working adults alongside the rise of new media and social media in China. So 
this thesis is not about how a given population take up and appropriate this new 
media. It rather considers a situation in which a population that never previously 
existed assumes its new form very much under the influence of the capacities 
they find in smartphones and social media. Social media in turn can only be 
appreciated if we understand the very dynamic context within which it is being 
formed. 
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Chapter 2 
The Social media landscape in China 
 
 
2. 0 Introduction  
On 20 September 1987 the first ever email in China read: ‘Across the Great Wall 
we can reach every corner in the world.’ (FlorCruz & Seu, 2014) Compared to the 
brick-and-mortar Great Wall, the Chinese internet ‘Great Firewall’ (fanghuo 
qiang) is actually the more difficult for people to climb (Clayton et al., 2006; 
Deibert, 2002). To this day China has completely blocked the world’s four most 
visited websites: Google, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. Yet it is by no means 
a desert in the social media landscape. As well as possessing the world’s biggest 
internet user base (649 million) 45 ,China also has the world’s most active 
environment for social media. Of the online population of China 91 per cent has 
a social media account, compared to 67 per cent of people in the US (Chiu et al., 
2012). In practice, most Chinese netizens do not really notice the absence of 
global internet applications because they have accustomed themselves to 
indigenous websites; there is no particular sense of an absent ‘outside’.  
Far from being a desert, therefore, mainland China is a thriving rainforest 
which grows its own diverse and unique social media ‘species’. The discussion 
of Chinese social media in this chapter begins with a brief introduction to Chinese 
internet development. It then moves on to consider the main features of Chinese 
                                                     
45 The 35th CNNIC statistical report on Internet Development in China. 2015. 
http://www1.cnnic.cn/AU/MediaC/rdxw/2015n/201502/t20150204_51650.htm  (accessed 
October 2015). 
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social media platforms, followed by a discussion of smartphones as the main 
digital device from which people gain access to social media.  
 
2. 1 A brief history of Chinese ICTs development46  
In 1978 China embarked upon a massive economic reform. The country’s 
leadership realised that modern China had to seize the opportunities of the 
‘revolution in information technology’ (Qiang, 2007) taking place in the rest of the 
world. Modernisation of technology was included in the national development 
goal of ‘Four Modernisations’ (sige xiandaihua) in 1978. In fact, ‘sponsor’ is more 
like the role played by the Chinese government in the development of ICTs. Using 
its administrative power and allocating national resources, the state made a 
remarkable effort to develop China into a technological superpower (Dai, 2003). 
Chinese policy makers have been using the internet to achieve a ‘digital leapfrog’ 
of economic development (Hughes & Wacker, 2003).  
The explosive growth of digital development has contributed significantly 
to the modernisation of China, which in turn legitimated the regime of the Chinese 
Communist Party (Lieberthal & Burns, 1995). In 2003 China became the world’s 
largest telephone market, and in 2008 the number of Chinese internet users 
became the largest in the world. China had also overtaken the US by that date 
as the world’s biggest supplier of information technology goods (Zhang & Zheng, 
2009). Probably because of the huge concern and interest in the single issue of 
Chinese internet censorship, there has been a reluctance to acknowledge the 
crucial role played by the central government – and also by local bureaucrats – 
                                                     
46 ICTs: abbreviation for information and communication technology. 
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in achieving this extraordinarily rapid shift to an efficient and widespread 
information technology sector (Li & Shiu, 2012).  
 
 
 
The timeline (Fig. 2.1) shows the development of the principal Chinese internet 
applications in comparison with their global counterparts. As can be seen, QQ 
started five years earlier than Facebook. Yet viewing QQ in the context of a 
comparative global social media study risks reducing QQ to being purely ‘social 
media’. The first very important reminder, therefore, is that QQ is not a Chinese 
Fig. 2.1 The timeline of internet applications, both inside and outside China  
Logos (left to right): [upper line] MSN (1995), eBay (1997), Google (1999), Skype (2003), LinkedIn 
(2003), Facebook (2004), YouTube (2004), Twitter (2005), What’s App (2009), Instagram (2010), 
Google+ (2011), SnapChat (2011); [lower line] QQ (1999), Tianya BBS (1999), Baidu (2000), 
Taobao (2003), Renren (2005), YouKu (2005), Tudou (2005), Douban (2005), Kaixin (2008), YY 
(2008), Sina Weibo (2009), WeChat (2011), MoMo (2011),  Meipai (2014). 
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version of Facebook. It is also quite common to see the social media site ‘Renren’ 
described by Western media as the Chinese version of Facebook. This is 
misleading, however, because in terms of popularity, Renren’s market share is 
not comparable. The chart (Chart 2.1) shows the monthly active users (MAU) of 
different social media platforms inside and outside China. Even though Chinese 
social media platforms share a limited international market, QQ has 843 million 
MAU — more than half of Facebook’s global users. Having explored the policy 
and company background, the following section will consider in more detail the 
three most popular Chinese social media platforms among people in GoodPath. 
 
Chart 2.147 Numbers of active monthly users of main social media platforms 
                                                     
47 Figure of MAU of QQ and Qzone: http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/10928/renren-q3-
2014/; WeChat: https://www.techinasia.com/wechat-650-million-monthly-active-users/; 
SinaWeibo: http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/14371/weibo-q2-2015/; Renren: 
http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/10928/renren-q3-2014/; Facebook: 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-
worldwide/; WhatsApp: http://www.statista.com/statistics/260819/number-of-monthly-active-
whatsapp-users/; Twitter: http://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-of-monthly-active-
twitter-users/  
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2. 2 QQ: The biggest social media platform  
In 1999 the Chinese central government launched a ‘Government online project’ 
(zhengfu shangwang gongcheng) which urged all levels of administration to set 
up their portal websites.48 In response to the project, the local government of 
GoodPath purchased a computer. However, the problem was that neither local 
officials nor residents found any use for it, even though many villagers felt the 
purchase boosted morale, as one of them recalled: 
 
Officials claimed that the computer marked the moment that our town had 
entered the high-technology age. Well, to be honest, you just heard so, but 
didn't really think about what that meant exactly. At least, that sounds 
exciting … it was like our folk saying: ‘Even though you have never tasted 
pork, at least you have seen a pig running’ (mei chiguo zhurou, zongsuan 
jianguo zhu pao).                                                
 
GoodPath’s ‘high-tech pig’ lay gathering dust for almost 8 
years until one day people found it was too old to run. For 
most people in this small town, the gap between the ‘national 
policy’ and ‘daily life’ remained unchanged until a penguin 
wearing a scarf walked into their life. The penguin (Fig. 2.2) 
is the mascot of Chinese ICTs giant company Tencent.  
 
                                                     
48 See Xinhua news, ‘Chinese government online’, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-
06/08/c_12195450.htm (accessed on Oct 2015) 
Fig. 2.2 The mascot of QQ 
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2. 2. 1 Introduction of QQ 
In 1998 HuaTeng Ma, a young software developer, set up a software company 
called Tencent, and his first product was ‘QQ’,49 a free instant message (IM) 
service. Nowadays, in terms of numbers of users, QQ is the unquestionably the 
biggest social media platform in China. Besides IM, Qzone (QQ kongjian) is 
another important part of QQ digital service. Strictly speaking Qzone, 50  the 
personal social networking platform on which users update statuses, write blogs 
and upload and share articles, photographs, music and videos with online 
contacts, is the social media platform usually compared with Facebook. For non- 
QQ users, QQ is truly different from other social media platforms in many ways. 
Five concepts will be used to consider the striking features of QQ: 1) high degree 
of anonymity; 2) high media convergence; 3) high customisation; 4) rich visuals; 
and 5) hierarchical structure. 
A QQ account is actually a string of figures generated by the system, 
usually called a ‘QQ number’ (QQ hao). Users can choose any nickname they 
like for their ‘QQ name’ (QQ ming). Real names are very rarely used for QQ 
names, and usually a QQ name does not even look like a traditional ‘name’. In 
many cases, people use a sentence such as ‘I am crying with a smile’ or ‘soaring 
in the blue sky’ as their QQ names. Exchanging one’s QQ details always refers 
to exchanging the ‘QQ number’ rather than ‘QQ name’, as the QQ number will 
always remain the same. Young people frequently change their QQ names; 
                                                     
49 The name ‘QQ’ actually arrived two years later. When Tencent company first released the IM 
software its original name was ‘OICQ’. This was soon accused of infringement by ICQ, the first 
instant messaging program for personal computers developed in the mid-1990s.  
50 In 2015 second quarter, the number of active monthly users of Qzone was 659 million. 
http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/14304/wechat-maus-reached-600-million-in-q2-2015/ 
(accessed October 2015) 
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during my research I had to make a note and ‘rename’ all my QQ contacts on my 
list so that I could recognise the users.51 In GoodPath 98 per cent of QQ users 
did not use their real names as QQ names; 64 per cent did not use real 
photographs as QQ avatars (profile pictures). The anonymity of profiles was 
slightly lower, but still very high among QQ users in Shanghai, where 95 per cent 
of QQ users do not use real names, and 50 per cent did not use a real photograph 
for their QQ avatar.52  
                                                     
51 The renamed QQ number on contact lists does not change, even though the contact changes 
his or her QQ name.  
52 Data collected from 49 people in Shanghai and 205 rural migrants in GoodPath.  
Fig. 2.3 The main body of the QQ menu bar 
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The main feature of the QQ ‘menu bar’ is a contact list, with other add-on 
functions. In contrast to Facebook, which does not highlight ‘contacts curation’, 
QQ strongly guides users to sort out their contacts into different categories. The 
default categories of QQ contacts are ‘Friends’, ‘Family’, ‘Classmate’, ‘Work 
colleague’, ‘Strangers’ and ‘Black list’; users can always rename the categories. 
As one can see on the menu bar (Fig 2.3), QQ offers multiple digital 
services. These include group chat (QQ group), video call, social media (Qzone), 
microblog (Tencent Weibo), email, online game, online music, and online 
shopping (QQ shop).53 Offering a whole package of digital solutions, QQ is the 
starting point for many people in China of their digital life: QQ email is the first 
email, Qzone is the first social media platform, QQ music is the first online music 
program and QQ games are the first online games. Nowadays the ‘convergence 
culture’ (Jenkins, 2006), in which previous separate multiple media technologies 
have gradually emerged into one, has become the mainstream in the West. 
However, few have acknowledged that the trajectory of digital development in 
China actually started with a high-level media convergence.    
The high customisation of QQ is well illustrated by the hundreds of 
personal webpage models, background pictures and music, and decorative 
elements offered on Qzone (Fig. 2.4), as well as thousands of online clothes and 
accessories enabling users to dress their online avatars up as they desire (Fig. 
2.5). Among hundreds of Qzones I have visited during my research, none have 
ever been identical. 
                                                     
53 Q-coin, issued by Tencent, is the payment tool for paid digital services on QQ. As a virtual 
currency, Q-coin has become increasingly accepted by online stores and gaming sites. 
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Fig. 2.5 The decoration of avatars on Qzone 
 
Customisation of digital space is actually commonplace throughout the 
Asia-Pacific region, and such a feature contributes to a far more humanised 
relationship between users and online spaces (Hjorth, 2005). One illuminating 
example on QQ is the ‘check-in’ (qian dao) service. Unlike on Facebook, where 
a check-in service allows users to mark the physical locations they are currently 
in online. the check-in service on QQ actually refers to checking into the online 
space of QQ, no matter where the users may be in the offline world. QQ offers 
different check-in stamps for users. For example, Fig. 2.6 shows the daily 
horoscope and Fig. 2.7 shows the ‘everyday wish’ stamps, offering helpful 
Fig. 2.4 The decoration home page of Qzone   
72 
 
guidance: ‘no procrastination’, ‘quit smoking’, ‘go to bed earlier’, ‘do exercise’, ‘do 
not waste food’. Xue, a 25-year-old factory officer, tried to use QQ check-in to 
quit smoking, acknowledging ‘To some extent I think it [QQ check-in] helped … 
it’s always more effective when you knew that you were being watched.’ For 
weeks Xue checked in on QQ every day, and his QQ friends would see a ‘quit 
smoking’ stamp from Xue’s news feed, which meant that he did not smoke on 
that day. 
 
  
 
The feature of ‘high customisation’ and ‘strong visuals’ are highly 
consequential. Chinese website design has been known for its richer colours and 
more complicated, cluttered layouts compared to Western websites, which value 
simplicity far more.54 On QQ the situation is the same. As one of most popular 
good wishes at Chinese New Year, niannian youyu (to have ample surplus by the 
end of every year) suggests, to have ‘more than enough’ is traditionally 
considered the lucky sign of prosperity. The principle of ‘the more, the merrier’, 
                                                     
54 See a detailed discussion of the difference between Chinese and Western website design at 
http://www.slideshare.net/cxpartners/chinese-web-design-patterns-how-and-why-theyre-
different (accessed October 2015) 
Fig. 2.6 (left) Daily horoscope as ‘check-in’ stamp on QQ  
Fig. 2.7 Daily wishes as ‘check-in’ stamps on QQ 
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frequently found on Chinese dining tables, also contributes to the ‘visual feast’ 
available on QQ.55 Unlike the white and blue uniform of Facebook, the Qzone 
interface appears much more colourful and visually rich. 
Finally, the QQ level system is another unique feature of QQ, reflecting the 
‘hierarchical structure’ feature. Launched in 2004, the QQ level system is based 
on customers’ usage time – the longer the user is signed-in on QQ, the higher 
the QQ level that can be obtained. Different QQ levels offer users different 
functions and services: the higher the level, the more online privileges users 
enjoy, such as the privilege to set up a QQ group and access to more decorative 
elements.  
 
At that time [around 2001], everybody in my middle school was crazy about 
the QQ level, people with a higher QQ level even were more likely to have 
a say … I also used all the means to gain a higher level … even today I 
have no clue of what kind of privileges I got or whether I have really used 
any of them, but at that time you just felt good about being upgraded to a 
higher level … maybe it’s just about mianzi (face).  
 
Huo, now a 26-year-old factory worker, sensed that the varied QQ levels, like all 
other systems of hierarchy, divide people into different classes; he thus felt the 
urge to gain a higher level on QQ to gain some face (mianzi), even though he 
hardly saw any instrumental value in a higher level. Huo even asked his older 
sister, who worked at a local internet café, to sign in on his QQ during the daytime 
                                                     
55 See http://www.smashingmagazine.com/2010/03/showcase-of-web-design-in-china-from-
imitation-to-innovation-and-user-centered-design/ (accessed October 2015) 
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when he had no access to the internet. Ten years ago Huo was just one of millions 
of Chinese QQ users working hard to climb the social ladder on QQ. The practice 
of signing in on QQ for as long as possible, purely for the purpose of upgrading 
to a higher level (guaji) became so popular among the population that the 
Chinese National Grid had to warn of the nationwide waste of electricity caused 
by QQ.56 In 2005 Tencent had to change the QQ upgrading algorithm to address 
such criticism. The new algorithm counts days of active usage, rather than hours, 
and two hours per day is counted as an active day of usage.57 
Besides the basic QQ level system calculated by time, users can also 
purchase different kinds of privileges or QQ VIP membership. Juan, a 20-year-
old rural migrant who worked at a local foot massage shop, bought herself a VIP 
QQ membership, which cost her around 250 RMB (US $40) for a year. As such, 
Juan’s QQ name was shown in red with a golden VIP label, and was always listed 
at the top of my QQ contact list. When asked why she wanted to spend almost 
one-tenth of her monthly salary for a VIP membership on QQ, Juan shrugged her 
shoulders: ‘I don’t know … I just feel good being a VIP’. At the foot massage shop 
where she worked, the VIP guests were usually rich factory owners – the da 
laoban (big bosses, or rich business men in general) as Juan addressed them. 
According to her, they were treated as kings. For Juan, the VIP title on QQ is the 
only affordable VIP status in her life, and it truly made her feel better about herself.  
 
At the first glance, the whole QQ level system seems simply to reflect the 
deep-rooted hierarchical social structure in Chinese social life; people seem 
                                                     
56 http://www.szlh.gov.cn/main/xwzx/bkzy/21281.shtml (accessed October 2015) 
57 http://blog.imqq.com/how-to-calculate-qq-membership-level/ (accessed February 2015) 
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intrinsically to accept the rules of the game. In practice, however, the hierarchy 
on QQ is fundamentally different from the social hierarchy in China. In offline life 
it is very difficult or almost impossible to overcome various existing inequalities 
and to reduce class differences, as the rural–urban divide, based on hukou 
household registration system (see Chapter 1) clearly demonstrates. Deep 
frustration about reality was common among rural migrant workers, especially 
young people. The older generation of migrant workers appeared to have 
accepted reality after years of ‘floating’ life; they were primarily concerned with 
how to make the best of the existing situation. The new generation was more 
likely to challenge and refuse to accept such inequalities, constantly struggling 
with the gap between dream and reality.58 Such frustration, however, does not 
exist on QQ since the rules are much simpler and more straightforward:  as long 
as one spends either money or time, success and upgrading is almost 
guaranteed. 
 
2. 2. 2 QQ, once the symbol of urban lifestyle  
 
I begged my brother to get a QQ for me. I thought it would be extremely 
difficult for our rural people to get one . . . you have to get your application 
stamped in government offices or things like that . . . anyway, now you may 
think it’s silly . . . I felt so happy and so proud of having a QQ, even though 
I didn’t have internet at home and I didn’t know what to do with it at that time. 
You know, only a few people in our village have ever heard of QQ, let alone 
used it. 
                                                     
58 See detailed analysis of the situation of the new generation of rural migrants at 
Chapter 6. 
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Da Guo, a 22- year- old factory worker, had his ﬁrst QQ nine years ago. At that 
time, he was still a schoolboy, living in a poor village in inland China and knowing 
nothing about the internet. His older brother had already worked away in cities 
for two years. During Chinese New Year when his brother came back for the 
family reunion, Da Guo heard for the ﬁrst time about the magical QQ that 
urbanites used. As Da Guo remarked, once upon a time QQ was regarded as the 
symbol of modern life, especially among people in rural areas.59  
In the early stage of internet development in China, the eastern area had 
much higher rates of internet penetration than the less developed western and 
inland regions (Li & Shiu, 2012). China’s commercial internet came into existence 
in 1995 in urban areas such as Beijing and Shanghai (Harwit & Clark, 2008), and 
was mainly used by urban elites (Tai, 2006). Due to the digital divide and other 
gaps in material life, as well as the hukou status assigned at birth, urban lifestyles 
have long been considered superior (Potter, 1983), and admired by the rural 
population (Yan, 1999). In such a context QQ, perceived as a digital privilege 
enjoyed by the urbanites, immediately gained a lofty status among the rural 
population when it first appeared in their lives. Clearly among rural young people 
such as Da Guo, the symbolic meaning of QQ out-weighted their actual use of it. 
To get a sense of how many people had a QQ before they had private access to 
the internet, a survey was conducted in September 2014 among 200 people in 
GoodPath and 48 people in Shanghai (Chart 2.2). 
                                                     
59 Communicative technology has long being regarded as playing an essential role in the 
formation of modern societies. See Thompson, J. B. 1995. Media and Modernity: A Social 
Theory of the Media. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.  
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In Chart 2.2, both in Shanghai and GoodPath, the use of QQ started before 
the ownership of personal digital devices (PC or mobile phone). In GoodPath 63 
per cent of people had QQ before the ownership of a mobile phone. QQ had been 
used for 5.8 years on average, with 11 years as the longest and 4 years as the 
shortest. It is also clear that the popularity of QQ ﬁrst started among China’s 
urban population and spread from urban to rural (the average years of use of QQ 
is 7.2 in Shanghai and 5.8 years in GoodPath). The digital gap between urban 
population and rural population in terms of ownership of digital devices seems to 
still exist, but when it comes to smartphones the gap has become less obvious. 
Despite all the disparities and differences in terms of QQ usage between 
rural migrants and residents of Shanghai, there is one common feature: after 
more than a decade of popularity among Chinese people, and despite remaining 
the biggest social media platform, QQ it has lost its ‘coolness’ and its association 
with urban life or ‘modernity’. The contrary now applies with some people even 
using terms such as ‘old friend’ or ‘hometown’ (lao jia) to describe QQ in a 
nostalgic tone. As Xu Hong, a 30-year-old factory officer, said, she would not 
leave QQ as her contact details any more since on her Qzone one may discover 
‘an immature girl of ten years ago’. However, she did not want to delete any of 
  GoodPath (small 
town) 
Shanghai (city) 
Having a QQ before having a private mobile 
phone  
63% 48% 
Ownership of Smartphone / functional mobile 
phone 
89% / 100% 98% / 100% 
Using QQ before having personal PC 96% 67% 
Ownership of PC 42% 83% 
Average year of use of QQ 5.8 7.2 
Chart 2.2 Use of QQ and ownership of digital devices in GoodPath town and Shanghai 
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the postings on her Qzone as it was always good to go back and visit her much 
younger self on QQ. For Xu Hong, her QQ has become a digital legacy.60 Among 
young rural migrants who are active QQ users, the use of QQ per se has become 
a routine of daily life. This is precisely the reason why they spend a lot of energy 
on designing and beautifying their Qzones to make them more stylish and unique 
(gexing), as being unique is still considered to be modern. Meanwhile for urban 
young people QQ has become a land of ‘hustle and bustle’, which has somehow 
become associated with rural youth culture.  
Compared to QQ, no longer associated with an urban fashion, WeChat, a 
smartphone-based messaging app launched in 2011, has become a new main 
social media platform used by urban residents. In 2015 the penetration rate of 
WeChat (the percentage of people who use WeChat at least once a week) in 
Chinese ‘first tier’ cities (Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou) had reached 93 per 
cent,61 while in small counties and fourth or fifth tier cities the figure was 26 per 
cent.62 The survey conducted during field work63 in Shanghai also illustrates the 
absolute dominance of WeChat: 86 per cent of people in Shanghai reported that 
their use of QQ had become less active since the use of WeChat. Meanwhile 95 
per cent have now switched to WeChat as the main communication tool in 
                                                     
60 In the social media age, we are the first people in history to create vast online records of our 
lives. The digital legacy is the sum of our relationship, interests and belief that people record on 
social media. See Paul-Choudhury, S. 2011. ‘Digital legacy: the fate of your online soul.’ New 
Scientist 210. 2809: 41–3. Carroll, E. and Romano, J. 2010. Your Digital Afterlife: When 
Facebook, Flickr and Twitter are Your Estate, What's Your Legacy? Berkeley, CA: New Riders. 
61 ‘2015 WeChat Impact Report’ http://www.199it.com/archives/398617.html (accessed 
October 2015)   
62 See http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/15287/wechat-users-insights-2015/ (accessed 
October 2015) 
63 A survey conducted by the author during in-depth interviews with 49 people in Shanghai in 
July 2014. 
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personal relationships. Consequently when it came to the question: ‘How would 
you react if somebody wanted to add you on QQ?’ a typical answer is that of Yi, 
30, a 30-year-old white-collar worker in a Shanghai international company: ‘If 
somebody asks for my QQ, I would be like … Are you kidding me? Can you be 
even more rustic (tu)?! … Sorry, I think we are on the same planet.’ Yi’s opinion 
about QQ actually was representative of the majority of interviewees of Shanghai. 
Of these interviewees 61 per cent, like Yi, admitted that in their eyes QQ was out 
of fashion (guoshi) or rustic (tu) , and exchanging QQ numbers in social life64 
would appear awkward.  
GoodPath also witnessed the fast growth in popularity of WeChat among 
rural migrant workers (Chart 2.3). At the beginning of the research a survey65 
shows that 19 per cent of people in GoodPath town had WeChat on their 
smartphones, whereas 96 per cent of them used QQ.  Among these only 11 per 
cent regarded themselves as active WeChat users,66 whereas 85 per cent of 
them use QQ as their main personal social media. About a year later a similar 
survey 67  shows that 65 per cent of people had installed WeChat on their 
smartphones and the rate of WeChat active users had soared to 45 per cent, 
whereas the rate of QQ’s active users had slightly reduced to around 80 per cent. 
                                                     
64 Even though it was very common to use QQ for work purposes in Shanghai since QQ works 
very well for transferring files.  
65 A survey conducted by the author in June 2013, among 205 rural migrants in GoodPath.  
66 ‘Active users’ refers to users who use WeChat or QQ more than three times per day.  
67 A survey conducted by the author in August 2014, among 119 rural migrants in GoodPath. 
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The ﬁgures above come from relatively small samples. Yet they do serve 
to showcase the different cultural capital ascribed to the use of QQ and WeChat, 
which has been conﬁrmed by the long- term ethnography. To analyse the 
difference between QQ and WeChat further, we need to have a closer look at 
WeChat ﬁrst. 
 
2. 3 WeChat: China’s favourite new social media  
Launched in 2011 by the same company that owns QQ, known in China as 
‘WeiXin’ (literally ‘micro letter’), the growth of WeChat is impressive: by November 
2015, the total of monthly active users of WeChat was 650 million, already 72 per 
cent of WhatsApp’s global achievement.68 In 2014, a survey by Global Web 
Index69 shows that WeChat is the most popular messaging app in the Asia-Pacific 
region. In terms of basic functions (Fig. 2.8), WeChat provides text messaging, 
voice messaging and video calls, as well as multimedia sharing (links, 
photographs and videos). WeChat ‘moment’ (pengyou quan) is the personal 
profile, and the WeChat subscriptions/public account (gonggong zhanghao) is 
                                                     
68 See Chart 2.1 
69 http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/10939/wechat-dominates-apac-mobile-messaging-q3-
2014/ (accessed  October 2015) 
Chart 2.3 Change in QQ and WeChat use from June 2013 to August 2014 in GoodPath 
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where users can subscribe information from more than 10 million accounts70 on 
the platform – ranging from media outlets and various institutions to personal 
blogs and more.  
 
 
Information on WeChat is storable and searchable. Users can save 
postings to their built-in WeChat files, or search for postings and conversation 
logs by key word on WeChat. In 2015 a WeChat user on average read 5.86 
articles per day; 20 per cent of WeChat users read articles from subscription 
accounts, while 80 per cent of users read on WeChat personal accounts.71 Given 
that in 2015 Chinese people only read on average 4.56 books per year, far less 
than its east Asian neighbours, 72  one can conclude that WeChat has also 
become also a ‘reading app’. 
                                                     
70 http://a16z.com/2015/08/06/wechat-china-mobile-first/  (accessed December 2015) 
71 http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/11765/wechat-users-reading-habits/  (accessed October 
2015) 
72 http://gbtimes.com/china/chinese-people-reading-much-less-east-asian-neighbours (accessed 
October 2015) 
Fig. 2.8 The interface of WeChat (left to right) The one-to-one chat; the group chat; the 
moment; and the subscriptions 
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To summarise, there are seven features of WeChat. Some of them are 
actually very different from QQ, which in a way also explains why WeChat and 
QQ are favoured by different groups of people: 1) smartphone- based; 2) visually 
oriented; 3) strong voice message function; 4) low degree of anonymity; 5) high 
degree of privacy; 6) closed community; and 7) high monetisation. 
Being launched at the time of the fast growth of the smartphone market in 
China – in contrast to QQ which started as a web-based messaging service and 
then was adapted for mobile – WeChat leapfrogged over the PC era directly to 
the smartphone direct.73 WeChat is designed to suit the ‘smartphone lifestyle’ and 
has become an aggregator of mobile services. Compared to the ‘visual feast’ on 
QQ, where users are allowed to design and decorate the whole page of their 
personal profiles, the room for customisation on WeChat is limited. The layout of 
WeChat profiles is fixed, and one can only change the avatar and cover 
photograph, which is similar to Facebook. However, WeChat gives priority to the 
visual in a different way. Posting on WeChat is designed to be visual-orientated. 
For each posting one has to upload at least one image first, before the text input 
area appears. As a result, it is effectively impossible to post anything on WeChat 
without an image. On WeChat the word ‘album’ (xiangce) is used to refer to a 
user’s personal profile, which also highlights the importance of the visual. In this 
perspective WeChat works a bit like Instagram, where images are regarded as 
the main body of the post. Even though later on WeChat added the ‘pure text’ 
function – meaning that if users ‘long press’ then ‘add a new post’ button one can 
do a pure text posting – this was known by less than 5 per cent of people in both 
Shanghai and GoodPath field sites during research. WeChat did not officially 
                                                     
73 The WeChat web version only offers far more limited functions.  
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prompt any such function. Studies have proven that visual clues are much more 
effective in directing attention to core information, enhancing comprehension of 
information and strengthening memorability (Burmark, 2002). Visually orientated 
and mobile-based entry on WeChat also encourages users to take more 
photographs by their smartphones to capture ‘on the go’ occasions. These visuals 
are not only shared with others immediately, but also stored on WeChat for users’ 
future recall. Such patterns of communication seem to boost more positive 
interpersonal communication, as well as offering the possibility of enhanced 
emotional well-being (Wu, 2014). It is known that a timely response to good or 
nice things in daily life serves to maximise their positive effects on our lives 
(Bryant, 2003). In addition, ‘savouring’, namely a mindful engaging in thoughts or 
behaviour that highlights positive emotions, heightens and enhances the positive 
experience of daily life (Bryant & Veroff, 2007). Having said this, the study in 
GoodPath and Shanghai shows that different social groups actually made very 
different use of, and had very different attitudes towards, the visuals on WeChat. 
This will be further discussed in Chapter 3.  
Besides visual orientation, voice messaging, another major function of 
WeChat, also enhances the platform’s media richness.74 Statics in 2014 show 
that 84.5 per cent of WeChat users employ WeChat for voice messaging,75 and 
in 2015 the average daily amount of WeChat voice messaging was 280 million 
                                                     
74  ‘Media richness’ refers to the capacity to carry complex information through multiple 
communication channels. There several dimension of media richness, for example the ability to 
handle multiple information cues simultaneously, the ability to facilitate rapid feedback, the 
ability to establish a personal focus and to utilise natural language. See Daft, R. L. and Lengel, R. 
H. 1986. ‘Organizational information requirements, media richness and structural design.’ 
Management Science 32(5): 554–71.  
75 See http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?R=1011578  (accessed on Oct 2015) 
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minutes – equivalent to 540 years of phone calls.76 In GoodPath 60 per cent of 
WeChat users send or receive voice messages almost daily. In Shanghai voice 
message is also becoming popular among the elderly, as noted by Sang, a 66-
year-old retired company official.  
 
[Leaving a] voice message is as simple as making a phone call. I never use 
instant messages because first I don’t know ‘pinyin’,77 second I can’t see 
such small words on a small screen.  
 
Voice messaging has enabled an older generation of Chinese, in their fifties and 
above, to enjoy a much easier communication; text entry has always been a big 
barrier for users over 50 who are not good at pinyin (Sun, 2012). Having said this, 
WeChat users are in the main still very young, with those aged between 18 and 
35 accounting for 86.2 per cent of the total.78 Besides ‘being convenient’, some 
other nuanced implications of voice messaging have also been acknowledged, 
as here by Guli, a 21-year-old factory worker:  
 
I only feel comfortable about talking with my boyfriend in whatever situation; 
with others you will be worried about whether your voice is right or not or 
sending voice message is proper or not. 
                                                     
76 See http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/15287/wechat-users-insights-2015/ (accessed on Feb 
2016) 
77 Pinyin is the phonetic transcription system for writing Chinese characters in the roman alphabet 
that is widely used in text message input. It was only introduced to schools in 1958 and therefore 
not in widespread use until much later, thus older generations find it less easy to use. 
78 ‘2015 WeChat Impact Report’ (weixin yingxiangli baogao). 
http://www.199it.com/archives/398617.html  
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To Guli, voice message is more personal and private than sending a text 
message. She was once annoyed by a male colleague who recorded his own 
singing and sent it to her as a voice message:  
 
…It’s so disturbing; if it’s just text I can easily ignore it … but why did you 
send me voice? Why don’t some people understand the simple fact that 
they can’t sing? … Anyway I just think you shouldn’t send voice messages 
at all to people who are not that close to you.  
 
Compared to text, voice messaging – carrying as it does the unique biophysical 
feature of a person – is commonly regarded as an intimate mode in personal 
communication. Like Guli, many saw voice messaging mainly suitable for intimate 
and private contacts. Only 28 per cent of rural migrants in GoodPath town 
reported that they have ever sent voice messages to their managers, and this 
reduces to only 9 per cent in Shanghai79 who ever used voice messages in 
supervisor–subordinate relationships.  
 
In answer to the question ‘Have you ever listened to your own voice 
messages after sending them off?’,80 47 per cent of female and 22 per cent of 
male respondents in GoodPath said yes, whereas in Shanghai the figures were 
70 per cent and 59 per cent respectively.  The main reasons included: 1) ‘I want 
                                                     
79  Data from a survey of 111 residents of GoodPath and 46 residents of Shanghai 
undertaken in August 2014. The survey was conducted via social media and all the 
informants were researcher’ social media contacts. 
80 As above 
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to check whether my voice message has been recorded completely’; 2) ‘I am 
curious about my own voice’; 3) ‘I want to check whether my tone is proper or 
whether I express myself properly'.’ In China few people have had the prior 
experience of leaving and receiving voice messages on telephone answering 
machines. Compared to Europe or America, therefore, voice messages are 
viewed as a much more radical innovation. 
Jack, a successful businessman in Shanghai uses WeChat to train his 
speaking skills. 
 
The way you talk matters. I listen to the voice messages I have sent off to 
my business partners all the time. It’s like a voice ‘mirror’ so that you know 
what you sound like and how can you do better…  
 
In the book Webcam, the authors noticed that one of its important features of the 
webcam is that it effectively acts as a mirror, allowing many people their first ever 
opportunity to see themselves in conversation (Miller & Sinanan, 2014). It is 
interesting to note that a similar novel state of communication is taking place in 
the case of voice messaging among Chinese users: people can actually listen to 
themselves in daily communication for the first time. Even though people started 
to use voice messages for speed and convenience, they ended up with a new 
awareness of their voice as something that one can creatively craft. 
The three features of WeChat we have observed so far are: 1) 
smartphone-based, 2) visually oriented and 3) strong voice message, all relating 
to the pattern of interpersonal communication. The fourth feature of WeChat, ‘low 
anonymity’, serves as the starting point of our inquiry into the nature of 
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interpersonal communication on WeChat. Compared to QQ, real names are used 
more frequently on WeChat. For WeChat public accounts registration in real 
names was required;81 even on WeChat personal accounts real names are more 
often used than on QQ. 
 
The majority of my WeChat contacts are either my family or friends who 
knew my real name anyway in the first place, or some business partners 
or clients where you need to use real names to talk with them. A non-real 
name is not professional.  
 
This remark by Zhao, a 32-year-old businessman in Shanghai, serves also to 
reflect another feature of the WeChat network: its relatively closed community. 
There are a few ways82 to add new contacts on WeChat (Fig. 2.9), the most 
common being scanning QR Code83, using mobile contact, QQ number84 or 
WeChat ID. Scanning QR code in most cases85 requires a face-to-face situation, 
which means contacts added by QR code were usually those one had met. Either 
mobile phone number, QQ number or WeChat ID all suggest a very targeted 
                                                     
81 http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-08-10/if-you-use-wechat-china-wants-know-your-real-name  
82 For a detailed introduction of adding WeChat contact at http://advicesacademy.com/how-
to/ways-to-add-friends-on-wechat/  
83 Each WeChat account has a QR code. 
84 Since QQ and WeChat are owned by the same company, Tencent, QQ users can register 
WeChat with their QQ numbers.   
85 In addition to being scanned directly from the contact’s smartphone screen, QR code can also 
be obtained from an image file. However, in most cases the QR code method is only applied in 
face-to-face situations, partly because it works most conveniently in these. 
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contact searching; it is extremely difficult for users to add random strangers by 
those methods. 
 
Having said this, WeChat users can still add strangers by functions such 
as ‘people nearby’ (fujin de ren), which facilitates users to search for strangers, 
listed by gender, who are allowed to be located and just within one’s vicinity (Fig. 
2.9). Another option is ‘shake’ (yao yi yao), which allows user to shake their 
device to find any random people who are shaking their smartphone at the same 
time all around the world (Fig. 2.10), or ‘message in a bottle’ (piao liu ping). In 
this function, as its name suggests, you can pick up digital messages in the form 
of text or short voice clip from random people, as well as toss digital messages 
into a ‘sea’ and allow others to pick them up (Fig. 2.11).  
Fig 2.9 The ‘people nearby’ function of WeChat 
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Even though there is no exact demographic data of people who use 
WeChat to connect with strangers, in field work it has become certain that young 
adults (18–29) and older adults (30+) remain in general less likely than teens to 
use those WeChat functions to connect with strangers. They may have tried once 
or twice and then stopped using them, whereas teens both in Shanghai and 
GoodPath were more attracted to those game-like functions. The exception is 
that male adults, from age 18–50, seemed to be as keen on ‘people nearby’ and 
‘shake’ as teens, in order to pursue potential romance and/or sex.   
Generally speaking, across China WeChat is mainly used by urban adults 
with a relatively stable social network, stable income and relatively higher 
education.86 For those people, WeChat represents a closed community which 
                                                     
86 ‘2015 WeChat Impact Report’ (weixin yingxiangli baogao). 
http://www.199it.com/archives/398617.html  
Fig. 2.10 (left) The ‘shake’ function of WeChat  
Fig. 2.11 The ‘message in a bottle’ function of WeChat  
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mainly consists of offline network (family, friends and colleagues), with little room 
for online strangers. Also, since the urban user’s online identity is overlaps 
strongly with their offline identity, real names were widely accepted and applied. 
However, the situation is very different for rural migrants who constantly feel 
frustration in their offline ‘floating’ life. They therefore have a stronger desire for 
higher anonymity online, in order to get lost or deny their unsatisfactory social 
identity offline. A survey in the study87 shows that 71 per cent of WeChat users 
in Shanghai applied real names or easily recognisable nick names or letter initials 
for their WeChat profiles. 82 per cent of them used real portrait photographs 
(photos of themselves or their children) as WeChat avatars. Of the rural migrant 
users in GoodPath, however, only 3 per cent show their real names on WeChat, 
while the rate of real photos is as low as 12 per cent. Even though we label 
WeChat as ‘low anonymity’ in general, therefore, the situation can be very 
different in different social groups.  
Designed mainly for urban users, the privacy setting on WeChat is stricter 
than on QQ and Facebook. For example, on QQ visiting one’s Qzone profile is in 
most cases88 visible not only to the profile owner, but also to all of the profile 
owner’s QQ contacts. This basically means that social media ‘stalking’ on QQ is 
difficult. On Facebook, by contrast, viewing someone’s profile trying not be 
noticed is not only possible, but also popular.89  
                                                     
87 Data collected from 49 residents of Shanghai and 200 rural migrants in GoodPath in July to 
August 2014. 
88 One of the ‘privileges’ that users can pay for on QQ is the ability ‘to visit other’s Qzone 
without leaving a footprint’ (yin shen fang wen). 
89 By contrast ‘stalking’ has become a common phenomenon on Facebook. See  Lindner, K. A. 
2008. ‘The Effects of Facebook “Stalking” on Romantic Partners’ Satisfaction, Jealousy, and 
Insecurity’. 
http://indigo.uic.edu/bitstream/handle/10027/9569/Lindner_Katherine.pdf?sequence=1  
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Compared to the situation on WeChat, however, the visibility of one’s social 
network on Facebook is still much higher (Wu, 2014). On WeChat users have no 
access to their WeChat friends’ contact list. On top of it, in many cases users 
have no access to like’s and ‘comments’ left on their friends’ profile pages. For 
example, if A and B both are both friends with C, but A and B are not friends on 
WeChat, then A cannot see B’s comments or likes to C’s posts. Moreover, one 
can only share postings from WeChat ‘public’ accounts. That is to say, sharing a 
friend’s post by just clicking on ‘share’, which is very common on Facebook, is 
not possible on WeChat. For Hu, a 33-year-old journalist from Shanghai, such 
filtering on WeChat is helpful. ‘I like the design, neat and simple; social 
relationships are complicated and it can avoid a lot of trouble if irrelevant contacts 
are separated rather than mixed up.’ It allows her much more freedom and 
flexibility to deal with different social networks:  
 
Sometimes banters between me and my close friends on comment can be 
very improper in other’s eyes … If all my friends’ comments could be seen 
by all my WeChat contacts, I am afraid my reputation will be totally ruined, 
haha!  
 
Whereas, nothing is perfect, sometimes Hu also wished that the comments and 
likes can be seen by all, ‘…but funnily enough, things are different if you post 
some good news, then you actually want everybody to see that you are “liked” by 
many and you got such and such praises on comments’.  
Like Hu, Hao Wen, a university graduate in his twenties has also spotted 
the consequence of the ‘common-friend-only’ (gongtong haoyou kejian) setting 
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on WeChat. However for him, rather than feeling regret that he cannot make 
highly praised posts visible to all the contacts, he actually makes his less popular 
postings appear to be very popular: 
 
The point is you don't know exactly how many people liked or commented 
on my posts since you have no idea how many are not our common 
friends … then that’s something I can work on. For example, I comment on 
my own posting saying ‘Thank you to all of you and I am really touched’. 
Now this comment can be seen by all, and people would believe that there 
are actually many people who have commented on or liked this posting; 
they couldn’t see any just because those who commented or liked were not 
common friends… I guess it’s also about mianzi (face); you just don’t want 
to lose face in front of your friends. 
 
It is difficult to judge how many WeChat users actually applied the same trick as 
Hao Wen did to produce a more popular and positive self-image online. 
Interestingly, what Hao Wen revealed was an anxiety about one’s public image 
in a relatively closed and strong-tie based online community.  
‘“Face” represents an individual’s claimed sense of positive image in the 
context of social interaction’ (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003).  In this instance 
social media is the context of social interaction, with concerns or even anxiety 
about one’s positive image on social media being commonly shared among 
people in the research. Without doubt Hao Wen successfully solved the problem 
by taking advantage of the setting of online display, and made the disadvantage 
of WeChat’s function in certain situations into a valued trick.   
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The features of ‘low anonymity’, ‘high privacy’ and ‘closed community’ on 
WeChat are embraced by many urban citizens, but they are not necessarily 
viewed as advantages among rural migrants in GoodPath. In fact the opposite is 
true: more than two-thirds of migrant workers, especially younger people, showed 
a clear preference for QQ over WeChat. Some of them gave as a reason that on 
QQ the social connection is more open. As we will discover in Chapter 4, visitors 
of Qzone are encouraged or even urged to engage with more interactions, which 
help to contribute to a ‘hot and noisy’ (renao) ambience of Qzone. Furthermore, 
strangers on QQ have become an important part of social life online90 for rural 
migrants whose real names are cautiously avoided, given the discrepancy 
between people’s online and offline social identities. 
‘High monetisation’ is the feature of WeChat to emerge most recently. The 
field work has witnessed a successful monetisation of WeChat, beginning at 
Chinese New Year 2014. On 28 January 2014 WeChat launched a new function 
called ‘WeChat red envelop’ (hongbao), which allowed users to send ‘digital red 
envelopes’ of money to WeChat contacts electronically. ‘The red envelope’ 
(which contains real money) has a long tradition in China as a festival and 
ceremony gift (for example a gift for Chinese New Year, a wedding), with the 
implication of bringing good luck and best wishes in addition to the monetary 
value. The new function on WeChat allows Chinese people to move this tradition 
online, and to make it more fun: the sender can either send a ‘fixed amount’ digital 
red envelope to certain contacts or alternatively decide how much to hand out in 
                                                     
90 Other research also shows that Chinese QQ users tend to make friends enthusiastically and 
communicate with strangers on QQ. See Tice, W. et al. 1995. ‘When modesty prevails: Different 
favorability of self-presentation to friends and strangers.’ Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 69: 1120–38. 
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total to how many people and then leave everything else to the system, which 
randomly chooses how the total is divided. For instance, A decided to hand out 
20 RMB to five WeChat contacts. The money could be divided into five digital red 
envelopes by the system randomly as 2.4, 3.6, 2.3, 1.5, and 0.2 RMB. Then the 
first five WeChat contacts of A who clicked the link got envelopes. Being the first 
one does not guarantee the most money, however; he or she may unfortunately 
end up with the envelope containing the least. The gambling-like red envelope 
grabbing soon went viral. From Chinese New Year’s Eve to 4pm on the first day 
of the Chinese New Year (31 January 2014), more than 5 million users tried out 
the feature to deliver in excess of 75 million red 
envelopes. Every minute an average of 9,412 
virtual red envelopes were received during this 
period.91 
Given the fact that users had to link their 
bank account(s) to their WeChat accounts 
before they could hand out or withdraw92 money 
from red envelopes, the red envelope 
phenomenon significantly fuelled the 
monetisation of WeChat. This in turn paved the 
way for mobile payments via WeChat. Via a 
WeChat ‘wallet’, the WeChat payment account93 
                                                     
91 http://thenextweb.com/asia/2014/02/05/messaging-app-wechat-brings-chinese-new-year-
traditions-into-the-mobile-era/ 
92 You can receive a red envelope on WeChat without having to link it to your bank card. 
However, actually to use the money in the red envelope requires you has to link your bank account 
to WeChat.  
93 WeChat payment service was officially launched on 4 March 2014.  
Fig. 2.12 WeChat pay interface 
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(Fig. 2.12), users can make instant payments for online as well as in-store 
purchases. In 2015 at least one in five active WeChat users were set up for 
WeChat payment. 94  Besides business institutions, all the WeChat public 
accounts can also sell products or services on WeChat. WeChat payment verified 
service accounts (retailers) on its platform. Through WeChat payment, service 
accounts are able to provide direct in-app payment service to users. Customers 
are allowed either to pay for items or services on web pages inside the app or to 
pay in store by scanning the digital ID (WeChat QR codes) of products provided 
by offline retailers. In 2015 WeChat launched the ‘City Services’ project,95 further 
expanding the scope of services to pay utility bills, book a doctor’s appointment, 
get bank statements, send money to friends, obtain geo-targeted coupons, etc. 
Through such practices WeChat has become an aggregator of the most 
frequently used and popular services available on mobile devices. We can 
conclude that WeChat has gone far beyond a social media tool. It has the 
potential to become a highly hybrid mobile and social commerce platform, with 
built-in payment accounts (e-wallet), LBS (location-based services) and much 
more.  
 The high monetisation of WeChat leads us to a wider exploration of e-
commerce in China.96 China is leading the way in this field with high mobile 
purchase rates (69 per cent of Chinese consumers made a purchase through 
their smartphone, as opposed to 46 per cent of consumers in the US) and a more 
                                                     
94 See http://a16z.com/2015/08/06/wechat-china-mobile-first/  
95 See detailed analysis of this new business move at http://techcrunch.com/2015/04/24/why-
wechat-city-services-is-a-game-changing-move-for-smartphone-adoption/  
96 WeChat has played a key role as a driver of m-commerce in China. See ‘E-commerce in 
China: Driving a new consumer culture.’ January 2014. KPMG Global China Practice report.  
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active participation in social media.97 In GoodPath, around 10 per cent of people98 
actively engaged with e-commerce, for example setting up one’s own online shop 
or selling goods on one’s personal WeChat profiles. Most of them have full-time 
jobs and do WeChat business part-time; others do it more professionally, since 
they sell the same products in their physical stores. Around 60 per cent of people 
engaged at least once with mobile payment functions or other forms of online 
commercial events, with an even higher rate among young people of 95 per cent.  
 Generally speaking, special/local goods (local specialties) or products 
endorsed by friends sold by friends sell best. Dee in GoodPath represents a 
successful example of doing business on WeChat. Her best-selling product is 
free-range chicken eggs from her parents’ farm.99 Towards the end of 2013 the 
outbreak of bird flu seriously affected the chicken farm’s business because all the 
regular buyers stopped purchasing. Hundreds of organic chicken eggs became 
unmarketable products overnight. This became one of the most difficult moments 
in Dee’s life as she watched the family business slide into a desperate situation. 
Inspired by the commercial posts on WeChat that she encountered every day, 
Dee decided to turn to it. She posted a photograph of a basket of eggs and wrote:  
 
My dear friends, if you want to buy healthy, organic eggs, please let me 
know. My parents’ chicken farm offers 100 per cent healthy and organic free-
                                                     
97 http://www.demandware.com/blog/2014/08/27/social-commerce-in-china/   
98 Data from a survey of 213 people conducted in GoodPath in June 2014. 
99 To meet Dee, and to gain a vivid impression of people’s daily engagement with WeChat 
business, you can watch a three-minute short film ‘WeChat and Small Business’, taken during 
field work. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WGuyM9eu9X4&index=4&list=PLVwGSavjGgEzPCcXI4
txF2gY9pibWeO4F  
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range chicken eggs at the most reasonable price! And also please spread 
the word!    
 
On the same day she got five orders from her friends and all the eggs were sold 
within two weeks. A friend of Dee’s, Yun, who ordered 50 eggs on WeChat, 
commented ‘I think it is a good deal, I helped her out, but it’s not that she owes 
me a big renqing (favour) since I also benefited a lot from the good price of the 
quality eggs.’ During the next two months of the egg crisis, I continued to trace 
the interaction between Dee and Yun on WeChat, observing that Dee’s ‘like’ and 
comments on Yun's new postings had become much more frequent since the egg 
crisis. ‘I think I owe her a favour (renqing), so maybe because of that I paid more 
attention to her updates on WeChat since then … and I do think we have a better 
relationship now,’ Dee explained.   
 At a first glance, Dee’s egg sale on WeChat is just one instance of ‘word-of-
mouth marketing’,  plenty of which I encountered in field work. This also seems 
to echo a study which shows that in China 66 per cent of Chinese consumers 
relied on recommendations from friends and family, compared to 38 per cent in 
the US.100 However, in Dee’s case there is something more to consider. On the 
one hand, as we mentioned in Chapter 1, in the collective society of China social 
relations (guanxi), the derivative of kinship or ‘in-group’ personal relationship, has 
its fundamental impact on a whole range of social interactions from business 
activities to public relations (Luo, 1997). On the other hand, it is important to 
acknowledge that business activities which manifest themselves, for example, in 
                                                     
100 See ‘Understanding social media in China.’, McKinsey Quarterly. April 2012. 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/marketing_sales/understanding_social_media_in_china  
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a form of traditional red envelopes – the gift money which was given with the 
expectation of return101 – is always an integral or even necessary part of personal 
relationships in China (Mullis, 2008). 
 In the anthropology of China, there is a rich literature on the ‘gift economy’. 
The major argument is that in the cycle of giving, receiving and the reciprocity of 
gift exchange, social relationships are established and maintained (Yan, 1996; 
Yang, 1989). In Dee’s case, the gift exchange does not take place in the form of 
a physical gift, but in a way of favour (renqing), which also follows the principle of 
reciprocity (Yang, 1994). Literally renqing means ‘human feelings’, and refers to 
the feelings inherent in personal relationships. Emotion and morality has 
intertwined with each other in Chinese context, in many situations, human feeling 
(renqing) is not only the biological reaction, but also has moral code involved 
(Yan, 2005). In practice renqing also provides a moral sense of obligation (such 
feeling as ‘I owe you’) towards others, which motivates further gift exchange (Qian 
et al., 2007). In Dee’s case, therefore, her return ‘gift’ was actually more attention 
and more positive interaction with her friend on WeChat. In guanxi, ‘any act of 
helpfulness or generosity, no matter whether given or received, begins to draw 
one into the network of reciprocal exchanges’ (Hu & Grove, 1999: 64). In the end, 
as Dee remarked, the relationship between herself and her friend had become 
closer and more positive through the cycle of ‘gift exchange’. ‘In guanxi, feeling 
and instrumentality are a totality’ (Kipnis, 1997: 23) Through the commercial 
                                                     
101  As the anthropologist Marcel Mauss pointed out, gift exchange serves as a mean of 
establishing and maintaining social relationships by creating social obligations between 
individuals that in the long-term bind people together. Though such gifts are apparently voluntary, 
there is no ‘free gift’ in a real sense as they are always given with the expectation of return. See 
Mauss, M. 1950. The Gift: the Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.  
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interaction on WeChat, the production of guanxi in Dee’s case simultaneously 
creates human feeling and material obligation.  
Thus, unlike the societies with a relatively long history of industrialisation 
and capitalism as observed by Georg Simmel or Karl Marx, where money is 
regarded as the opposite of humanity and business is supposed to take place in 
a professional context without personal touch and elements, 102 doing business 
and establishing personal relationships in China are usually the same approach, 
with slightly different fronts. In this sense doing business on social media in China 
seems to match with the very feature of guanxi at the first place. The success of 
the monetisation of WeChat, to a large extent, is a result of Chinese personal 
relationships which intrinsically include business elements; such forms of 
success cannot necessarily be copied by other societies.103 Furthermore, in the 
case of WeChat red envelopes, we see a challenge to our very understanding of 
the social meaning of money.  
In the West money is traditionally regarded as an impersonal medium; it is 
only supposed to apply in business where social connections are mainly 
functional. In Philosophy of Money Georg Simmel contended that money can 
never become an ‘adequate mediator of personal relationships’ as it ‘distances 
and estranges the gift from the giver much more definitely’ (cf. Zelier, 1997: 82). 
                                                     
102  This is the widely held idea of the relationship between money and personal 
relationship in Western society. However, an inspiring book by sociologist Viviana 
Zelizer challenges this view and presents a novel argument that instead of turning away 
from money, Americans actually incorporated money into their construction of new social 
ties and transformed its meaning as they did so. The interactions of private lives actually 
consist of subtle blends of acts of intimacy and economic exchange. See Zelizer, V. 2005. 
The Purchase of Intimacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
103 For example, it is found on Facebook that word-of-mouth marketing is less successful than 
traditional word-of-mouth marketing in face-to-face situations. See Eisingerich, A. B. et al. 2015. 
‘Why recommend a brand face-to-face but not on Facebook? How word-of-mouth on online 
social sites differs from traditional word-of-mouth.’ Journal of Consumer Psychology 25(1): 120–
8. 
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In China, by contrast, money has long been used to express concern and love in 
social relations. It has long been selected as a ‘perfect’ gift because it can be 
used to buy whatever the recipient desires, eliminating the unnecessary risk of 
choosing a wrong gift or the wastefulness of speculating on the recipient’s needs 
(Mukai, 1999). 
 In retrospect, some features of WeChat actually emerged in the process of 
use given the ‘technology affordances’. 104  In practice these features are 
interlocked, and work together as a new form of sociality online. A further 
discussion of how social relationships become reshaped or reinforced in the use 
of QQ and WeChat will continue in the rest of thesis. But now let’s move to Weibo, 
another buzz word surrounding Chinese social media. 
 
2. 4 What is Weibo? 
For many Westerners, Weibo (microblogging) is the equivalent of Twitter. In China 
there are several Weibo platforms, such as Tencent Weibo and Sohu Weibo. 
Because of the popularity of Sina Weibo, however, with 212 million monthly active 
users,105 ‘Weibo’ is often used generically to refer to Sina Weibo. Many features 
of Weibo appear familiar to Twitter users,106 such as the 140 character limit, use 
                                                     
104
 To put it in a simple way, the term ‘technology affordances’ refers to the perceived and actual 
use of specific technologies, or the possible uses that humans can make use of specific 
technologies. The term has been defined differently in literature, some scholars put emphasis on 
the interactions between users and technologies. For example, Wijekumar, K. J., et. al. 2006. 
‘Technology affordances: The ‘‘real story’’ in research with K-12 and undergraduate learners.’ 
British Journal of Educational Technology 37(2): 191–209. Meanwhile some used the term as a 
middle ground between technology determinist and social constructivist perspectives. For 
example, Graves, L. 2009. ‘The affordances of blogging: A case study in culture and 
technological effects.’ Journal of Communication Inquiry, 31: 331–346.  
http:// dx.doi.org/10.1177/0196859907305446. 
105 http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/14371/weibo-q2-2015/  
106 See a detailed comparative study of use of Sina Weibo and Twitter. For instance, Weibo users 
are more likely to disclose personal information and their interests change more frequently. Gao, 
Q. et. al. 2012. ‘A Comparative Study of Users’ Microblogging Behavior on Sina Weibo and 
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of ‘@’ to mention people and addition of ‘#’ to keyword the postings. Additionally, 
Chinese users were able to embed multimedia content in Weibo more than 18 
months before Twitter users could do so in the US. 
 Weibo is a celebrity hub. Chinese celebrities depend on Weibo as a way to 
connect with their fans and drive their popularity. However, the statistics in 
GoodPath show that the usage of Weibo among rural migrants is extremely low. 
Even though many have heard about Weibo, less than 1 per cent107 actually used 
Weibo to post or follow others. Among the 1 per cent Weibo users, Tencent 
Weibo, rather than Sina Weibo, was the main site – mainly because Tencent QQ 
‘bind’ its users to embedded Weibo services. Gui You, a factory official in his 
forties, has Tencent Weibo which synchronises updates automatically with his 
QQ status updates: 
 
When I updated a status on QQ, the ‘Weibo’ would do the same thing 
automatically. I have no idea of Weibo, but I can’t be bothered to figure it 
out.  
 
Gui You’s confusion about Weibo is widely shared among people in GoodPath. 
Few know what it is really about or what it is good for. Duo Tian, a 26-year-old 
factory worker, explained why she abandoned her Sina Weibo account after using 
it for a couple of weeks. ‘I tried, but I really don’t like it … it’s too complicated, and 
you have no friend there.’ It is true that the specific grammar in Weibo, such as 
                                                     
Twitter.’ J. Mastiff et al., eds. User Modeling, Adaptation and Personalization. Heidelberg: 
Springer-Verlag. LNCS 7379: 88–101. 
107 Data based on 203 rural migrants in GoodPath in September 2013. 
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the @ and # function, are a bit confusing for beginners. However, the main reason 
seems to lie in the fact that Weibo is more like a public publishing platform rather 
than a personal ‘chat’ platform between friends. People find it more difficult to 
establish personal connections with the platform, and so prefer to remain at the 
platform that most of their contacts use.  
 Compared to WeChat, Weibo addresses a far bigger audience. Big cities are 
Weibo’s main market, 108  since the urban population shows a stronger 
information-seeking motivation, driven by a need for richer, more diverse 
information. The limited market of Weibo in towns and villages further 
discourages people to use Weibo as a personal communication tool.   
 Having said that, the use of Weibo among China’s urban population also 
witnessed a decline. Not only my field work in Shanghai showed that people use 
Weibo less109 because of more frequent use of WeChat. The WeChat public 
account has taken the place of Weibo for the purpose of news reading and 
information searching. National statics show that the number of Weibo users in 
2013 declined by 27 million compared to the number of users at the end of 2012. 
The level of activity also declined, with around 80 per cent of users hardly ever 
logged in.110 
 There are several reasons that the Chinese urban population became less 
interested in Weibo. First is the decline in the quality of Weibo information, the 
result of an overflow of advertisements. In contrast to WeChat and QQ, strangers 
have the right to leave comments on any Weibo profile, which leaves a loophole 
                                                     
108 See http://chinamarketingtips.com/weibo-marketing-strategic-direction/  
109 Among 49 people from Shanghai, more than half of Weibo users admit they used Weibo less 
in 2014. Date collected in July 2014. 
110 http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/05/PIP_TeensSocialMediaandPrivacy_PDF.pdf  
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for the posting of commercial advertisements111 by the millions of ‘online water 
army’ (shuijun) who get paid for such work. This has significantly diluted the user’s 
experience of Weibo. Secondly, since 2013 the Chinese government has started 
to ‘clean’ up the internet, targeting Weibo.112 Officials have intensified attacks on 
the spread of online rumours, and Weibo users can be jailed for up to three years 
for posting false information that is forwarded 500 times or viewed 5,000 times.113 
As a result, a large number of online public intellectuals had to give up their 
accounts. Some of them began to shift towards WeChat,114 as a WeChat public 
account works much less publicly than on Weibo. Information on WeChat spreads 
more slowly than on Weibo, but because of the ‘slow burn’ feature, which appears 
less intimidating to the regime, WeChat content seems to undergo less strict 
censorship. 
This chapter has introduced the main social media platforms. Given the 
low rate of usage of Weibo among people in this study, the discussion of Weibo 
here will be relatively brief. It is also true that there are other Chinese social media 
platforms, but given the limited space they will not be introduced one by one, 
especially when they are not used by the majority of people in the study. 
However, a few of them will be introduced later in the thesis when discussing a 
specific individual’s use of social media. The next section will focus upon the very 
                                                     
111 Paid followers are those paid to post comments online to influence public opinion of Sina 
Weibo can be bought and sold online for as little as 4 yuan (63 dollar cents) per 
thousand.http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-11/22/c_131261763.htm  
112 https://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2013/07/09/targeting-rumors-on-chinas-sina-weibo/  
113 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/10/china-social-media-jail-rumours  
114 http://www.economist.com/news/china/21594296-after-crackdown-microblogs-sensitive-
online-discussion-has-shifted-weibo-wechat 
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digital devices on which most of the engagement with social media in China now 
takes place. 
 
2. 5 Social media and smartphones 
By 2014 the number of Chinese mobile internet users had reached 527 million, 
making mobile phones the most common device for access to the internet.115 For 
people who cannot afford a PC,116 a smartphone has become their first private 
access to the internet. Budget smartphones dominate the smartphone market in 
GoodPath, the average price being around 500 RMB (US$ 80). The average 
monthly cost is around 100 RMB (US$ 16). A smartphone is definitely the number 
one internet device. 
It has been young rural migrants who drove the local budget smartphone 
market. The majority (80 per cent) of rural migrants aged between 17 and 35 
already own a smartphone, and 70 per cent of smartphones that people currently 
use are their first. One-third of people reported that they wanted to have a 
smartphone by a ‘good brand’ (hao paizi) in a couple of years’ time, when they 
will have saved up enough money. A ‘good brand’ smartphone (such as iPhone 
and Samsung) is regarded as a symbol of social status. 
According to the local mobile phone dealers, shanzhai mobile phones 
used to be very popular, mainly because of their huge price advantages (usually 
the price is between one-fifth and one-tenth of the ‘real brand’). A shanzhai mobile 
phone refers to a low priced mobile phone, quite possibly knock-off; Shanzhai in 
                                                     
115 The 34th China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) Statistical Report on 
Internet Development in China. July 2014. 
116 Personal computers are not affordable or practical, combining a higher price with less 
portability. This is particularly important given the ‘floating life’ that rural migrants have. 
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Chinese refers to the mountain camps or mountain villages under the control of 
regional warlords or bandits, far away from governmental control.117  Several 
unique features of shanzhai mobiles attract users. For instance, the ringtone of 
most shanzhai phones is extremely loud and some of them even go with funky 
and sparkling ‘incoming calls flashlight’. This is regarded by customers as not 
only ‘convenient’ (as most of rural migrants work in a noisy factories), but also 
fashionable. The function of ‘Dual SIM card dual standby’ (shuangka shuangdai), 
which allows two different SIM cards in one mobile phone, is also welcome as 
people usually chose different phone packages for keeping in touch with local 
people and those back in their original villages.  
Since the end of 2012, however, the shanzhai mobile phones have started 
to shift in terms of sales strategy. Previously they just copied famous brand 
names. Now some shanzhai mobile phone manufacturers have set up their own 
branded phones, and newly designed budget smartphone brands such as 
‘XiaoMi’ (Mi-One) have established their market position (Gupta & Dhillon, 2014). 
Major Chinese telecom companies have started to invest in the market for 
smartphones with a price lower than $150 dollars (qianyuan ji)118 and launched a 
few packages for contract mobile phones (heyue ji) together with Chinese local 
mobile phone manufacturers such as HuaWei. With $10 to $15 dollars 
guaranteed consumption (baodi xiaofei) per month, one can get a smartphone 
for around 50 dollars or even for ‘free’. These inexpensive smartphones quickly 
captured the low-end smartphone market, offering not only a similar price 
                                                     
117 See a detailed introduction of ‘shanzhai' mobile phone in Tse, E. et. al. 2009. ‘Shan 
Zhai A Chinese Phenomenon.’ Strategy 
 http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Shan_Zhai_AChinese_Phenomenon.pdf  
118 For example: http://www.goodchinabrand.com/8323200070en.html  
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advantage but also better quality and after-sale service than their shanzhai 
competitors (Chart 2.4).119  As a result the shanzhai era of Chinese low-end 
mobile phone market has already passed. 
QQ was the first digital platform in China which successfully practised 
‘media convergence’, and smartphones have considerably accelerated the 
process. Smartphones not only have been woven into the patterns of people’s 
daily life, but also function as the ‘mega media’ which allow people to navigate 
various social networks, enjoy forms of entertainment and participate in 
consumer culture. Cara Wallis notes: ‘For those who study convergence among 
more privileged users, there is a tendency to downplay its technological aspect, 
or the way one device can increasingly handle numerous media functions. 
However, millions of people in the world must make do with a single delivery 
technology for most of their digital media use, and almost always it is a mobile 
phone (Wallis, 2013)’. 
                                                     
119 Data based on 200 rural migrants in GoodPath in August 2014. 
Chart 2.4 Distribution of different kinds of mobile phone devices among 200 
rural migrants in GoodPath 
107 
 
 
 
As quoted, even before the smartphone had become available among this 
‘information have-less’ group,120 mobile phones had already played an essential 
role in the lives of low-income people. Now the smartphone has become the first 
music player, video player and camera, as well as the first private access to online 
reading, online payment and online social networking. The popularity of budget 
smartphones has therefore largely closed the gap of the digital divide in China. 
  
2. 6 Conclusion 
So what can be learned from Chinese social media such as QQ and WeChat and 
the wider technologies of the smartphone? The real significance of this chapter 
is only apparent if it is not read as a chapter about Chinese rural migrants and 
social media, or even a chapter about Chinese social media, but rather as part of 
a comparative ethnographic study on the very meaning and nature of social 
media.  
The starting point has been the radically different historical trajectories of 
these developments between China and the West. In the West, people have a 
tendency to assume they know what social media naturally ‘is’, because there 
has been a slow incremental development based on clear precedents. In the 
developed West the smartphone was gradually appropriated as a new digital 
device, the natural successor to the personal camera, mobile phone and PC. 
                                                     
120  The term ‘information have-less’ was used to refer to Chinese migrants and 
unemployed workers who populate the vast zone on the other side of China’s digital 
divide. See Qiu, J. 2008. ‘Working-class ICTs, migrants, and empowerment in South 
China.’ Asian Journal of Communication 18(4): 333–47. 
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Social media was also quite a specific development in personal communications, 
forming a niche within more general IT development. By contrast the Chinese 
social media landscape has been formed as a result of a dynamic movement. It 
has been cut apart from the global environment outside China, pushed by a very 
deliberate policy of the party–state, carried forward by a vast domestic market 
demand, accelerated by the booming growth of smartphones. In due course this 
was the demand that collided with the traditional pattern of social relations and 
technological innovation. This dynamism continues to grow apace, with new 
forces continually arising such as dating and commerce. We need to start by 
acknowledging the sheer, incredible scale of this. Now hundreds of millions of 
people, who only a short time ago had no experience of anything digital, suddenly 
find themselves in possession of instruments that are as powerful as their 
equivalents in developed countries where ICT has being embedded in daily life 
since the second half of 1990s when ‘digital divide’ became a central issue on 
the scholarly agenda of ICT development (NTIA, 1999; OECD, 2000; van Dijk 
and Hacker 2003). On top of it, as we have seen, among those once information 
have-less population (Qiu, 2009), ICT was often used for a still greater range of 
purposes.   
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Chapter 3 
Visual Material on Social Media  
 
 
3. 0 Introduction  
79 per cent121 of people have taken more photographs since they started to use 
social media; 64 per cent believe that a visual post is more convincing on social 
media than a text-only post, and 85 per cent prefer visual posts to text-only posts. 
Compared to former times when for most ordinary people it was only 
possible to circulate a few visual images, the contemporary world is very much a 
phenomenon ‘seen online’ (Rose, 2012: 3) Because of the use of social media 
and the popularity of smartphones, our relationship to visual images has reached 
a level of ubiquity that is historically unprecedented122. Moreover, unlike mass 
media, visual material on social media is produced and circulated in a ‘two- way’ 
interaction, becoming an essential part of interpersonal communication. This 
chapter will discuss what people actually post on social media123 and see how 
the visual is culturally constructed –  what is made to be seen and what is made 
to be unseen (Foster, 1988). In some cases, the ‘face value’ of the visual can be 
misleading or confusing, and needs to be interpreted. Although visual images are 
the focus of this chapter, the analysis of visual material on social media occurs 
                                                     
121 Data collected from a survey of 427 people, including 350 residents of GoodPath and 
77 residents of Shanghai. (July- September 2014) 
122 See Miller et al. 2016 How the World Changed Social Media. London: UCL Press. 
Chapter 12 ‘What are the consequences of communication becoming more visual’. 
123 The visual analysis based on 8,540 visual postings (the last 20 visual postings of each 
participant) by 461 participants (377 in GoodPath, 84 in Shanghai) on WeChat or QQ. 
(data collected from July- September 2014) 
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throughout this thesis. Some genres of visual images are mentioned here only 
brieﬂy and will receive further analysis in other chapters. 
Much of this chapter consists of a brief survey of what I have identiﬁed as 
the 15 main genres of images posted by rural migrants. This is in order to identify 
some key patterns to this practice when viewed as a whole. This is clariﬁed when 
the dominant genres of rural migrants are compared in the conclusion with a 
survey of middle- class people from Shanghai. What we ﬁnd is that, although 
there is a continuity between visual postings and traditional photography, there is 
also a series of key new genres on social media added by rural migrants. 
The new visual genres which emerged from this comparison of rural 
migrants with urban residents pave the way for further analysis in the remainder 
of this thesis, especially in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. In Chapter 4, the new 
generation of rural migrant workers is discussed in great detail with a focus on 
the relationship between postings on their social media profiles and personal 
development in the process of their rural-to-urban migration. Meanwhile, starting 
from specific visual genres described in this Chapter, taking account of offline 
activities in local social life, Chapter 5 takes a holistic approach to further examine 
the ‘efficacy’ of postings on social media which actually speaks to the rich 
anthropological accounts of Chinese cosmology and life philosophy shared by 
ordinary Chinese people. 
The figures illustrated on the charts of visual analysis in this chapter are 
based on 7,540 social media postings of 377 participants in GoodPath, including 
90 young women and 135 young men (aged 16-35); 25 middle-aged women 
(aged 35-50); 7 older men and 4 older women (aged 50+). Figures are illustrated 
in group size order. 3/4 of the people covered in this visual analysis were my key 
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informants in factories, the rest 1/4 (i.e. older domestic workers and older local 
shop keepers) were included with the purpose of presenting the diversity of 
residents in GoodPath. I gathered and coded the images manually by recording 
the last 20 visual postings of each participant. The significant majority of the 
postings was visual as only less than 2 per cent of the postings were text-only. 
Thus visual postings were representative of all the postings people in GoodPath 
posted. In practice, even though some visuals had obvious subjects (such as 
selfie, children or food), the naming of each visual genre was not always 
straightforward. During the counting practice I came to my key informants from 
time to time for possible/appropriate naming. The usual way was to invite them 
to comment on others’ postings and pick up the highly repetitive wording people 
used. For example, the naming of ‘chicken-soup-for-the-soul’ as well as ‘feizhuliu’ 
(anti-mainstream) came from such method. Meanwhile the names of visual 
genres such as ‘fantasy’ and ‘archive’ emerged based on my analytical 
observation of the way people engaged with these particular kind of postings in 
their daily life.  
In some cases, the genres overlap with one another and could have easily 
been subjected to further division. For example, one photo of a group of people 
in a sightseeing place could be either counted as genre of ‘relationship’ or genre 
of ‘travel’. In practice, such ambiguity is inevitable and the primary principles are 
1) all the images collected got counted; 2) each image only got counted once. 
The main point was not to classify the different visual genres ‘scientifically’, but 
rather to help us appreciate and clarify the range of these postings. Given the 
relatively small sample, and the dominance of factory workers, the figures were 
in no way meant to be representative of larger phenomena. This highly visual and 
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descriptive chapter is an effort to address something that is usually neglected in 
previous social media studies - a properly illustrated discussion of the visual 
material which often dominates what people actually post on their social media. 
By focusing on the visuals, this chapter also emphasises the value and 
explanatory power of visual postings in anthropological inquiry of ordinary 
people’s daily life.  
 
3. 1 Genres of visual material on social media 
An inspection of the huge amount of visual postings on rural migrants’ social 
media profiles suggested 15 main genres: ‘relationships’, ‘selfies’, ‘trivia’, 
‘compulsorily shared’, ‘chicken soup for the soul’, ‘humour’, ‘fantasy’, ‘children’, 
‘travel’, ‘events’, ‘archive’, ‘political’, ‘food’, ‘anti-mainstream’ (feizhuliu) and 
‘commercial’. 
 
3. 1. 1 ‘Relationships’ 
This is ‘social’ media and the majority of the visual material deals in some manner 
or other with relationships. However, the genre of ‘relationships’ here refers only 
to certain kinds of directly depicted relationships, such as kinship (Fig. 3.1), 
romantic relationships (Fig. 3.2) or friendship (Fig. 3.3). The majority of images 
about kinship refer to the relationship between young parents and babies, partly 
due to the fact that in this study the main contributors of the visual postings are 
young people.  
Friendship between females is usually expressed in a very straightforward 
way. It may include photographs of women hugging or walking hand-in-hand, and 
in many cases takes the form of group selfies (Fig. 3.4). While 32 per cent of 
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females had photos of their best friends on their social media, only 3.5 per cent 
of males did the same. The demonstration of male bonding seems to be different. 
For instance, through playing video games together, as we will see in Chapter 5, 
and postings of related deity images, which we will further discuss in Chapter 4. 
 
Fig. 3.1 Typical images of kinship on social media 
      
 
In terms of romantic relationships, the visual representation for young men 
seems to be slightly more drawn to sexual intimacy; rather than posting any 
image of themselves, the common practice is to collect photographs from the 
internet (Fig. 3.5). For women, on the other hand, a typical image seems to be 
Fig. 3.2 A typical image showing a 
romantic relationship on social media 
Fig. 3.3 A typical photograph of 
friendship on social media 
Fig. 3.4 Typical group selﬁes of women 
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more about emotional intimacy (Fig. 3.6). As Chart 3.1 shows,124 98 per cent of 
young women and 85 per cent of young men posted images of the ‘relationships’ 
genre. More than half of middle-aged people also have such postings, whereas 
elderly people seem to be least inclined to post on this theme. At all ages, women 
showed more interest in posting ‘relationship’ images.  
            
 
 
 
                                                     
124 In this chapter all the statistical results related to visual genres are based on 7,540 
social media postings of 377 participants in GoodPath, including 90 young women and 
135 young men (16–35); 25 middle-aged men and 16 middle-aged women (aged 35–50); 
7 older men and 4 older women (aged 50 +). Figures are illustrated in group size order.  
Fig. 3.5 A typical image of intimacy on the 
social media proﬁles of young men 
Fig. 3.6 A typical image of emotional intimacy 
on the social media proﬁles of young women 
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Chart 3.1 The distribution of 'Relationships' postings 
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3. 1. 2 ‘Selfies’ 
The ‘selfie’, defined as ‘A photographic self-portrait; esp. one taken with a 
smartphone or webcam and shared via social media’125, has become a universal 
phenomenon. Among rural migrants, selfies also have become an instant visual 
communication of where they are, what they are doing, who they think they are, 
and who they think is watching. There are a number of sub-genres of selfies, and 
interpretations of different genres vary. A typical or classic selﬁe is usually shot 
from a high angle, with a full focus on the face. It is common for young women to 
have a great number of this type of selﬁe, capturing different facial expressions, 
accessories or make-up (Fig. 3.7), whereas for young men a typical form is a ‘hair 
selﬁe’, focusing on their stylish haircuts (Fig. 3.8). The fact that the average height 
(around 167 cm) of male rural migrants from inland provinces is below the 
national average may explain the cult of hairstyles that make them appear 
between 2 and 5 cm taller. The other reason would be the desire to show a 
rebellious gesture; such hairstyles seem to accord with the anti-mainstream 
(feizhuliu)126 aesthetic of youth culture. 
                                                     
125 See the Oxford English Dictionary 2013. See also a history of the ‘selfie’ at Saltz, J. 
2014. ‘Art at arm’s length: a history of the selfie’ available at 
http://www.vulture.com/2014/01/history-of-the-selfie.html  
126 See genre 14, the ‘Feizhuliu’ postings 
116 
 
 
Fig. 3.7 A typical range of selﬁes uploaded by young women to their social media proﬁles 
 
 
‘Mirror selfies’, i.e. those taken through a mirror, come across as another 
popular selfie genre. The mirror selfie is convenient to take, but also allows a 
wider view which helps to unfold some other details, for example dresses or 
shoes (Fig. 3.9). It may be used to show some part of the body to best advantage 
(Fig. 3.10), or even the very digital device with which the selfie was taken.  
Fig. 3.8 ‘Hair selfies’ by young men 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, iPhones are regarded as symbols of higher 
socioeconomic status among low-income people such as rural migrants, thus 
revealing the ownership of an iPhone is regarded as a plus on a selfie. Among all 
the mirror selfies posted by rural migrants the majority (around 90 per cent) were 
taken by iPhones. However, such figures do not match with the relatively low 
ownership of iPhones among rural migrants, as shown in Chapter 2. There thus 
two possibilities: that non-iPhone users choose not to take mirror selfies or that 
the people featured on their selfies may not necessarily own the iPhone. For 
example, the young factory worker Huatian took a mirror selfie using the iPhone 
of one of his friends (Fig. 3.11) and posted it on Qzone. On this selfie he was 
wearing a fake Adidas T-shirt and Doc Martins acquired at the local night market. 
It has been argued that since China’s economic liberalisation, counterfeit 
products have been helping to spread the luxury brand cult in Asian countries like 
China and Chinese consumers have cultivated a taste for luxury goods through 
their consumption of counterfeit products (Chadha & Husband, 2007) ‘though the 
Fig. 3.9 A typical ‘mirror selfie’ illustrating 
one’s dress or shoes 
Fig. 3.10 A typical ‘mirror selfie’ helping to 
show part of the body to best advantage 
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manufacture, distribution, and retailing of counterfeit goods are illegal, it is not 
dysfunctional in the sense that these good create an aura of authenticity and 
desirability for brand name items’ (Lin, 2011: 27) For young rural migrants, the 
counterfeit fashion items make their pursuit of becoming modern affordable. Even 
though the goods are fake, the desire to take care of their appearance so that 
they look good is definitely sincere. As Huatian said, ‘I think you just want to show 
the best of you on a selfie.’ Comments on this selfie, as he expected, focused on 
the nice material world shown in the photograph; one of the comments read, ‘Life 
is not too bad … Lucky you!’ 
 
However, not all the selfies seek 
to portray glamorous aspects of oneself. 
‘Pyjama selfies’, which people take in 
their bedrooms in their most casual look, 
are examples of a different trend. As the 
text on Fig. 3.12 reads ‘Can’t fall asleep, 
too tired’, these ‘pyjama selfies’ were 
usually posted at the end of the day 
before people went to bed, or sometimes 
when they could not get to sleep. Even 
though most rural migrants do not have 
their own private space, given the limited 
living accommodation, a ‘pyjama selfie’ seems to be the first time people 
intentionally invited the public to view some most private moments of their lives.  
Fig. 3.11 A ‘mirror selfie’ taken by Huatian to 
portray himself as somebody enjoying a good 
life 
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The results are regarded with some scepticism. ‘I think she is faking it; 
even though it looks like no make-up, I bet she photoshopped it to make sure her 
skin looked perfect … It is actually a carefully posed selfie to show how cute she 
is … look at the duck face and the collarbone’, commented a young female 
participant, who did not know the subject of Fig. 3.14. On the other hand, in a 
separate interview, the subject of Fig. 3.13 herself remarked, ‘I just feel like taking 
a selfie, no specific purpose’. With or without any specific purpose, the very action 
of posting a pyjama selfie is always a deliberate act by the person posting. 
A pyjama selfie usually attracts more ‘likes’ or comments, partially because 
it looks different from people’s usual daytime appearance and helps the senders 
to get closer to their online contacts. As the male factory worker featured in Fig. 
3.12 observed, for women a ‘pyjama selfie’ may mean removing physical make-
up, but for men it can be the moment when they finally take off the ‘mask’ of social 
expectation of being a man. ‘I let you see the real me which you can never see 
Fig. 3.12 A ‘pyjama selﬁe’ of a young man Fig. 3.13 A ‘pyjama selﬁe’ of a young woman 
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during the daytime. At work I won’t show a weak part of me as a man.’ Even 
though people may interpret pyjama selfies in different ways, to unfold a private 
and different aspect of oneself voluntarily is usually regarded as a friendly gesture 
on social media, where self-exposure can lead to mutual trust. In this sense a 
pyjama selfie is an example of how a selfie is a skillful self-representation that 
can connect to, and communicate with, others (Hogan & Wellman, 2014). In 
terms of the awareness of relationships, the ‘group selﬁe’ takes a step further, 
directly portraying the closeness of the relationship (as mentioned in the section 
on ‘relationships’ postings above). Compared to other kinds of group 
photographs, group selﬁes require physical proximity in order to include a group 
of people in a photo frame, which in a way also legitimises more intimate and 
informal body contact. Such body language, triggered by group selﬁes, enhances 
the sense of connectedness, which is further reinforced when group selﬁes are 
posted on social media. 
In retrospect, self-love or narcissism is rarely the only motivation behind 
selfies.127 In many cases, rather than recording themselves, people are in fact 
recording their social network via selfies. For many, a selfie is not ‘complete’ until 
it has been uploaded to social media and viewed by others. Thus it makes little 
sense to single out any individual selfie without acknowledging the context of the 
anticipated audience on social media. A selfie is actually a new form of social 
interaction facilitated by social media; it reflects how people see themselves in a 
network.  
                                                     
127 It is common to see arguments about the link between self-love and the selfie, for 
example Barry, C. T. et al. 2015. ‘Let Me Take a Selfie: Associations Between Self-
Photography, Narcissism, and Self-Esteem.’ Psychology of Popular Media Culture. 
Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/ppm0000089 
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As shown on Chart 3.2, so far the genre of ‘selfies’ is still the exclusive 
preserve of young people among rural migrants. However, it is highly likely that 
the situation will change in the near future, given the evidently increasing 
popularity of smartphones among older people and the increasing social 
acceptance of selfies in China –  especially now China’s President Xi has also 
started to post selfies.128   
 
3. 1. 3 ‘Trivia’     
The genre of ‘trivia’ refers to photographs of insigniﬁcant housework or household 
items (Fig. 3.14). It usually takes place when people feel bored, and it seems that 
the very action of taking a photo and posting it on social media is the less tedious 
activity that enlivens the daily routine. 
As Chart 3.3 shows, in ‘trivia’ gender and age play important roles. For some 
middle-aged women trivia made up most of their original visual postings on social 
                                                     
128 http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/34620535/selfie-of-the-year-sergio-aguero-
the-pm-and-chinese-president-xi-jinping  
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media. Men are less keen on posting trivia. Older people rarely posted trivia as 
they tended to view social media postings as significant personal statements, 
whereas many younger people have no problem in posting daily trivia on social 
media as they see it as a personal diary. 
 
Fig. 3.14 Typical trivia postings 
   
 
3. 1. 4 ‘Compulsorily shared’ 
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The reason this genre has been 
labelled ‘compulsorily shared’ is 
summed up by one participant’s 
response to the post’s sharing 
request: ‘you feel you have to share it, 
otherwise you would worry that there 
will be something wrong.’ The majority of ‘compulsorily shared’ posts are deeply 
related to beliefs in the efficacy of the images of deities (Fig. 3.15), lucky animals 
(Fig. 3.16) or even strange beings (yishou) (Fig. 3.17), all of which derive from 
Chinese folk religion. In some cases the texts accompanying these images make 
the compulsion to share even stronger; the text on Fig. 3.17 reads ‘If you don’t 
share it, your parents will have a disaster in 7 days’. 
Fig. 3.15 A typical image of a 
deity shared on social media 
Fig. 3.16 A typical image of lucky animals shared on 
social media 
Fig. 3.17 A typical image of strange beings 
shared on social media 
124 
 
A further discussion of the practice of Chinese folk religion on social media 
is discussed in the next chapter. One 
sub- genre, however, consists of 
regional images. For instance, the text 
embedded on Fig. 3.18 says: ‘If you 
come from Jiangxi, you have to share 
this post!’ Jiangxi is an inland province 
of China, from which many rural 
migrants come. The dirty face of the 
rural boy in Fig. 3.18 strongly 
contrasts with the large, cool 
sunglasses and cigarette. As a factory 
migrant worker who shared it 
commented: ‘Our peasants are poor, 
but we can also have an attitude 
(zhuai).’ On top of the image, the text blurb declares Jiangxi to be the best place 
in China: 
 
The high buildings in Beijing are nothing compared to huts in Jiangxi; the 
fast cars in Shanghai are nothing compared to the bikes in Jiangxi; Jiangxi 
has the most beautiful women in China, and men in Jiangxi are all very 
handsome and rich.  
 
Fig. 3.18 A typical ‘compulsorily shared’ 
posting among rural migrants with a focus 
on regional connections 
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Such kind of posting has become a meme.129 Rural migrants from other provinces 
also share similar postings about their hometowns. In the face of severe social 
discrimination and a strong rural–urban divide, the pervasive lack of self-
conﬁdence and sense of belonging among rural migrants is somehow expressed 
in an extremely proud tone in these postings. And many people feel a compulsion 
to share such postings to make a proud public statement. The reason for sharing 
such posts also lies in some pragmatic concerns.  
 
 
As we will see in Chapter 5, social connections between people from the 
same hometown is the fundamental social network on which rural migrants rely 
to get a job, find a place to live and get access to other forms of support (Zhang 
& Li, 2003). Thus a collective identity based on the same hometown (tongxiang) 
not only serves as a sense of belonging for individuals; it also plays a key role in 
                                                     
129  ‘Meme’ refers to frequently reposted visual postings consisting of images and 
embedded text. A meme can be reproduced quickly on social media. On social media 
memes have become a very popular model of visual postings. 
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the collective allocation of social resources in rural migrants’ economic lives. 
Given all the reasons above, images from the ‘compulsory-shared’ genre are 
pervasive on the social media profiles of rural migrants (Chart 3.4). 
 
3. 1. 5 ‘Chicken soup for the soul’ 
Images from the ‘Chicken soup for soul’ genre are usually the illustrations of 
articles on the same theme. When people shared this kind of article, they also 
shared the images embedded within them. Originally Chicken Soup for the Soul 
referred to a book series from the US, consisting of inspirational true stories about 
how ordinary people managed to have happy and successful lives. The book was 
translated into Chinese around a decade ago and became a major bestseller. 
Nowadays people use the expression ‘chicken soup for the soul’ (xin ling ji tang) 
to describe shared articles on social media offering career and lifestyle advice. It 
is very common for those articles to contain photographs of celebrities. Ma 
Yun, 130  for instance, a successful businessman who started from scratch, 
frequently appeared as a great source of advice. Ma is viewed as a living legend, 
especially as he failed the university entrance examination twice and ended up 
at a third-class university. This relatively unimpressive educational background 
resonated with rural migrants, many of whom have a poor educational 
background, making people accept him more easily in this role.  Titles of such 
articles run along the lines of ‘You are poor because you are not ambitious 
enough’ or ‘How to seize the most important opportunities in your life’. There is 
no direct quotation from Ma Yun or similar celebrities in those articles, but they 
                                                     
130 The founder of ‘Taobao’ and ‘Alibaba’, the first mainland Chinese entrepreneur to 
appear on the cover of Forbes Magazine. Today he ranks as one of the world’s 
billionaires. 
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all read as if suggestions came directly from the celebrities, and people who share 
them truly believe this is so.  
Many rural migrants, especially young men, believe that if one follows the 
advice they will also become rich and successful men. Such conviction is 
reinforced by the fact that many factory owners in GoodPath also started from 
scratch. The majority of the factory owners also come from villages; they were 
born with a rural hukou and did not have higher education, not dissimilar from the 
situation that factory migrant workers are in. In the eyes of many rural migrants, 
the reason this group of people rose to become the nouveau riche (tu hao)131 is 
not because they are more hard-working or smarter; it is rather because they had 
the luck to be born in coastal villages rather than inland rural areas, and were 
blessed by the opportunities offered by economic development in China.  
Women on the other hand, especially young women, turn more towards 
Reader’s Digest-style articles which, together with sweet and cute images, deal 
with wise attitudes towards 
relationships and life. Titles of 
such posts are along the lines 
of ‘30 pieces of advice for 
young women’, ‘What is real 
love?’ and ‘Men, if your woman 
no longer needs your 
                                                     
131 See also discussion of Chinese ‘nouveau riches’ at Goodman, David, S. G. 2008. The 
new rich in China: future rules, present lives. Abingdon: Routlege. 
Fig. 3.19 A meme about a touching love story of a 
pair of lizards  
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protection, she no longer 
loves you’. Fig. 3.19 shows 
a male lizard grilling his tail 
for his girlfriend. The text 
reads, ‘Don’t worry, it said 
that my tail will grow 
again’. Here the sacrifice 
of oneself to please a 
partner was presented as a touching sign of true love. On Fig. 3.20, the text reads: 
‘When you have to take a break and think about whether you are still in love with 
somebody, that means the love has already gone.’ 
Among all the memes which tend to give people advice for life, one specific 
topic, the ‘passing traveller’ (guoke), seems to stand out. The text (Fig. 3.21) 
reads: ‘If you are not happy, you should let it go … someone appeared at some 
point and brought you a big surprise, which made you believe he or she was your 
god in life; however, you are wrong, some people are doomed to be just passing 
travellers in each other’s lives’ (fig. 3.21).  
 
 
Fig. 3.20 A popular meme about the nature of true love 
Fig. 3.21 Two typical ‘passing traveller’ memes 
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All the ‘passing traveller’ memes deliver the message that one should not 
take current encounters too seriously since life itself is unsettled and nobody can 
really control it. It is not hard to see the attraction of this ‘passing traveller’ memes 
given what we know of the transient lives of rural migrants. Moreover, the new 
generation of migrant workers has been experiencing insecurity and 
impermanence since childhood. As a result, them seem to have learned to 
present themselves as unflappable or even unconcerned about their own lives. 
Such a highly performative attitude almost detaches them from either their own 
or other people’s judgements.  All in all, the ‘chicken soup for the soul’ genre 
stands out as a major feature in postings among rural migrants (Chart 3.5). 
 
3. 1. 6 ‘Humour’ 
Most images in the ‘humour’ genre seem to be straightforward, with some obvious 
focal points for laughter. The text on Fig. 3.22, for example, reads: ‘Young man, 
you have grasped the rule of the world: swiping credit cards.’ In addition, there 
are many amusing photographs related to children or animals (Fig. 3.23). The 
gender difference in humour postings is clear, with men all appearing to enjoy 
humour postings more than women (Chart 3.6). Middle-aged men seem to be the 
biggest ‘jokers’, which bears some consistency to people’s offline social life: 
making good jokes at the dinner table is seen as a blessed talent, especially 
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among middle-aged men. Such capability often contributes to the ‘hot and noisy’ 
(renao) ambience of social life that we will discuss further in Chapter 5.  
 
 
3. 1. 7 ‘Fantasy’  
The ‘fantasy’ genre refers to beautiful and polished photographs of luxury 
lifestyles or prestigious goods, none of which seem to have anything in common 
with rural migrants’ offline lives in GoodPath. Those images showcase the ideal 
Fig. 3.22 (left) A ‘humor’ posting shared by a 
male factory worker  
 
Fig. 3.23 A typical ‘humor’ posting related to 
animals 
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lives for which both young women (Fig. 3.24) and young men (Fig. 3.25) are 
longing. Chapter 6 will further discuss the reasons behind the popularity of this 
genre. As apparent in Chart 3.7, the genre of ‘fantasy’ exists mainly among young 
people. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.24 Images showcasing the ideal lives of young rural migrant women  
 
Fig. 3.25 Images showcasing the ideal lives of young rural migrant men  
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3. 1. 8 ‘Children’ 
 
Most photographs of children are taken in a ‘natural’ way, not posed, and rarely 
have any art ﬁlter or decoration. The research in the rural area of north China 
found that parents express their best wishes for their children through 
professionally shot studio images (McDonald, 2016). However, such studio 
photographs of children are very rare on rural migrants’ social media proﬁles. 
Photographs of children (Chart 3.8) are one of most popular topics among 
women, and the ‘children’ genre is a major feature on social media. 
 
 
Fig. 3.26 Typical postings of children  
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3. 1. 9 ‘Travel’  
Photographs in the ‘Travel’ genre were usually taken when people were 
travelling, whether for work or on holiday. It is common to see images of train 
tickets or landscapes encountered on the way, posted to mark the journey. Even 
though rural migrants are characterised by high mobility, such ‘mobility’ mainly 
refers to the concept of ‘unsettled residence’ (Knight & Yueh, 2004). In terms of 
work and living patterns, the ﬂexibility and mobility they enjoyed in daily life were 
actually very limited. Most of them spent long hours labouring in factories or other 
workplaces, and could not afford to spend money and time travelling around for 
leisure. 
Having made this point, one nonetheless has to observe that there is 
growing interest in the idea of tourism among rural migrants. Many migrant 
workers started to experience tourism after they left their villages, and those trips, 
arranged either by more experienced colleagues or the factory workers’ guild 
(gong hui), were usually very short, but they still introduced ‘tourism’ as a feature 
of modern lifestyles for the first time (Kwek & Lee, 2013). 
 
Fig. 3. 27 Unedited travel photographs on social media  
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Dawei, a 20- year- old factory worker, is a typical example. He took many 
photos on his new smartphone during his ﬁrst trip, and posted all of them on his 
Qzone (Fig. 3.27). Last Chinese New Year, when Dawei returned to his village, 
he showed the photographs to some of his relatives and fellow villagers. ‘In my 
home village, no one has ever done tourism. People don’t even have the idea 
(mei zhe ge gai nian)’, he explained. Dawei’s relatives and fellow villagers who 
had stayed behind in the villages were inspired by Dawei’s tourist photographs, 
and a few weeks later they took a group trip to a nearby mountain. The local 
mountain area was actually a very famous sightseeing attraction in China, yet the 
peasants from neighbouring villages had never been there before. 
‘Travel’ genre postings on social media have introduced the modern idea 
of tourism, and their impact on people’s offline travelling behaviour is evident. 
Here we see how visual material on social media is not only the record of thoughts 
and daily lives. It is also an efficient way to transmit ideas that may have a 
signiﬁcant impact on people’s offline activities. In Da Wei’s case, the ideas of 
modern lifestyles that he picked up during his migration were spread by him to 
the remaining villagers via social media. The way in which cultural practices 
diffused from rural migrants to rural populations also suggests that rural migrants’ 
contributions to their home villages cannot be valued only from an economic 
perspective. As well as ﬁnancial remittance, there is another, simultaneous 
remittance – social remittance (Levitt, 1998; Murphy, 2002 Through this so- called 
social remittance, urban culture can increase its impact on the rural via 
interpersonal interaction between rural migrants and the remaining village 
residents. Meanwhile, the diffusion and appropriation of ICT, such as mobile 
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phones and computers in rural China, also took a form of ‘social remittance’ from 
migrant workers to rural residents (Oreglia, 2013).  
There is another feature of those travel photos: such a large number of 
photographs are not usually selective. For instance, Dawei uploaded 248 photos 
about a day trip to his Qzone. There is always more than one photo about the 
same person, object and similar scenery (see the differently coloured circles on 
Fig. 3.27). What Dawei did is very common among rural migrants, and the major 
reason for it lies in technology. Most rural migrants do not have a personal 
computer or other digital device for storing all their photographs, in addition to 
which the smartphone’s memory space is limited, so QQ online albums actually 
serve as a hard disk. Even though none of them have ever heard of ‘cloud 
technology’, their QQ albums have actually been used as a ‘cloud’ long before 
this became a global technological trend. Generally speaking, young men 
appeared most active in posting travel photos (Chart 3.9). ‘Those photos show 
that you are a man with a lot of travelling and experience’, explained Zhi Qiang, 
a 24-year-old factory worker. As he said, the idea that ‘travelling makes a man’ is 
deeply rooted. Travelling as a youth is viewed as the road to growing into a 
real man (Stafford, 1995). 
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3. 1. 10 ‘Events’  
Weddings, performance, public activities (Fig. 3.28) … all events that stand out 
from the routine of daily life are appropriate subjects for the ‘events’ genre. Like 
travel photographs, visual material surrounding events also tends to include a 
large number of repetitive images. 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 1. 11 ‘Archive’ 
Postings in the ‘archive’ genre contain how- to information, ranging from how to 
cook delicious soup and tips for using essential balm to emergency ﬁrst aid for 
children rescued from water (Fig. 3.29). The reason people share these postings 
Fig. 3.28 Typical postings of events 
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is that they want to store the useful information on their QQ proﬁles, just like a 
digital archive. For many people such shared articles have provided them with 
useful knowledge, and some have already applied information learned from 
social media in their daily lives. For rural migrants without a higher level of 
education, these ‘archive’ postings actually offer an effective learning experience: 
the genre is an important form of adult education. 
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3. 1. 12 ‘Political’ 
The most popular topics of the ‘political’ genre include criticism of corruption, 
social discrimination, injustice and poverty (Fig. 3.30). All of these issues evoke 
high levels of sympathy among rural migrants, since they perceived themselves 
as direct victims. The most popular international political issue was the China–
Japan relationship (Fig. 3.31), invested with strong emotions of patriotism and 
nationalism. Among factory workers, suffering from all sorts of domestic problems 
on a daily basis, anti-Japan postings are still far more popular than any other 
political postings related to domestic issues. Suffice it to say that nationalist 
sentiment against Japan is an instrument that the Chinese Communist Party uses 
to ally public support, to bolster the population’s faith in the party-state and to hold 
the country together during its rapid and turbulent transformation (Zhao, 2005). 
As shown on Chart 3.12, the political genre is definitely male-dominated and 
generally speaking rural migrants, especially the younger generation, show an 
extremely low rate of participation in this social media genre. 
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Fig. 3.30 Typical political postings relating to criticism of corruption, social 
discrimination, injustice and poverty. 
 
Fig. 3.31 Typical political postings with strong elements of patriotism and 
nationalism. Text (left): ‘Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands belong to China –  share it and 
let the world see it’. Text (right): ‘Chairman Xi tells the world that China is going 
to teach Japan a lesson. Share it!’ 
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3. 1. 13 ‘Food’ 
The genre of ‘food’ refers both to images of food alone or to ‘people + food’, which 
shows the food being collectively consumed as a social event. ‘You are what you 
eat’ as people say, food is such an important part of Chinese perceived cultural 
experience (Chang, 1997). The use of food to express sophisticated social norms 
is highly developed in China (Watson, 1987). As Kao Tzu, an ancient Chinese 
philosopher, observed, ‘the appetite for food and sex is human nature’ (Shi Se 
Xing Ye). Also, in a traditional society, division of a stove is symbolic of family 
division (Stafford, 1995). A marriage without eating together is not considered 
legitimate, while the birth of boys and adoption of heirs are both events marked 
and celebrated by eating together (Watson, 1987). Given the high social 
significance of food and ‘eating together’, it is not difficult to understand the 
popularity of food photographs on social media to highlight the social connection.  
 
 
Fig. 3.32 Typical postings of food  
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As Chart 3.13 shows, middle-aged women and young men contribute the 
highest number of postings in the ‘food’ genre. The images of food shared by 
males were in most cases about dining events, which usually include a group of 
people and food. 
 
 
3. 1. 14 ‘Anti-mainstream’ (Feizhuliu)  
Contemporary China has witnessed the emergence of a motley group of youth 
subcultures or countercultures since the beginning of the economic reforms (Liz, 
2011). The concept of Feizhuliu (FZL hereafter), meaning anti-mainstream or 
non-mainstream, has become very popular among the Chinese post-1990s 
generation,132 and FZL culture has its full expression on the social media postings 
of rural migrant youth. There are two sub- genres of FZL, one rebellious and cool 
(Fig. 3.33), the other extremely cute (Fig. 3.34). On ‘rebellious’ images there are 
figures of evil gangsters, always depicted in popular HongKong films (Zhou, 
                                                     
132 See a further analysis of anti-mainstream culture in Shen, Y. 2009. ‘The reasons for 
the popularity of the anti-mainstream culture.’ Journal of Zhangzhou Normal University 
(Philosophy and Social Science) 2: 139–142. 
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2007), or some brave and rebellious statements (on Fig. 3.33 the text reads: 
‘crush, fly’).  
 
 
 
 
Young men seem to be keener on sharing ‘gangster’ images, whereas other 
rebellious images and memes are equally popular among young men and 
women. Cute and sweet images seem to be more popular among young women, 
although you can often see men sharing some extremely cute and sweet images. 
Chapter 7 will explore these issues of gender as reflected by the posting of cute 
images. As shown on Chart 3.14, postings in the ‘anti-mainstream’ or FZL genre 
Fig. 3.33 Typical rebellious anti-mainstream postings  
Fig. 3.34 Typical cute and sweet anti-mainstream postings   
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seem to be confined to young people and middle-aged men. In Chapter 7 we will 
take a closer look at the issue of gender identities behind these FZL images. 
 
 
3. 1. 15 ‘Commercial’   
Postings in the ‘commercial’ genre started to become popular among all ages 
following the monetisation of social media (Chart 3.15) – especially WeChat, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Fig. 3.35 is a typical post in which the user sells stuff on 
his or her profile. Another common commercial activity, Jizan (collecting ‘likes’) 
involves users collecting ‘likes’ from their online friends to win a coupon (Fig. 
3.36). On this screenshot, the text on the top reads ‘I kneel down for more “likes”’; 
the image and link below form part of the advertisement of a local photography 
studio. 
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3. 1. 16 What is special about the visual postings of rural migrants? 
‘We are becoming a visually mediated society. For many, understanding of the 
world is being accomplished, not through words, but by reading images.’ (Lester, 
2006) So far we have discussed all 15 genres of social media visual postings. 
Some of the images require more contextual knowledge to be interpreted fully, 
Fig. 3.35 (left) A typical commercial 
posting from which people sell 
goods on their profiles  
Fig. 3.36 A typical commercial posting 
from which people collect ‘likes’ 
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and we will continue the discussion in the rest of the thesis. Even before further 
discussion, however, we seem to have reached a good point to consider what is 
special about the images posted by rural migrants on their social media profiles. 
Are these a result of Chinese people’s general visual preferences, or does it 
reflect the choices of this specific social group? A comparison between the visual 
postings of rural migrants and middle-class residents in Shanghai (Chart 3.16)133 
offers us a perspective from which to consider this question. 
 
 
As shown on Chart 3.16, ‘relationships’, ‘selfies’ and ‘children’ are the three visual 
genres popular among both rural migrants and the urban population. The urban 
population showed more interest in posting visual material on the genres of 
                                                     
133 Data based on 8,540 visual postings (the last 20 visual postings of each participants) 
by 461 participants (377 living in GoodPath, 84 in Shanghai) on WeChat or QQ. (data 
collected from July- September 2014) 
48% 47% 45%
42%
21%
18%
10%
27%
39%
44% 45%
41%
44%
62%
30%
5% 6%
13%
0%
14%
10%
30%
40%
43%
46%
50%
54% 55%
65% 65%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
C
o
m
p
lu
s
o
ry
-s
h
a
re
d
F
a
n
ta
s
y
'C
h
ic
k
e
n
 s
o
u
p
 f
o
r 
s
o
u
l'
F
Z
L
C
o
m
m
e
rc
ia
l
T
ri
v
ia
P
o
li
ti
c
a
l
A
rc
h
iv
e
H
u
m
o
r
S
e
lf
ie
s
C
h
il
d
re
n
E
v
e
n
ts
F
o
o
d
R
e
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
s
T
ra
v
e
l
GoodPath Shanghai
Chart 3.16 Distribution of 15 visual genres among rural migrants of GoodPath and 
residents of Shanghai 
146 
 
‘travel’, ‘political’, ‘archive’, ‘events’ and ‘food’, partly reflecting the difference of 
socioeconomic status and lifestyle between Chinese rural migrants and the urban 
Chinese. However, the most outstanding discrepancies occur in the genres of 
‘compulsorily shared’, ‘fantasy’, ‘chicken soup for the soul’ and ‘anti-mainstream’ 
(FZL), where rural migrants have definitely shown more passion. 
These four genres can very well serve as the starting point for us to explore 
the features of visual postings among rural migrants. Firstly, a strikingly common 
point between these four is that none of them records domestic offline life, and 
none is a type of social memory comparable with the former use of analogue 
photography.134  The majority of images in these four genres is memes and 
images collected from the internet, rather than original photographs that people 
took themselves. All the images of postings in the ‘compulsorily shared’ genre 
are related to folk religion or hometown- related memes; those in the ‘fantasy’ 
genre, meanwhile, present a modern, materialistic world, dramatically different 
from rural migrants’ offline life. Similarly, the ‘chicken soup for the soul’ visual 
genre provides a whole set of aspirational life models with artistic images or 
images of celebrities. And for rural migrant youth, the ‘anti- mainstream’ (FZL) 
genre provides the speciﬁc visual language to express rebellious gestures or 
gestures that are not really acceptable in offline situations. The desire for a 
modern life is efficiently expressed by the popularity of these four visual genres. 
In Chapter 6 we will explore further how the beautiﬁed life on social media helps 
rural migrants to think through changes in their own existences and to live 
                                                     
134 Research on digital photography has suggested that photographs on social media 
somehow remain similar to the analogue photography as a form of memory in the pre-
social media age. For example, see Dijck, J. van. 2007. Mediated Memories in the Digital 
Age. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.  
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different daily life. Second, it turns out that age is a key factor in terms of 
posting activity. Young rural migrants, both female and male, are far more active 
in posting images, especially aspirational images about modern lifestyles, on 
social media, whereas older people, especially women, were the least active. As 
Jacka noticed, the search for ‘autonomy, hopes and aspiration’ (Jacka, 2006: 
138), is the key factors in the rural youth’s decisions to leave their villages. One 
can easily argue that is because young people are supposed to have more 
dreams about life, and that such youthful passion will gradually disappear over 
time. However, there is something more about the special situation of young 
people among rural migrants, which I will further discuss in Chapter 6.  
 Third, among rural migrants, the three least posted visual genres are 
‘political’, ‘trivia’ and ‘commercial’. Given all the argument in Chapter 2 about the 
booming of social commerce in China, it may appear strange that the 
‘commercial’ genre is still among the last three. Here, however, ‘commercial’ 
refers to postings of doing business, selling goods or posting commercial 
advertisements on one’s personal social media proﬁles. To put things in 
perspective, therefore, the absolute ﬁgure of 21 per cent is already very 
impressive compared to the situation on Facebook, where it is very rare to see 
postings on personal accounts for the direct purpose of making money. As for 
‘trivia’, the result is not unexpected. However, probably the most surprising fact 
is that among all the 15 genres, the concept of ‘political’ – much discussed as a 
key element that can facilitate political participation – turns out to be the least 
posted among rural migrants. Yet this may be the very population that need social 
media most, as they are least likely to express their political opinions in any other 
media. What has happened? Is this because of the internet censorship in China? 
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Or were people simply indifferent about politics, or saw no point in political 
postings? Chapter 7 will address all these questions through a closer look into 
the engagement with politics, both online and offline, among different groups in 
GoodPath and a discussion of the social media’s impact on political participation. 
 
3. 2 The visual on social media, a new language 
It is evident that visual images on social media helped people to express 
themselves better. In many cases it is not just a question of improving the ability 
to express oneself: some of what we ﬁnd is unprecedented offline. To see this 
more clearly we can start from one particular tragedy. In 1993, 87 young female 
rural migrants lost their lives in a large ﬁre in a toy factory in south China. 
A researcher managed to get access to 77 personal letters that the victims had 
received from friends and relatives, as well as to the letters they were about to 
send.38 Those letters revealed for the ﬁrst time the hidden inner world of Chinese 
migrant workers. The main topics mentioned in those private letters were 
1) wages; 2) work conditions; 3) problems related to physical well- being; and 
4) loneliness and isolation. Money is the biggest concern, and a few workers 
mentioned they felt lonely in cities. Curiously, two decades later, the common 
topics of phone calls and other offline conversations among rural migrants remain 
much the same. The most common subjects in today’s phone calls were ‘how 
much one has earned or saved so far’, ‘whether one can ﬁnd a better paid job’, 
‘whether the children can get into the local schools’ or ‘whether one can help a 
relative or a fellow villager to ﬁnd a job’. Generally speaking, how best to get by 
remains the dominant concern within these phone calls, just as they were in 
letters and personal phone calls at that time. Even in these communications, 
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personal feelings are subsumed by practical concerns. Topics such as thoughts 
about life or personal aspirations seem to be ‘unspeakable’. Ke Li, a factory 
worker, put it in this way: ‘It is not something you will talk about on a phone call 
or in front of people you know … it’s just weird, you only talk about what needs to 
be done or what’s wrong, rather than those daydreams.’ By contrast Chi Hui, a 
24-year-old factory girl, used ‘giving idealistic speech’ (jiang dadaoli) to describe 
the memes about romance which she constantly shared on her Qzone.  
 
Well, you won’t call your friends and give them those idealistic speeches 
(jiang da dao li), people must think you are insane … When you share 
those online that’s normal, because everybody does so. 
 
As Chi Hui observed, social media has become the ‘normal’ and ‘proper’ place in 
which people can talk about their (day)dreams, their aspirations and what they 
think about life, rather than what they want to have for tomorrow’s dinner. The 
easily shared and ubiquitous visual material on social media certainly facilitates 
such new forms of communication. Besides this, the one- to- many nature of 
social media postings also encourages people to be more focused on their own 
feelings, rather than addressing speciﬁc daily issues to particular individuals. 
Furthermore, communication on social media is usually asynchronous, which 
enables people to manage their self- presentations more strategically, without 
time pressure. On Ke Li’s Qzone there are many shared postings about how to 
become a successful businessman. He also regularly posts photographs of 
luxury night clubs which he collects from the internet, both representing the kinds 
of personal aspiration that would not have been expressed in phone calls. 
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3. 3 Conclusion 
This chapter started with a description of the 15 genres of visual images that rural 
migrants commonly post on their social media, followed by an analysis of the 
motivation behind them. These highly diverse and sometimes unexpected 
images are like a treasure trove to outsiders trying to understand the feelings and 
aspirations of a marginalised but massive population –  one whose voices can 
hardly be heard in mainstream media, and which has kept its feelings and 
thoughts to itself over the past three decades.  
The chapter then proceeded to examine the difference between the visual 
languages shared by rural migrants and those of the urban population in 
Shanghai. Only through such comparisons does a unique ‘visual grammar’ 
appear. Rather than being a digital memory which records offline life, the 
evidence suggests that images on social media can illustrate complementary 
aspects of life. Before social media we used to see photography as a historical 
effort to represent or duplicate life (Barthes, 1981). However, the situation here 
can be the opposite. Certainly in visual genres such as ‘children’, ‘food’, ‘events’, 
and ‘travel’ we see continuity between traditional photos and visual postings 
online. However, in other cases visual postings in the genres of ‘chicken soup for 
the soul’, FZL and ‘fantasy’ detach people from their offline situation and construct 
a whole new world online. People talked about what is happening on their social 
media in their offline life –  in a manner that suggested that it was their online 
lives which for them represented a colourful and interesting world constructed 
around aspirational images. So online space has now become the world that 
people truly enjoy, dream about and want to replicate in their offline lives. 
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Chapter 4 
Social media and efficacy, continuity and transformation 
 
 
4. 0 Introduction  
The discussion of the 15 visual genres in Chapter 3 provides a panoramic view 
of the visual landscape on the social media profiles of migrant workers. In the 
second part of Chapter 3, through the comparison between the postings of rural 
migrants and Shanghai residents, the main argument is that the visual on social 
media has become a revealing way to understand the daily life of rural migrants 
— what do they really believe in and care about, what kind of life are they looking 
for, and how do they see themselves.  
 However, the argument in Chapter 3 seems to presuppose that posting on 
social media automatically attains certain efficacy in people’s daily life. Why did 
rural migrants post deity images on their social media? Why did those young 
migrant workers post photos about their imagined modern world or rebellious anti-
mainstream gestures on their Qzones? Is the posting on social media merely an 
efficient and adequate way of expressing oneself or is there something else which 
has made the posting on social media ‘do the trick’? In what context do postings 
on social media gain their efficacy? Drawing upon anthropological accounts of 
Chinese cosmology as well as ethnography in GoodPath town, this chapter aims 
to answer these questions. 
 
4. 1 Chinese folk religion and social media  
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As shown in Chapter 3, the social media profiles of rural migrants are full of 
images of all kind of deities in Chinese folk beliefs. In order to make sense of 
these deities’ presence online, one has to return to a more general observation 
of the popularity of deities, or Chinese folk beliefs to be exact, in people’s daily 
life. Starting from a Communist Party member’s funeral, this section traces back 
the cultural and social roots of Chinese folk religion in contemporary China, which 
gives an explanation to the ‘rebirth’ of deities on social media. 
 
4. 1. 1 The religious life of the atheists 
Lao Zhang died at the age of 81 without a struggle; he simply passed peacefully 
away. Local people believed that this was a ‘good death’ (hao si), something only 
achieved by those who are blessed (you fu qi). On the day of Lao Zhang’s funeral 
a ‘master’ (da shi) led the way, chanting spells aloud in a flat tone which, from 
time to time, was overwhelmed by the fireworks. 
 A middle-aged man who worked as a driver for a local Party official, 
brought me down to earth by commenting that ‘You know what, because he [Lao 
Zhang] was a senior Party member, the Party paid not only the regular funeral 
expenses, but also the fee for the master (da shi).’ This seemed confusing to me, 
so I pressed further: 
‘Really?! … but …why does a Communist Party member need a folk religion 
master to perform the funeral ritual?’ 
‘Why not? The Party leadership thought he deserved a proper funeral.’ 
‘No, no, no … I mean, isn’t the Communist Party atheist?’  
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‘Hey look, he worked for the Party when he was alive, but the problem is the 
Party can’t take care of him after his death, right? So now everything is taken 
over by the deities (shen ming)!’  
 
As the man jerked his head forward, clearly punctuating his statement with an 
exclamation mark, our conversation was interrupted by shouting from the front of 
the procession. ‘Dad, run! Run fast!’ someone exclaimed. ‘There will be a big fire!’ 
A chorus of voices shouted ‘Run!, ‘Run!’, ‘Run!’, ‘Run!’ – warning the spirit (hun) 
that the body was going to be carried into the incinerator.  
 After an hour the procession moved on to inter the ashes, led by the 
master. Before the sealing of the stone cave where the ashes were placed he 
Fig. 4.1 ‘Spirit money’, the funeral banknotes 
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rearranged the display of offerings for better Feng Shui,135 then toasted a cup of 
spirit (shao jiu) to the god of the Earth (tu di gong). The toast was a rhetorical 
negotiation with the deity, which basically ran along these lines: descendants of 
Lao Zhang will visit here every year and make offerings; therefore, in turn, the 
god of the Earth shall take care of Lao Zhang under the ground and bless his 
descendants.  
 After the toast, Lao Zhang’s relatives started to burn piles of ‘sprit 
money’136 – the funeral banknotes (Fig. 4.1) that, according to folk religion, would 
be ‘transferred’ to Lao Zhang’s account underneath the ground, to be used by 
deities and himself.137 “Paper offerings are burnt to ashes so they may go beyond 
the confines of the living world — to the gods, the ghosts, and the ancestors” 
(Scott, 2007: 20). As Chapter 2 noted, money is always regarded as a proper 
expression of family feelings; it is also used in Chinese folk religion to maintain a 
                                                     
135 Feng Shui, which explains how the universe is held in harmony by ‘yin’ and ‘yang’ 
forces, is a core philosophic system closely linked to Chinese Taoism. Feng Shui is widely 
practiced in Sino-Asia (including HongKong, Taiwan, Singapore etc.), and its main 
purpose is to arrange a balance in peoples’ lives between humankind and the surrounding 
environment. Maintaining such a harmonious relationship is regarded as a key element 
influencing one’s welfare and luck. See Lip, E. 1995. Feng Shui: environments of power: 
a study of Chinese architecture. London: John Wiley & Son Ltd. 
136 In some anthropological accounts of Chinese funeral rituals, this kind of ‘money’ burnt 
at funeral was also called ‘paper money’ as a literal translation of the Chinese term ‘zhi 
qian’. And in practice, there are different types of paper money for different purposes and 
with different names, ranging from sheets of coarse paper, ‘paper silver’ for ancestors and 
common spirits, and ‘paper gold’ for higher ranks of deities, to ‘hell bank notes’ imitating 
the appearance of modern banknotes. See a detailed discussion of the techniques and 
practices of various kinds of ‘paper money’ as well as the production of value in paper-
burning customs at Blake, C. 2011. Burning Money: The Material Spirit of the Chinese 
Lifeworld. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.  
137 Sending valuables to the dead is a common funeral practice in and outside China. In 
general, there are at least three means of ‘transmission’. The first is to present the 
valuables in a ritual venue and invite spirits; the second is to bury he valuable with the 
dead; and the third is to destroy the valuables by immolation or by exposure to the 
elements of wind, water, and especially fire. With the development of paper since the 
early Song dynasty, the custom of burning the vessels in the form of paper has been 
widespread. See Blake, C. 2011. ibid. 53–54.   
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good relationship with the gods. As a folk saying declares, ‘the god of the Earth 
runs a bank; money opens the way to the gods’ (tu di ye kai yin hang, qian tong 
shen lu), reflecting a common belief that ‘money’ was used widely as ‘capital by 
the gods themselves in transactions with human beings’.138 
 The ‘underground’ banknote, with a face value of 1 billion, is issued by ‘the 
bank of Earth and Heaven’ (tian di yin hang). It appears to be very international: 
the layout and signatures are those of the US dollar, while on the side two 
Chinese characters read ‘Pounds Sterling’.139 In the middle is an image of the 
Jade Emperor (yu huang da di), the supreme God in Chinese Taoism. The face 
value has nothing to do with inflation, but simply suggests that one has an 
unlimited supply of money – literally, money to burn. 
 On the way back, the driver took an extremely strange detour, basically 
turning right and left randomly at each intersection we passed. He explained:  
 
                                                     
138 There are many other uses of money in the burial rites of Chinese folk religion. In 
some cases real currency, not only ‘spirit money’, is involved – for example people will 
pay a master to communicate with a dead person. See more detailed discussion and 
analysis of the use and value of money in Chinese folk ideologies at Gate, H. 1987. 
‘Money for the Gods.’ Modern China 13(3): 259–77.  
139 Blake argues that the tendency of producing spirit money which looks like real foreign 
bank notes in circulation represents the insertion of the traditional custom into the forces 
of capitalism. On the other hand, it is also a parody of capitalist relations. In practice, 
there are other types of ‘paper offerings’, ranging from paper car, paper air conditioners, 
paper iPhone, paper sexy girl, to paper viagra and condoms. See Blake, C. 2011. Op. cit. 
In addition, during the time of writing, the most well-known event about the Chinese 
paper-burning custom is the ‘paper Gucci’ row which ended up with Gucci’s official 
apology after their warning of Hong Kong’s funeral shops not to sell paper fakes of Gucci 
products was widely criticized. 
http://www.theguardian.com/fashion/2016/may/06/gucci-apologises-hong-kong-
funeral-fakes-row  
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We need to confuse the sprit. It remembers the way we came here and 
will follow us, so I need to make a lot of detours to get rid of it. Otherwise 
we will both suffer from disaster (zai) in the following days. 
  
The next day an image of GuanYin (Avalokitesvara) was shared on this driver’s 
Qzone (Fig. 4.2). GuanYin is a mother Buddha140 who is also worshipped in 
Taoist temples. The posting commented: 
 
 If you see this image 
please share it on your 
Qzone and WeChat; it 
will help you to avoid 
bad luck in the coming 
seven days. If you don’t 
share, you will have a 
disaster (zai) soon.  
 
Lao Zhang’s daughter also posted the image of GuanYin on her WeChat and 
wrote, ‘A safe trip, my father’. People in GoodPath would never use terms such 
as ‘cosmology’ or ‘religion’ — their beliefs and fears about the universe, deities, 
bad luck and death are deeply embedded in their daily cultural and social 
                                                     
140  GuanYin, as the one of most popular deities worshipped in Chinese households, is 
multifaceted. See a detailed analysis of GuanYin at Yu, C. 1979. ‘Images of Kuan-yin in Chinese 
folk literature.’ Hanxue yanjiu 8(1): 221–86.  
Fig. 4.2 An image of GuanYin, a mother Buddha 
figure, shared on social media  
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practice. “Being civilized, that is, being Chinese, was nothing less than proper 
human behavior in accordance with cosmic principles.” (Cohen, 1991: 113) The 
Communist Party’s official doctrine would describe what the driver did both offline 
and online as ‘feudal superstition’ (fengjian mixin).141 The efficient transformation 
of ‘tradition’ into ‘feudalism’, ‘customs’ or ‘religion’ into ‘superstition’, thus giving 
these customs, traditions and religion the connotation of backward and negative 
‘old society’, has been pervasively applied to attain cultural legitimacy of the ‘new 
nation’ created by the Communist Party (Cohen, 1993). However, the idea of 
traditional cosmology has for long been fully absorbed into Chinese vocabulary 
and is deeply ingrained in the thinking of ordinary people throughout China. In 
fact, traditional cosmology has been practiced in folk rituals and handed down 
from one generation to the next, reinforced by a myriad of folk tales, over 
hundreds or even thousands of years. For the greater part of the Chinese 
population, modern nationalism articulated with a total rejection of the traditional 
sense of being Chinese is problematic and even ironic (Cohen, 1991). Therefore, 
in practice, such ‘feudal superstition', including Fengshui, is still ubiquitously 
                                                     
141 Feudal superstition, which includes all folk religious activities, has been ruled to be 
illegal and unworthy of protection. See details at Donald, E. M. 1989. Religion in China 
Today: Policy and Practice. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books. As the number of 
religious believers grows, the Post Mao government applied a slightly looser regulation 
upon religion. As part of its larger program for social control, the government permits 
some religious liberties for authorized and supervised religions, and generally prohibits, 
represses, and prosecutes unauthorized groups. The current regulations continue to 
represent strong state supervision of religion. See Carlson, E. 2005. ‘China's new 
regulations on religion: A small step, not a great leap, forward.’ Brigham Young 
University Law Review 3:747-797. Meanwhile, in current official discourse ‘feudal 
superstition’, referring to various folk religious customs, remains as a stigmatised term 
which stands on the opposite side of the ‘civilisation and ideology of socialism’. Thus 
‘feudual superstition’ needs to be strictly controlled and cleaned up. For example, see 
news report (20/01/2015) ‘Blow the wind of “civilisation” to the villages by cleaning up 
feudal superstition’ [zhengzhi fengjian mixin shi gei xiangcun chui “wenming feng”] 
http://www.wenming.cn/wmpl_pd/yczl/201501/t20150120_2409728.shtml  
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applied, and that in many cases the Party, or the Party officials to be exact, 
actually appear to endorse it (Chau, 2006). 
 From here we see that despite the huge efforts made by the Communist 
Party for more than half a century to reshape the ‘superstructure’ of Chinese 
society, it has failed to change the essential beliefs held by much of the population 
(Yang, 2011; Luo, 1991). “It is precisely the enormity of Communist cultural 
ambitions, as backed by the politically enforced monopolization of cultural 
production and by the claim to be the sole legitimate source of cultural meaning, 
that in fact has led Communist states to be revealed as so culturally impotent.” 
(Cohen, 1991: 152) 
 ‘Say one thing and do another,’ (shou yi tao, zuo yi tao) as people say, 
and it appears that they do. In the survey I conducted, a strong majority of people 
(86 per cent) wrote down ‘Nil’ to the inquiry about religion and belief (zongjiao 
xinyang). 142  However, when it comes to immediate personal interests and 
welfare, such as trying to ensure the best ‘after-death life’ for a loved one, people 
have no problem in abandoning the ‘politically correct’ doctrine and following their 
own systems of belief. The discrepancy between what people claim and what 
people do seems to be indicative of the Chinese forces on “proper behavior rather 
than on proper ideas, on orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy” (Cohen, 1991: 117). 
In addition, Social media, the platforms on which people feel freer to express 
themselves, has become one of the major places where people can practice folk 
religions. The situation is especially true for rural migrants, whose ‘floating’ lives 
make practicing such folk religion more difficult. Nevertheless, the practice of folk 
                                                     
142 A demographic survey conducted among 238 rural migrants and 75 local people in 
GoodPath in June 2014. 
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religion has been so deeply embedded in rural migrants’ daily life to the degree 
that even without obvious religious rituals, the way people related themselves to 
others and the society strongly reflect the beliefs in folk religion. To further explain 
the relationship between folk religion and the related pattern of sociality observed 
in this field work, some brief introduction of Chinese folk religion is necessary.  
 
4. 1. 2 Chinese folk religion: some background 
In brief, Chinese folk religion involves three main categories of supernatural 
beings: gods, ghosts and ancestors (Wolf, 1974). The latter two both rely heavily 
on offerings made by living people. Ancestors have a permanent abode within an 
individual household or an ancestral hall, where they receive offerings of food, 
incense and flowers (Ahern, 1982). Ghosts however are ‘unwanted beings’ – 
usually people who died a premature, accidental or other ‘unnatural’ death (Wolf, 
1974), after which they wander around as lonely ghosts. However, the terms 
‘ancestor’ and ‘ghost’ are relative. Someone’s ancestor can be another person’s 
ghost, because ancestor sprits, unlike a deity, will only bless their own 
descendants and may be harmful to someone not related to them (Eng, 2006). 
That explains why the driver at Lao Zhang’s funeral perceived the spirit possibly 
to be an evil ghost who might bring him bad luck. 
 Polytheism is a striking concept of Chinese society where “civil power not 
only tolerates all religions equally, but has placed them all under its own direct 
jurisdiction” (Lyall, 1890: 90). In practice Chinese people have no problem in 
worshiping deities from Buddhism or Taoism or saints from Confucianism all 
together; as one informant observed: ‘All the deities out there are friends; they 
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just speak different languages.’ Most people are tolerant of this diversity in 
religion and see no reason for bothering about the distinctions (Harrell, 1977). 
 Orientation towards the secular is another striking feature of Chinese folk 
religions. The word ling (efficacy) is frequently used to describe whether 
supernatural beings can or would be willing to address the desires and claims 
from the secular world, whether these concern wealth, health or other specific 
wishes such as having a baby (Baity, 1975). Gods are ranked according to 
efficacy, but such a rank is flexible according to different situations – all 
suggesting a clear correspondence between Chinese folk cosmology and the 
structure of secular bureaucracy (Sangren, 1983). In GoodPath people would 
discuss which temple is the most efficacious one, and a similar rank of deities 
can be also seen on social media postings. 
 
4. 1. 3 Deities on social media 
GuanYin and GuanGong are probably the 
two deities ranked most highly by rural 
migrants. It’s not the first time GuanYin,143 
the mother Buddha, has been mentioned 
in this volume. In this chapter we have 
seen saw how people posted images of 
                                                     
143 See Sangren, P. S. 1983. ‘Female gender in Chinese religious symbols: Kuan Yin, 
Ma Tsu, and the “Eternal Mother”’. Signs 9(1): 4–25 for a detailed analysis of the origin 
of GuanYin as a female deity. Please note in the study of GuanYin, some research applied 
the traditional phonetic notation of the deity name, which is ‘Kuan Yin’. GuanYin, is the 
standard pinyin which is used in mainland China. The difference between GuanYin and 
Kuan Yin is similar to the difference between ‘Beijing’ and ‘Peking’. 
Fig. 4.3 An image of the deity 
GuanGong shared on social media 
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GuanYin after Lao Zhang’s funeral, for various reasons. Traditionally GuanYin, is 
regarded as a mighty goddess who blesses fertility, safety and health; she is 
worshipped most widely across Chinese society (Sangren, 1983). 
 Unlike GuanYin, whose image was posted and shared by both men and 
women, images of the male deity GuanGong are mainly shared among men on 
social media. In history GuanGong was a great general and minister during the 
Han Dynasty (in the third century AD); after his death he was worshiped as the 
deity of the martial virtues. 144  Kai, a factory worker, shared the image of 
GuanGong on his Qzone (Fig. 4.3) when one of his closest colleagues was 
leaving. On that post Kai wishes that their brotherhood would be like ‘The Oath 
of the Peach Garden’ (Tao yuan jie yi). The story, recorded in a famous historical 
novel Three Kingdoms,145 describes how GuanGong and two other men took an 
oath and became sworn brothers in a ceremony in the Peach Garden. The legend 
is based on historical fact: these three sworn brothers established the state of 
Chu Han during the Three Kingdoms period.  
 The popularity of GuanGong posts on social media among male rural 
migrants reflects the widespread ideal of brotherhood they share. Loyalty is 
always regarded as the most important virtue of such a brotherhood. GuanGong 
was a royal general who had never disobeyed the orders of his sworn elder 
brother, the emperor Liu Bei. Here brotherhood, in many cases, aligns with 
                                                     
144 GuanGong is not only worshipped in temples, but also in stores and shops. People 
believe that he has the ability to suppress evil demons, thus he is viewed as a means of 
protection for people and prosperity for business. In addition, because of his interest in 
history and literature, he is also regarded by many Chinese scholars as a deity of literature. 
See Cohen, A. and Jaw, Y. 1977. ‘A Chinese Temple Keeper Talks about Chinese Folk 
Religion.’ Asian Folktale Studies, 36(1): 1–17. 
145 See the details of this novel at Roberts, Moss. 1976. Three kingdoms: China's epic 
drama. New York: Knopf Inc.  
162 
 
China’s hierarchical social system, serving as one of the dominant channels of 
social mobility and networking for men (Mann, 2000). For young male rural 
migrants, who have very limited social resources and have to rely on the 
protection and security of such brotherhoods, this is now even more true. In many 
cases such brotherhoods assumed forms of patronage, mentoring and 
‘discipleship’. 146  Unfortunately, however, as happened in history, 147  the 
brotherhood among young male migrant workers can be very fragile and easily 
fall apart– partly because it was formed under the pressure of survival in a specific 
situation, and was not strong enough to endure the test of ‘floating’ life in the 
longer term. 
 The image of GuanGong on Kai’s post,148 therefore, does not only portray 
a supernatural being with magical powers to be used for blessing and protecting 
his brotherhood. As GuanGong himself had a secular life and became a deity 
after death, he can also represent this ultimate ideal brotherhood149 – something 
                                                     
146 See Mann, S. 2000. ‘The male bond in Chinese history and culture.’ The American 
Historical Review 105(5): 1600–1614.  
147 One of the famous events in Chinese history was the failed Boxer Rebellion that 
occurred during the Qing dynasty. It was a major anti-foreign uprising among Chinese 
rural males, and the brotherhood claimed by the secret society was especially attractive 
to unemployed and powerless village men. See Cohen, P. A. 1997. History in Three Keys: 
The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth. New York: Columbia University Press.  
148 For female rural migrants the expression of bonding between females seems to be 
more straightforward. As we have seen in Chapter 3, people would post group 
photographs or other images illustrating close relationships between female friends. 
149 There is no specific deity figure representing bonding between women or a non-family 
tie between men and women in Chinese folk religion. This is mainly because social life 
in the traditional Chinese society is strongly segregated by gender. Girls and women, 
except for courtesans and prostitutes, were mainly confined to the domestic domain, while 
men spent most of their leisure time exclusively with other men. Such homo-social bonds 
and male culture gave rise to a special emphasis on male bonding in traditional Chines 
society. See Mann, S. 2000. ‘The male bond in Chinese history and culture.’ The 
American Historical Review 105(5): 1600–1614. Ebrey, P. B. 1993. The Inner Quarters: 
Marriages and the Lives of Chinese Women in the Song Period. Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press. 
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that rural migrants desperately long for, but can hardly ever achieve.150 The very 
figure of GuanGong resonated with ordinary people, and enabled them to project 
their own lives on to it. The folk tales of GuanGong give the ground and material 
for people to imagine what brotherhood should be in a secular world. In this 
sense, traditional folk beliefs and deities have never been separated from the 
daily practice of social relationships. 
 In some cases, posts related to folk religion are also a means of making 
relationships with deities more practical. A typical meme on QQ read:  
 
From 11pm to 9am tomorrow morning, GunYin Bodhisattva will open the 
heaven treasury. If you shared this amulet image (ping an fu) for people who 
were born in the year of the cockerel (the years 1969, 1981, 1993 and 2005) 
they will have a good fortune and be healthy and wealthy forever. Share it, 
and bring good luck to your friends who were born in the year of the 
cockerel! 
 
There are several similar posts featuring different zodiac animals151 and offering 
good luck to people who were born in the year of the rabbit, the goat, the tiger, 
the dragon and so forth.  
                                                     
150 In Chapter 5 there is a further discussion of friendship among young migrants and a 
detailed personal story of a factory worker called Feige showcases the reason for short-
lived brotherhood among young rural males.  
151 The Chinese Zodiac, known as Sheng Xiao, is based on a 12-year cycle, with each year 
in that cycle being related to an animal sign. 
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 ‘Luck’ is probably a universal concept. However, the ‘luck’ in Chinese folk 
belief represents a more specific emphasis on human endeavours and efforts. In 
contrast to ‘fate’ (ming), which refers to one’s life-long, immutable fortune, luck 
(yun) refers to a something that people can change or ‘shift’ (zhuan) through their 
own efforts (such as providing offerings to deities or consulting fortune-tellers) 
(Harrell, 1987). The Chinese character ‘转’ (zhuan) is used in both the phrases 
meaning ‘to change one’s luck’ (zhuan yun) and ‘to share something on social 
media’ (zhuan fa). Thus these two phrases with the same head vowel formed a 
catchy expression, as people said: ‘share it (on social media), so you can have a 
change of your luck (zhuan fa jiu zhuan yun)’.  
 Guang, a factory worker in her thirties, frequently shared images of various 
deities on her QQ profiles. Her reasons seem to be instinctive rather than 
carefully considered:  
 
Well, I don’t know exactly why … Anyway … it’s a good thing to do. At 
least … I think the deities (shen ming) will be pleased if you show respect 
to them, and in return you will be blessed (bao you), which is very 
important. 
 
Guang was not alone, Even the majority of people who had shared similar posts 
failed to give a clear answer of why and how those postings will bring them good 
luck; they all believed that the very act of sharing the images of deities is, on its 
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own right, a way to please them.152 As one said, ‘It’s always safer to believe that 
they exist rather than not (ning ke xin qi you, bu ke xin qi wu). Who knows whom 
you will offend?’ To put it in another way, given the fact that there are so many 
deities, some of whom are benevolent and some are not, people had learned to 
show respect to all of them so that they will not offend (de zui) any by mistake.  
 Whether the issue was one of pleasing or offending these deities, people 
assume that these gods were just like human beings, capable of being pleased 
and offended in the same way on social media. It is thereby evident that Chinese 
deities are philosophically ‘down to earth’ immanentists, in contrast to deities in 
other religions who are believed to be entirely transcendent, above and beyond 
humankind (Holzman, 1998). In Chinese folk religion, therefore, people are in a 
better position to negotiate with deities for their own benefits. Building 
relationships with various deities is a very similar process to the practice of guanxi 
(social relations); social networking is pragmatically applied in the principle of 
reciprocity and it seems that deities are rather similar to secular bureaucrats who 
can be bribed. In addition, the practice of folk religion has been deeply and tightly 
integrated into people’s everyday lives: managing relationships with various 
deities has always been a part of life for ordinary Chinese rural migrants. Viewing 
the images of deities that people post on social media, it can be easy to focus on 
the sharp contrast between the ‘digital’ and the ‘deities’, while forgetting that the 
                                                     
152  This echoes with another anthropological observation about the practice of folk 
religion in Taiwan: ‘what matters to the practical believers is not whether the offerings 
they put out are actually eaten in some spiritual way by hungry ghosts, but whether by 
putting out such offerings they can cure their children’s lingering fever. More people are 
willing to profess belief in the efficacy of such offerings than will state that they believe 
ghosts exist’. See Harrell, S. 1977. ‘Modes of belief in Chinese folk religion.’ Journal for 
the Scientific Study of Religion. 16(1): 55–65.  
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latter were part of daily life way before the digital age. As a result, when people 
began to embrace the digital in their lives, they naturally included the deities.  
 Other kinds of deities are worshipped only by respective kinship groups. 
As previously noted, in Chinese folk beliefs all people become deities, on some 
notion or another, after death; ancestors are then dependent upon regular 
worship and offerings from their descendants, since without offerings those 
ancestor spirits will become unwanted ghosts. In return, ancestors will reward 
filial descendants by protecting and blessing them. There is thus a mutual 
dependence between the living and the dead (Hock, 1997). Moreover, a common 
practice to ensure an efficient approach to higher ranked deities is to go through 
one’s ancestor deities, perceived to be the nearest to the living; the idea of a 
direct leap from the human world to the metaphysical sphere seems not to be 
convincing enough (Holzman, 1998). Thus the strategy underlying guanxi (social 
relations), widely applied in human relationships, is also applied in those between 
humans and deities. It is not the only one, however, as the traditional respect for 
ancestors and spirits can also be mediated by relationship to the places 
associated with them. Such associations of lineage and burial sites was indeed 
a major theme in the early anthropology of China (Watson, 1988; Cohen, 1990). 
Relationships with one’s ancestors provide essential intermediaries within the 
greater human–deity relationship. On social media we can also find the 
representation of such relationships in the photographs of people’s places of 
origin. However, in several respects this was not as might have been predicted.  
 
4. 2 The homeland on social media  
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As mentioned in Chapter 1, this research started with an assumption that social 
media would play a key role in enabling a displaced migrant population to re-
connect with their homelands. However, the accumulated evidence from the 
ethnography suggests that the degree of diminished contact with their villages of 
origin was not because of the lack of technological support, but mainly a question 
of choice. Moreover, as Chapter 6 will further discuss, rural migrants seemed to 
show more interest in exploring new kind of social relationships on social media 
rather than maintaining contact with those left behind in villages.  
 
4. 2. 1 The homeland one cannot return to 
The experience of ‘seeing the modern world’ has made young migrants unwilling 
to return to a backward and boring rural life; many regard themselves as no longer 
sharing the same values with those who remained behind.153 In addition for the 
majority of migrant workers, as surplus labour, there is nothing left for them to do 
within the agriculture system; as soon as they return to the villages they risk losing 
financial independence, even the chance to earn a living. On top of this, their 
social networks, built on reciprocity between fellow villagers, largely collapsed 
when the migrants no longer made any contribution to the ‘ritual economy’ of their 
previous local communities.154 Mutual help in the ‘ritual economy’ was common 
                                                     
153 The same mindset was also recorded in Zheng, T. 2009. Red lights: The lives of sex 
workers in postsocialist China. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. 
154 Anthropology of China has long dawn attention to the ‘ritual economy’ in Chinese 
society. Ritual economy encompasses not only traditional pattern of gift exchange during 
festivals and ritual occasions but also the reciprocal provision of financial and practical 
support within the community. See Yang, M. 1994. Gifts, Favors and Banquets: The Art 
of Social Relationships in China. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Stafford, C. 2006. 
‘Deception, Corruption and the Chinese Ritual Economy.’ in Latham, K. et. al. eds. 2006. 
Consuming China. London, NY: Routledge. 42-55.  
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among villagers, particularly for harvest, wedding or funeral ceremonies. 
However, ‘The situation changed dramatically after 1995, when many villagers 
began to work in other cities or provinces as migrants. Exploring economic 
opportunities outside of the village became a key concern for most villagers… 
many qualified villagers were no longer in the village or were not willing to 
sacrifice their time for such free work.’ (Lu, 2014:151)  
Furthermore, in Chinese traditional rural communities, social control and 
local governance has been well maintained and enforced via endogenous 
relation-based village compacts that are primarily supported by effective social 
sanctions and stable social interaction (Lu, 2014: 20-21). However, such close-
knit rural communities in many Chinese villages have been significantly 
challenged and destroyed because of the rural-to-urban migration. ‘With a 
significant portion of its villagers working out of the villages most of time, as well 
as the much lower stakes and less intimacy they associate with their home 
community and fellow villagers, the social environment of villages has undergone 
some significant changes’ (Lu, 2014: 151). The foundations of local authority 
have also significantly diversified and crucial social norms have got eroded 
because of the increasingly limited information and the decreasing significance 
attached to local reputation (Lu, 2014: 137). Generally speaking, in Chinese 
villages with a higher level of rural-to-urban migration, villagers are ‘less likely to 
internalise the norms that prioritize collective interests, long-term relationship, 
and harmonious relationships within the villages’ (Lu, 2014: 186). Thus for many 
rural migrants in GoodPath who have separated themselves from the rural 
communities and local governance in their home villages, returning to their home 
villages has become very challenging.  
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According to my research among 340 young factory workers (age 16-25) 
during the 15 months in three massive factories, around 64% of young factory 
workers were once left-behind children who spent their childhood in their parents’ 
home villages with their grandparents or other senior family relatives. For this 
group of ‘once left-behind children' rural life in most cases was actually not 
associated with farm work as they were either too young to do farm work or spent 
most of the time in boarding middle school in the nearby village town when they 
were slightly older. They certainly had living experience of their home villages, 
whereas most of them, like Dong in Chapter 1, expressed various extent of 
disappointment, frustration, or even resentment about their past in their home 
villages. Another quarter of the 340 young rural migrants was born during the 
process of rural-to-urban migration, that is in the factory towns or cities where 
their parents worked at that time. For these young people, the original home 
villages of their parents seemed to be rather strange to them as they did not even 
have any experience of living there. Most of them only visited the home villages 
with their parents during Chinese New Year. Therefore, the chance that they will 
return to the villages is very limited.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, the majority of 
the rural migrants in GoodPath have their home villages located in the most 
remote and undeveloped mountain area in Guizhou, Guangxi, and Yunnan 
provinces. The huge gap between those home villages in inland China and the 
factory towns and cities in the coastal areas further discouraged young people to 
return to their home villages. Having said that, in some cases, rural migrants 
would choose to work and live in ‘county-towns’ near their villages of origin. Some 
young rural migrants talked about their plans of moving back to their provinces of 
origin when they have saved enough money to afford a flat in the nearby county 
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town of their home villages. ‘Near county town’ is different ‘home village’ as the 
former is relatively urbanised and developed, and has some job opportunities, 
whereas the latter remains undeveloped and rural.  
 Having said so, to put things in perspective, given the demographic 
diversity and generational differences of rural migrant population as well as varied 
levels of socioeconomic development of different rural areas in China, the impact 
of migration on the villages varies and is undergoing constant historical change. 
For example, the research (Murphy, 2002) in relatively well-off rural areas in 
Jiangxi province shows a rather positive impact of rural-to-urban migration on the 
development of rural communities: ‘over time, migration and return not only 
become culturally entrenched pathways to the time-honored goals of marrying, 
building a house, creating a legacy for descendants, and honoring ancestor, but 
also incorporate new values and resources into rural societies’ (Murphy, 
2002:216). The field work of this quoted research took place during the period of 
1996-2000 (Murphy, 2002: 3), when the older generation (in contrast to today’s 
new generations of rural migrants) still constituted the majority of rural migrant 
labour. Notably, compared to the older generation, rural migrants in this study 
show much less motivation to return to their home villages. On the other hand, 
more recently, economists have pointed out that after three decades of benefitting 
from ample cheap rural labour, China’s demography and labour dynamics are 
changing (Lam at al. 2015; Wildau, 2015). In 2015, the total number of rural 
migrants dropped for the first time in three decades, which on the one hand 
parallels China’s rapidly shrinking labor force, on the other hand reflects a slump 
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in the labor-intensive manufacturing sector.155 Chinese rural-to-urban migration 
has reached a turning point, and for many rural migrant workers the question is 
not whether they want to return to their home villages, but whether they will be 
‘forced’ to return to their home villages in the face of declined labour-intensive 
industry in the near future.   
 
4. 2. 2 From homeland albums to the countryside myth  
 For many rural migrants in GoodPath, the feeling towards ‘homeland’ has 
become ambivalent. On the one hand, people want to get rid of the rural 
background and become modern. As Yan Hairong argues, ‘post-Mao 
development has robbed the countryside of its ability to serve as a locus for rural 
youth to construct a meaningful identity’ (Yan, 2003: 579) and therefore the 
countryside is constructed as a ‘wasteland of backwardness and tradition’ (Yan, 
2003: 586). On the other hand, as the folk saying goes, ‘no ancestors, no identity’ 
(Ang, 1993): the home village is the only place to which they can link, and 
ancestors left behind in their homeland are the most reliable deities to whom they 
can turn. Moreover, as increasing numbers of the migrant population are born 
into, and grow up in, such ‘floating’ lives, many young migrant workers have no 
real-life connection to the villages where their parents or grandparents came from 
and their ancestors are buried. Thus for them the homeland, in a way, is not lost 
– it never existed in the first place. In situations where the physical homeland has 
atrophied and one can no longer present offerings to ancestors directly, people 
                                                     
155 https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-01-25/china-s-migrants-go-home-
and-stay-there  
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chose not physically to return to their homelands, but rather to move the 
homeland where their ancestors live on to their social media profiles. 
 For Hua, the factory worker in her late thirties, Chinese New Year is a 
crucial opportunity to win good luck (hao yun) for the following whole year. Ideally 
she should go back to her home village for a family reunion and worship her 
ancestors, but the length of the trip, plus other expenses and concerns, had 
prevented her from doing this for many years. However, she had always made 
sure that some relatives who had remained behind provided offerings to the 
ancestral grave on her behalf. 
 
People like us [rural migrants] depend heavily on our luck (yun qi) while 
working outside (chu lai da gong); you don’t know what will happen, and 
everything can happen to you. My ancestors can protect me and my family 
from bad luck … My life has nothing great, well, you know, you can’t really 
change your fate (ming), but nothing went terribly wrong … which is good 
enough. 
 
173 
 
Besides posts of deities, Hua’s Qzone features an album called ‘homeland’ (jia 
xiang) where she uploaded large numbers of photographs of the mountain behind 
her native village (Fig. 4.4). The homeland album on social media is 
commonplace among rural migrants. Around 15 per cent of rural migrants’ 
Qzones have a specific online album called ‘homeland’ or ‘home village’156. In her 
homeland album Hua wrote, in an almost nostalgic tone, that she has a strong 
emotional attachment to the beautiful mountain behind the village where her 
ancestors have their eternal sleep. Curiously, however, when I asked Hua 
whether she had thought about moving back to her home village, her answer was 
a definite ‘No’.  
 
 
                                                     
156 The reason of ‘homeland’ visual not being a particular popular visual genre listed in Chapter 
3 mainly lies in the fact that the visual data in Chapter 3 was collected among the most current 20 
posts made by rural migrants which usually didn’t cover the time when rural migrants posted 
homeland photos in the beginning years of their journey of migration. In addition, some photos 
of homeland were counted as ‘event’ or ‘travel’ genres, depending on specific subjects portrayed 
and focused on the images.  
Fig. 4.4 A typical ‘homeland album’ on social media 
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 ‘My home village is a place you always miss, but not really a place you 
want to return to’, she explained. Hua’s attitude toward returning to her home  
village is widely shared especially among young rural migrants in GoodPath. On 
those homeland photos all the bad memories and negative associations of village 
life and homeland had been expunged, leaving only the ideal, purified images to 
symbolise her homeland and ancestors. Her birthplace has thus become a 
symbol – but one that exists on people’s social media and helps to ground daily 
existence within one’s ‘floating’ life (Safran, 1991).  
 ‘History is always ambiguous, always messy, and people remember, and 
therefore construct the past in ways that reflect their present need for meaning’ 
(Ang, 1993). If the popularity of posting deities on social media reveals the 
continuity of the practice of folk religion, offline and online, then the homeland 
album takes a step further: through these albums, millions of rural migrants who 
have been uprooted from their homeland rebuilt their past on social media. In this 
sense social media, once a symbol of modernity,157 has reversed the trajectory 
of Chinese rural migrants’ movement from ‘tradition' to ‘modernity’, effectively 
serving as a ‘clan temple’ where ancestors and other deities are worshipped and 
folk tales are related. 
  Having said that, not all the homeland related postings served as a means 
for rural migrants to maintain a certain degree of connection with their homeland. 
Some homeland postings seem to have nothing to do with the real village at all, 
and these postings provide a subtle perspective for us to further understand the 
role the homeland plays (or can play) in the process of rural migrants becoming 
                                                     
157 As discussed in Chapter 2, social media such as QQ, as apart of ‘advanced technology’ was 
admired as  the symbol of modern lifestyle among rural people.  
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urban citizens.  What Chun Mei posted on her WeChat is a good example. Chun 
Mei is a 25-year-old factory worker, and her husband worked as a cook at the 
factory canteen. Four months after I left GoodPath I was told this couple also left. 
They were back to work in an inland town in Jiangxi province which is very close 
to their home village DaQin. One day in 2016158, Chun Mei shared a posting with 
the title ‘If you feel tired, please go back to DaQin village’ on her WeChat (Fig. 4. 
5). This posting was produced by an online DIY application which allows users to 
edit background music, background picture and scrolling text to produce a short 
clip of basic animation. On the posting the text reads: “In Province Jiang Xi there 
is a Stone County, In Stone County 
there is a village called DaQin village, if 
one day we all feel tired, let’s go back 
to our village together, not to pursue 
our aspiration, but merely for the 
transportation free from traffic-jam and 
the air free from pollution. If one day we 
all feel tired, let’s go back to our village, 
during the daytime, we can work 
together in our little vegetable garden, 
feed chicken and play with dogs, in the 
evening we can visit old friends and 
neighbors; If one day we all feel tired, 
let’s go back to DaQin, to relive the 
                                                     
158 Even though I have finished the fieldwork in GoodPath in 2014, social media allows me to 
keep tracing the lives of a few key informants who still keep in touch with me on WeChat or QQ.  
Fig. 4.5 the homeland posting on Chun 
Mei’s WeChat profile 
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country life in the memory of our childhood, to hike in the mountains and to stand 
on the top of the mountain and look far into the distance, to see the county road 
in the distance, the road which once lead us to our journey to the outside world… ” 
Rather than using any photo of DaQin village as the background picture, this 
posting chose a ‘relaxing-beach-holiday’ image which apparently had nothing to 
do with the inland village DaQin deep in poverty.   
 If the previous homeland albums can be regarded as an effort to 
‘transplant’ one’s home villages onto social media — even though the images of 
home villages had been purified, there are still some realistic visual aspects of 
the villages as shown on the real photos, then the picture Chun Mei posted on 
her WeChat to depict her home village is certainly a creation of a totally different 
place which she merely gave the name of DaQin. In reality, nine years ago, Chun 
Mei and her husband left DaQin to escape rural poverty, to earn a better life and 
to see the modern China. They had no choice but to move back one and half 
years ago because the couple had to take care of the husband’s parents whose 
health had deteriorated — nothing to do with the reasons of ‘coming back to 
DaQin’ elaborately written on Chun Mei’s homeland posting.  
 Chun Mei’s posting appears even more puzzling when almost at the same 
time Chun Mei’s husband talked to me on WeChat, complaining how much they 
suffered from the corruption of local village government and he thought the village 
was utterly hopeless. He said “Had it not been because of my parents who are in 
urgent need of a lot of care at home, we would definitely not have gone back to 
the rubbish countryside— in China the less developed the place is, the more 
corrupt the local officials can be!” Knowing the extremely difficult situation the 
young couple encountered in their home village, the inquiry of why did Chun Mei 
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post a highly romanticized posting about her home village has become not about 
‘whether she will have a final disillusion of the idyllic countryside on the face of 
the reality of her home village’, but more about ‘what happened that she still 
wanted to post such posting of her home village when she apparently knew that 
was not the case at all’. 
 Curiously, the countryside depicted in Chun Mei’s posting bears a lot of 
similarities with the bucolic countryside image in Western post-modern society 
where there is a continued, even growing nostalgia for the countryside 
(Bunce,1994). In Anglo-American societies where the majority of people are 
urban dwellers, the myth of symbolic countryside is part of prevalent countryside 
ideals. In the discourse of the ideals, the ‘countryside’ is the ‘other’ place, a place 
symbolically distanced from everyday life in busy cities, a place that provides a 
retreat from the urban-industrial system, a place close to nature, rich in 
community ties, where life is lived at a slower pace in settlements amidst idyllic, 
nostalgic settings (Shield, 1991; Hopkins, 1998). Therefore, ‘countryside’ ideal is 
also a deeply entrenched concept that is fundamental to the production and 
consumption of rural tourism (Hopkins, 1998: 65).  
 Moreover, the countryside depicted in Chun Mei’s posting can also be 
found in nostalgic discourse of countryside among Chinese zhiqing (education 
youth) generation since the 1990s (Yang, 2003). From 1962 to 1979, during the 
time of the Cultural Revolution, no fewer than 16 to 18 million urban youth were 
forced to move to the rural countryside under the Communist Party’s ‘Up to the 
Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement’ (Bernstein, 1977). These 
urban youths who had received high school education were called ‘educated 
youth’ (zhiqing) in contrast to uneducated peasants at that time. Such political 
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rustication movement has changed the life trajectory of millions of urban youth. 
During that period, university entrance examinations were suspended and many 
‘educated youth’ were unable to receive higher education or become employed 
in cities. Many of zhiqing abandoned the villages where they had been sent and 
returned to the cities by any means possible in the late 1970s (Gold, 1980). The 
realistic descriptions of the struggles, personal deprivation, suffering, and fatigue 
of zhiqing, and the first public exploration of the cost of the Cultural Revolution 
can be found in the popular literature in the late 1970s and early 1980s - so called 
‘scar literature’ or ‘wounded literature’ (Galik, 1982; Lau, 1982). However, when 
the zhiqing generation entered their middle age, the 1990s witnessed the jump 
from the collective protest to the collective nostalgia toward previous life in the 
countryside. As Yang argues, such large-scale nostalgia reflects cultural 
resistance against the radical changing conditions of Chinese modernity which is 
dominated by economic inequality and instrumental rationality (Yang, 2003).  
 However, neither of the analysis of western bucolic countryside nor of 
Chinese nostalgic countryside among the zhiqing generation seem to fully explain 
the reason for romanticised image of countryside in the case of young rural 
migrants as presented on Chun Mei’s posting. First of all, the aspiration towards 
modernity is a major reason why young rural migrants left rural communities and 
embarked on their rural to urban journey, which means they neither possess the 
subjectivity of urban dwellers who may imagine rural life as the symbol of nature 
and beauty, nor would they be applying the concept of countryside as a means 
of cultural resistance toward modernity; second, for zhiqing, whose adolescence 
was spent in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution, the nostalgia toward 
countryside is understandable when they became middle-aged, as ‘adolescence 
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is the stage of life cycle of special importance to the nostalgic experience’ (Yang, 
2003: 272) and adolescence serves ‘as the prototypical frame for nostalgia for 
the reminder of the life’ (Davis, 1979: 59). Unlike these zhiqing, former urban 
youth, today’s rural migrant youth spent most of their adolescence in cities and 
factory towns. Besides, they are still somehow too young to become nostalgic. 
Certainly, there is no exact phrase or age for a person to be more nostalgic or 
less nostalgic. Here the point is the popularity of nostalgia towards countryside 
among young rural migrants cannot be explained by either their age or their 
personal historical experience. 
 The most possible reason seems to lie in Chun Mei’s observation of 
urbanites. During the field work there was a TV reality show Where Are We Going, 
Dad? and Chun Mei always invited me to watch it together with her. The series 
was about five celebrity fathers and their children traveling to rural places. This 
reality show achieved a huge success in China:  sharp contrast between the 
glamorous images of the celebrity family under the spotlight and the arduous life 
they experienced in the countryside as recorded by 24 hour cameras is one of 
the selling points. On the show, a movie star made a remark: ‘even though it’s 
tough, I enjoy the pure and natural life here [the countryside]’. Chun Mei laughed 
out loud when she heard so: ‘See, that’s the problem of urbanites! Sometimes I 
really don’t understand why do they think countryside is so good! What do you 
think? Maybe they had too much sweet, and are looking for some bitterness?’ I 
tried to give her an answer, saying: ‘It is also quite popular in the UK. City people 
there enjoy life in the countryside because they love nature and are tired of their 
busy city life.’ Chun Mei was not surprised by my answer at all, she continued: 
‘Yes, I knew it. Chinese rich people always follow the foreigners’ trend!’  
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 Chun Mei’s remark reminded me of another comment a young factory 
worker made. Once I visited a rural migrant family and asked whether I can take 
some photos of their room which was a bit run-down. The father in his 40s 
appeared reluctant and suggested that I wait until his wife sorts out the room 
quickly so that it will at least look neat. The father’s suggestion was denied 
immediately by his young son, who said: “There is no need to make the room 
look better, she [me] comes from a foreign country, and I know they all fancy 
these things, the more rural the better! Now is just fine.” Regardless of young 
rural migrants’ own opinion of countryside, it seems that many of them are fully 
aware of the middle-class urban aesthetic where the countryside myth is highly 
valued. Such awareness emerged from their consumption of popular content on 
mass media, social media as well as their own experience in urban areas. 
Therefore, the popularity of nostalgia among young rural migrants towards the 
countryside is triggered not so much by their own preferences as their 
understanding of urban taste, and to pick up the urban taste is always regarded 
as an essential part in the process of becoming urban citizens among young rural 
migrants (Fang, 2011). By setting themselves apart from the countryside and 
appreciate the countryside as the ‘other’ place as what urban people do, rural 
youth embrace the countryside myth, with the self-expectation of becoming urban 
in the future. For the Chinese zhiqing generation, the nostalgia towards the 
countryside, by connecting individuals to their past, is a means of identity 
construction (Yang, 2003). Whereas, for Chinese young rural migrants, a similar 
nostalgia, by associating them to the future, is also a means of identity 
construction.  
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 To put things into perspective, just as political eradication and crackdowns 
on folk religions under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party did not change 
the essential beliefs held by large parts of the population, even though the 
introduction of social media enabled people to be both more religious and more 
modern, the mechanism of social media per se did not make people ‘become’ 
either more religious or more modern. Both political regulation and technological 
methods are outside forces which either restrain or facilitate people’s activities in 
their daily lives. The real reason that social media has come to serve as a ‘clan 
temple’ is not because of the technological affordances of QQ or WeChat. It is 
because Chinese rural migrants strongly believe in the magical powers of the 
deities, and the practice of traditional folk religion has always been part of their 
daily lives. For them, the images of deities have the efficacy to change their luck, 
and posting on social media by and in itself is the effort to change one’s life. 
Similar postings related to countryside can be used to make a link with one’s 
home village and ancestors, whilst at the same time facilitating the imagination of 
being a modern citizen.  
 Besides deities and home village related postings, ‘folk tales’ I referred to, 
are another kind of popular posting among rural migrants which in many ways is 
also a result of entanglement of the beliefs of rural traditional system and new 
ideas gained in rural-to-urban migration. Stories of rural migrants are widely 
shared among the rural migrant group and most of them have elements of truth 
and reality which rural migrants can easily relate to. In the next section, folk tales 
on social media, the role stories shared on social media play in people’s ever 
changing lives is analysed. 
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4. 3 Folk tales on social media  
Kai’s post of the deity image GuanGong was associated with a whole range of 
associated folk tales. Such stories are not only an essential part of Chinese folk 
beliefs. They also comprise the main body of folk literature – far more persistent 
and pervasive in history than the ‘aristocratic literature’ of more ‘cultured’ groups 
because it was more readily accepted by the majority of the people (Hung, 1985). 
On social media, besides posts of deities and homeland, storytelling also 
represents a major genre. Almost half of the rural migrants of my study shared at 
least one story on their social media in their last 20 social media posts.159 Below 
is an example of popular stories widely shared by rural migrants.  
 
4. 3. 1 Story: The Revenge  
A very good-looking village woman followed her husband to work outside the 
village. The couple worked together in a large factory, owned by a very rich man. 
The woman’s beauty soon caught the attention of the factory owner, who seduced 
her secretly through money and fine promises. Soon the woman betrayed her 
husband and became the factory owner’s secret mistress. Her husband 
discovered the affair, but was then threatened by the factory owner. Even though 
he was heartbroken, he decided to let his wife go since he loved her so much and 
wished her a better life than he could afford. He quit the factory job and returned 
to the village to take care of their only son. The 10-year-old boy refused to accept 
that his mother would never come back, and secretly set off alone on a trip to find 
                                                     
159 Data collected from 377 social media profiles of rural migrants in GoodPath. 
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her. After a very tough, long journey the little boy finally arrived in the city where 
his parents had worked together. There, at the factory entrance, he had the shock 
of seeing his mother walking out with a strange man, hand in hand. Before she 
could recognise him, the little boy dashed away, but unfortunately he was run 
over and killed by a speeding car. The whole village was outraged and everybody, 
including the woman’s family, cursed her at the boy’s funeral. However, the man 
said nothing. The woman felt so guilty that she committed suicide soon after the 
funeral. Hearing of his wife’s death, the man still said nothing and disappeared. 
Two days later he appeared at the factory, where he stabbed the factory owner 
to death and then committed suicide. The whole village mourned for him and 
everybody worshipped him as a hero from then on.  
 The story ends up with a warning that people who live for money, and 
women who betray their husbands for money, will never come to a good end. Nor 
will the rich come to a good end if they do not treat the poor as human beings.  
 For Wei, a 28-year-old factory worker who shared this story on his Qzone, 
whether the story is true or not did not really matter. He believed it because of his 
own experience: 
 
I have seen a woman like that. The wife of my co-worker left him without 
saying anything. He actually treated her very well; he had never beaten her, 
always gave her money to buy new clothes …but she still ran away, 
somebody said she had run away with a businessman. Poor man – now he 
has to raise two kids all by himself. Alas, there seems to be no way to 
prevent it; you know, nowadays most women, I bet, are much more 
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realistic… I agree with the story: if you betray your husband for money, you 
don’t deserve a happy ending, and the man had guts. So I shared it.  
 
As will further be discussed in Chapter 7, young rural migrant women can improve 
their socio-economic status via marriage and other relationships, whereas young 
rural migrant men may risk being jettisoned. Wei’s sense of justice has been 
expressed perfectly through the dramatic tension of the story he shared.   
 
4. 3. 2 Folk tales in the digital age 
There are several striking features of the story. First, it took place within the 
setting of ordinary rural migrants’ daily lives, settings to which people can easily 
relate. Second, it contains quite a bit of drama, which both purifies and spices up 
the daily life into a legend, and through which strong and distinct thoughts and 
attitudes unfolded. Third, it safeguards and reinforces values and morals shared 
by the specific rural migrant group.  
 All these features remind us of the folk tales, which also serve as a 
pedagogic device, reinforcing morals and values ‘particularly, but not exclusively, 
in non-literate societies’ (Bascom, 1954). In those stories we watch the heroes 
and traitors, the perceived justice and unfairness, the doomed fate and the up-
and-down rollercoaster of daily life. Stories on social media, the folk tales of a 
digital age, play an important role in recording and shaping the world view of 
Chinese rural migrants. Compared to other text-based publications, stories on 
social media have the lowest threshold in terms of getting stories published, and 
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thus provide the most accessible outlet for less-educated people who may 
otherwise struggle to get their voices heard. Folk tales were traditionally spread 
by oral transmission, making them products of an entire community rather than a 
particular writer (Hung, 1985). Similarly, on social media stories are spread and 
reproduced by sharing — and in the ‘charmed circle’ of sharing people contribute 
their personal experiences and different interpretation. It has been said that ‘each 
of us comes to know who he or she is by creating a heroic story of the self’ 
(McAdams, 1993). By arranging the episodes of their daily lives into stories, 
Chinese rural migrants seek to invest a fragmented and confusing experience of 
living with a sense of coherence, and so to discover the truth about what is right 
and what is meaningful in their on-going ‘floating’ lives. These new folk tales on 
social media help people think through changes in their current lives, and prepare 
them for the future with a lot uncertainty.  
 
4. 4 Conclusion  
This chapter discusses the efficacy of social media postings by first examining 
links with traditional spiritual realms, reflected in folk beliefs and ancestor worship. 
All of these existed before social media, but are highly significant today — they 
emerge as structural factors that deeply influence the use of social media among 
Chinese rural migrants. In the first section, the presence of folk religion on social 
media, illustrates the continuity of Chinese folk beliefs in daily life, both in offline 
discourse and online discourse. It further explains how and why the efficacy of 
social media postings has become recognised. It shows how such efficacy has 
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been widely accepted by people who view this as an integral aspect of the 
relationship between the secular world and the deities’ realm. 
 The point being made is more complex than simply suggesting that folk 
religion is expressed on social media. Such a sense of religious efficacy has a 
profound effect upon what people think a social media posting is, and what they 
believe it might achieve. Both in folk religion and on social media, making 
something visual, or sometimes even making it immaterial160, is a form of efficacy 
in and of itself. Transitions between the tangible, physical world and the intangible 
world of the deities help people to reflect upon the relationship between the two, 
which may be what makes these manifestations efficacious. So if one can no 
longer actually visit the temple in the place of origin, one can equally well make 
a visual trip online without losing the efficacy. Moreover, such visibility on social 
media not only ensures the perceived efficacy of deities; it also enables people 
to conceive a new understanding of themselves and their on-going lives.   
 Next the chapter considers the discrepancy between my own expectations 
of how social media might be used in reconnecting with the homeland and what 
the ethnography actually encountered. Such discrepancy provides the basis for 
explaining a major shift from offline homeland visiting to the creation of online 
homeland albums, in effect relocating the effective homeland for these rural 
migrants for different purposes. We thereby see how social media has been used 
as the agency for people to achieve this re-connection with their pasts and the 
places where they came from, but in an entirely different and transformed manner 
to that anticipated.  
                                                     
160 For instance, burning funeral banknotes 
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 The third section reveals the way in which postings of folktale-like 
narratives illustrate a key moment when social media become a centre for a 
whole set of world views. Attitudes towards marriage and justice gradually 
emerge in the context of the current rural-to-urban migration. All the stories 
shared on the social media profiles implicitly, and often explicitly, constitute a 
moral judgement, reflecting the views of ordinary people about the dichotomy of 
right and wrong or good and evil within the given context of their ‘floating’ lives. 
Thus these new stories on social media continue to provide moral guidance just 
as folk tales traditionally did, helping people to make sense of, and to think 
through, transformations of ‘the current’.  
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Chapter 5 
Social media and social relationships 
 
 
5. 0 Introduction  
The dynamism of Chinese social media is truly impressive. Even more 
impressive, however, is the speed of response of Chinese social media users. 
They pick up almost instantly on each subtle gesture and movement allowed by 
social media, and skillfully apply these to navigate their relationships with families, 
friends, romantic partners and even with strangers online. A whole set of social 
norms have emerged regarding the use of social media, which people soon take 
for granted: social media thus comes to feel an essential part of their daily lives, 
as if it had always been with them. In this chapter we will explore different kinds 
of social relationships in the context of social media usage. The evidence in this 
chapter suggests that social media has not only become an integral part of 
everyday life, a place where people live alongside their offline life. It also provides 
the potential for people to experience relationships that are not fully developed, 
or do not even exist, in prior offline situations. In this chapter we will explore 
different kinds of social relationships, which are also called ‘sociality’ in 
anthropology, in the context of social media usage.  
 
5. 1 The anxiety and longing about social life on social media  
Before the more detailed examination of the use of social media in various social 
relationships, some general observations of sociality on social media is provided 
in this section to outline the overall experience and expectation of social media 
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use in rural migrants’ daily life. From the pervasive anxiety expressed on social 
media to the most ideal social atmosphere on social media, what is described in 
this section is about how the use of social media reflects the changing sociality 
of rural migrants. 
 
5. 1. 1 ‘Thank you for keeping me on your contact list’  
This is a general understanding of rural migrants’ social media contacts. Since 
the autumn of 2014 people in GoodPath have been bombarded by a particular of 
text message from their WeChat contacts. A typical one reads: 
 
My dear friend, it’s getting cold, please keep yourself warm as I do care 
about you. btw, this a group message. Copy this, and send it as group 
message to all your contacts so that you will see who have removed you 
from their contact lists since the system will tell. Try it; you will have a clear 
picture of your social relationships, and it’s also convenient for you to clean 
up those who had removed you. If you receive this message, then thank 
you for keeping me on your contact list. 
 
Starting with a sweet, caring line, followed by some practical advice about 
cleaning up contacts, such text messages have become so popular among 
people in GoodPath that almost everyone has experienced them. Some found 
them annoying, feeling that the subtext of the message seemed to be ‘I don’t 
really care about you, I only care about whether you care about me’. Many 
followed the suggestion, trying to ﬁgure out who had removed them. Some people 
who did so actually found a few contacts they were happy to discard. Others even 
190 
 
discovered to their shock that those who had just borrowed money from them had 
already deleted the contact before they had returned the money; or that former 
colleagues who had recently moved to another town had already dropped them; 
or that their ex- partner, with whom they still wanted to remain friends, had 
actually severed the connection unilaterally.  
The popularity of such group messages seems to indicate a pervasive 
insecurity and uncertainty about personal relationships, which can be explained 
partly by the life patterns of rural migrants. In the process of migration, this 
‘ﬂoating’ population has experienced a large number of transient encounters and 
frequently had to say goodbye to others. During the research rural migrants, 
especially middle- aged ones such as 43- year- old Lao Zhou, talked from time to 
time about the interdependent rural communities they had come from: 
 
‘When I was very young, in my village, if one household had difficulty in 
harvest, the whole village lent a hand. And when my grandfather died, male 
adults in the neighbourhood all came to carry the coffin … In a way you have 
to, everybody is watching you. If this time you don’t help others, next time 
nobody will come to help you.’   
 
I happened to observe him on another day around dinner time, when the muggy evening 
brought a sudden shower: Despite what he had told me, when Lao Zhou rushed to collect 
his clothes hanging outside in the collective yard he only collected his own. His 
neighbours’ washing was left to get wet in the rain. I asked why.  He replied: 
 
Neighbours? No, I don’t think they are, who knows who they are? Almost 
every month people move in and move out. I can’t be bothered to recognise 
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all of them. Of course, in my previous village I would have collected my 
neighbour’s clothes, but here things are different. I am not mean, I just try 
to be realistic. 
 
Knowing how fleeting a co-residence can be, rural migrants seemed to have little 
expectation of developing any long-term relationship with people who happened 
to work on the same assembly line, or happened to rent a room next door. Social 
connections, such as colleagues or neighbours, can be very close in the short 
term, but in the long run they were considered fragile and unstable, especially 
when one of the parties migrated to other places. Lao Zhou’s experience from a 
‘super-stable’ social structure in a village society, 161  in which ‘everybody is 
watching you’, to an unstable and loose connection in a floating life – ‘who knows 
who they are?’ – is common among migrant workers in GoodPath. Such living 
experience set the tone for people’s attitudes toward offline social life. 
 
5. 1. 2 The ‘hot and noisy’ principle 
The introduction to this thesis discussed the importance of interpersonal relations 
(guanxi) and face (mianzi) in exploring Chinese social relationships. Both guanxi 
and mianzi emphasise the importance of the harmony (hexie) of social groups, 
which works as a powerful mediation between the individual and the society. 
More specifically, another principle is widely applied to achieve a harmonious 
ambience of social life. This principle can be literally translated as ‘hot and noisy’.   
                                                     
161  As Chapter 4 has mentioned, the social environment of traditional Chinese rural 
communities is based on long-term relation-related reciprocal interaction among fellow 
villagers. Also see also Skinner, G.W. 1964. ‘Marketing and social structure in rural 
China, Part I.’ The Journal of Asian Studies 24 (1): 3– 43. Kipnis, A. 1997.  Producing 
Guanxi: Sentiment, Self, and Subculture in a North China Village. Durham, London: 
Duke University Press. 
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From time to time people would say ‘come and leave your footprints on my 
profile’ (lai wo kong jian caicai) to their friends, inviting them to visit their QQ 
profiles162 (Qzone). On Qzone not only the user, but also the user’s other QQ 
contacts can check who has paid a visit. Having said this, one is supposed to 
‘leave footprints’ (that is to leave comments on others’ profiles) in order to show 
the evidence of caring for one another. For example, two girls who work together 
on the same assembly line would still come to leave footprints on each other’s 
Qzone after work, even though they have seen each other 10 hours per day, 29 
days per month at work. Usually ‘footprints' resembled a long string of banter 
between friends on one’s QQ profile. ‘Don’t you think with more people coming 
here and more footprints left, it will appear more renao?’ a female factory worker 
asked. 
Re in renao means hot, and nao means noisy. Putting the two characters 
together, renao, creates a frequently used Chinese word, referring to a lively, bustling 
and exciting ambience of social connection. Traditionally renao was regarded as a 
positive and ideal status of Chinese social life, and was highly sought after (Warden & 
Chen, 2009). For instance, in the celebrations of Chinese New Year, the ‘hot and noisy’ 
is essential as the festival mood (Pan, 1993). The expression ‘join the hot and noisy’ (cou 
renao) is commonly used to describe the attendance of any kind of meeting with others. 
As shown in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, social life in GoodPath is more dependent on any 
gathering of people, rather people fitting themselves into a space designated for that 
purpose. Any activity in public which is ‘hot and noisy’ thus automatically became a social 
event.  
In GoodPath, one of the most renao events is the Chinese opera show. Every 
two months a traditional Chinese opera troupe from a nearby village would perform a 
                                                     
162 See the relationship between QQ and Qzone in Chapter 2. 
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show on a makeshift stage at the parking area. Hundreds of people always gathered 
around the stage, even though not everyone was interested in opera. Noise off the stage 
was just as loud as the singing on the stage. When the show was over, more than half 
of the audience remained in their seats, chatting with each other. It seemed that for many 
people renao, rather than the opera, was the real reason why they had come to the show. 
The parallel between the opera audience and social media users shows that the 
expectation of an ideal ambience of social life has migrated from offline to online. Social 
media has become the main place where peers hang out to join the renao. 
And in some situations, it is difficult to tell the fine boundary between online and 
offline when it comes to a ‘hot and noisy’ ambience. In GoodPath, internet cafes are very 
popular among young men. Each internet cafe has around 100 computers. At night, 
around 90 per cent of the machines are in use, with male users accounting for around 
85 per cent. Almost all these male users are playing massive multi-player online games. 
Many young men come to the internet cafe in groups and play games with their friends 
together. The internet cafe was always extremely noisy. As Wuli, a 21-year-old factory 
worker, explained: 
 
Playing a game alone is deﬁnitely not the same. If I win playing alone, no one can 
share the excitement with me! With friends I can give a shout, letting everybody 
in the room know that I’ve won – it feels so good! . . . And you know, you feel the 
brotherhood when you go to the internet cafe together and kill enemies together! 
 
Wuli visited the internet cafe almost every day after work with a group of his fellow 
villagers who worked in factories. When the group was playing games together, they 
talked so loudly that everybody in the room could hear. Conversations that could be 
heard were not necessarily about gaming; they might involve boasting about one’s new 
girlfriend or a new purchase of an iPhone. ‘The human being is a part of the machine,’ 
as a factory manager said. For factory workers such as Wuli, who received little attention 
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during working hours, the big noise they made in the internet cafe seemed to be one of 
the few moments they won any attention, and they relished it. Furthermore, in chapter 3 
we saw that compared to women, men are less likely to portray bonding through posting 
group photos on their social media. Here we can see that this is not because there is 
less bonding, but rather that it is expressed in a different way. Here we see one 
alternative way to demonstrate male bonding, through this more physical and 
performative companionship. 
From leaving footprints on Qzones to playing online games in a ‘hot and noisy’ 
internet café, the principle of renao was followed both offline and online. As a result, the 
boundary between online and offline has become very blurred. 
 
5. 2 Social relationships on social media  
Following the general discussion of sociality on social media, this chapter will focus more 
closely on social media usage in each category of significant social relationships. 
 
5. 2. 1 Couples and wider family relationships on social media  
When I first saw Lan, she was producing linings for pet carriers in a dark 
workshop. It was a small, underground workshop, adapted from a residential 
room, hiding deep in a narrow lane. Becoming aware of me, Lan immediately 
bowed her head even lower, and hushed the two children playing around the 
sewing machine to be quiet (Fig. 5.1).  It took a while to make friends with Lan, 
her son, aged almost ﬁve, and her daughter, aged three. Like many young rural 
migrants, 24- year- old Lan had dropped out of school and left her village early in 
search of a better life. Five years previously she had married a truck driver from 
a neighbouring village. A year ago the couple had moved to GoodPath, working 
together in a factory. Then, in order to support each other and their young children 
195 
 
better, Lan’s husband took a better paid job in Shanghai, a position to which he 
was introduced by a fellow villager. However, the living costs for the whole family 
in Shanghai were prohibitive. So as a compromise Lan’s husband worked in 
Shanghai, staying at the collective dormitory, and Lan remained behind, taking 
care of their children in GoodPath. She had to quit her assembly line job at a 
factory and take a lower- 
paid job at this illicit sewing 
sweatshop, run by a local 
peasant. More ﬂexibility 
was allowed at the 
workshop, and she could 
take her children there to 
save on daytime nursery 
fees. In Lan, one can see 
the typical kind of 
traditional, virtuous 
Chinese woman who is 
devoted to her family. Her 
Qzone possessed a few 
‘locked’ albums, not open to visitors. ‘Only my husband and I know the password’, 
she explained. ‘I only uploaded photos of our children to the albums so that he 
can check them over there.’ 
Lan’s husband is a quiet man. I only met him once when he came back to 
visit his family. Being asked about his children’s photographs, he remained silent 
for a while, then replied: 
Fig. 5.1 Lan and her two children (A partial image of a 
traditional Chinese painting ‘Locked album’, 145 × 75 cm; 
painter: Xinyuan Wang) 
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I was too busy during daytime. At night, on the bed, when I couldn’t fall 
asleep and worried about things, I would take out my smartphone and have 
a look at them … then I felt much better. 
 
Then he became silent again. 
A QQ album has become the essential connection between this young 
couple, bringing immense comfort to people who had no choice but to live 
separately. Yet being physically apart was not always regarded as bad news by 
a family. For some, it would come across as a great relief, as Yan Hong, the 37-
year-old owner of a local nail salon, describes: 
 
When he was at home he never did any housework. I needed to take care 
of our daughter, him and the business of the shop. You know, I was not very 
lucky to marry such a lazy man! . . . . But now things have become more 
bearable. I no longer need to work as a maid, and I even feel that he cares 
for us more on WeChat and QQ. Before he had never taken the initiative to 
ask about our daughter’s performance at school. But now he asks me about 
her from time to time. 
 
Yan Hong believed that her marriage had become more ‘bearable’. With the help 
of social media, her once unpleasant, housework-loaded married life had 
transformed into a more supportive and considerate one. Compared to rural 
migrant families, hers is definitely much better off. Yan Hong’s husband is a 
businessman who works in a city in north China, thus rarely staying at home. 
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Every day the couple talk over WeChat voice message. Once a week they have 
a half hour QQ video call, during which their 10-year-old daughter, who lives with 
Yan Hong joins the conversation and says hello to her father. Yan Hong seemed 
to be happy about her WeChat strategy:  
 
…It [WeChat voice message] is similar to a phone call, but better … 
because you don’t need to arrange a time for a conversation. Before, when 
I called him, he always sounded in the middle of something and impatient … 
which always pissed me off. But by voice message, it’s still as if we are 
talking, but in a more relaxed way … I leave voice messages for him 
whenever I want, and he comes back to me when he was free. 
 
The use of voice messaging on WeChat varied remarkably among different 
people. For many young people, especially those in the early stages of romance, 
WeChat voice messages could be sent and received so rapidly that it functioned 
as a synchronous mode of communication. It did not have to be, however, as in 
Yan Hong’s case. She found that the acceptable time delay between WeChat 
messages has allowed her more control over previously problematic 
communication with her husband. 
Furthermore, the ‘stored’ conversation on WeChat has brought some 
unexpected benefits. Yan had difficulty few problems with her mother-in-law 
because the old lady was too indulgent with her granddaughter; she always 
became very protective of the girl when Yan Hong tried to establish discipline at 
home.  
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I complained about my mother-in-law on WeChat, and my husband replied 
that, ‘grandparents always spoil kids, so don’t let her get involved too much, 
do what you feel you need to do’ . . . The next day, she [the mother- in- law] 
gave me a bollocking again when I was scolding my daughter for not 
ﬁnishing her homework. So I said, ‘ok, I can’t argue with you, then let your 
son argue with you!’ So I replayed that piece of voice message from my 
husband to her. She was totally shocked because my husband had never 
really supported me in front of his mother. 
 
Yan Hong’s husband had never considered that a fragment of the conversation 
between him and his wife would be taken from its original context and used as an 
argument by his wife against his mother –  
 something he always tried to avoid. A similar situation also happened in other 
families. Jokes between family junior members on voice messages were replayed 
to senior family members, for example, causing embarrassment, or secrets were 
disclosed to non- family members by voice messages. Technologically it is 
possible to record a phone call, but before WeChat voice message, voice 
recording was very rare; most daily phone conversations had not been recorded 
automatically as happened on WeChat. In this sense WeChat voice message 
made people’s daily phone conversations replicable for the ﬁrst time. As a result, 
these reconstructions of daily conversations, facilitated by the use of voice 
messages, have now become a part of both family life and wider social life. 
Given the much higher penetration rate of smartphones and social media 
among older people in urban China, the one- month of research undertaken in 
Shanghai (July 2014) unfolded some new patterns of social media usage in 
kinship. These had not yet happened in GoodPath. For instance, surveillance on 
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social media by senior family members has become a problem among people in 
Shanghai: 
Oh my, you just don’t know how annoying it has become since my mum 
became my WeChat friend. I uploaded something after midnight; she left a 
comment, nagging me to go to bed earlier. I uploaded some photos with my 
friends having fun in a club; she called me the next day, nagging about why 
couldn’t I have a proper girlfriend … In the end, I had to block her from those 
‘sensitive’ postings.  
 
Huang, a 28-year-old company official, decided to conduct self-censorship 
against his mother’s ubiquitous surveillance. Compared to most men who tried 
not to include their parents on social media, women seem to cope better with the 
experience of having family members on social media. Jing Yu Qi, a 32-year-old 
tourist guide, discovered that WeChat could be a nice buffer mechanism between 
her and senior family members: 
 
It’s true that sometimes they were a bit nosy about my personal issues, but 
that’s always the case, with or without WeChat. And on WeChat I can ignore 
their inquiries or reply later when I am in a good mood. In ‘face-to-face’ you 
can’t do that; as the junior you can’t say no to their face or ignore them … 
For me, WeChat is like a ‘cushion’.   
 
Such usage actually has many points of similarity to Yan Hong’s WeChat strategy 
regarding her husband. 
WeChat groups have also become popular among families in Shanghai, 
efficiently connecting several nuclear families together. For example, there is a 
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WeChat group called ‘Grandpa, what will we have for dinner?’ on Fan’s WeChat. 
A media worker in Shanghai, she explained that the name of the WeChat group 
came from the family tradition that every fortnight the big family, including four 
nuclear families, would try to have a family dinner at her grandfather’s place: 
 
…In the beginning, the WeChat group was mainly functional, because it’s 
quite convenient to check who will come for dinner on it rather than calling 
each family one by one … I forget when it was that one of my uncles started 
to post some photos on the group, and others were inspired to also post 
various things such as family news or jokes … now we basically catch up 
with each other almost every day in the group. And the funny thing is over 
family dinner, face to face, we continue chatting about the topics from our 
WeChat group. 
 
For Fan, the WeChat family group has become the virtual family dinner. Some 
also found the interaction with senior family members on WeChat group allowed 
them to see a different aspect of their relatives. Ding Yi Han, a freelance artist in 
her late 30s living in Shanghai, described the transformation WeChat has made 
in her relationship with senior family members: 
  
I have never seen him smile like a child, you know; the traditional, typical 
father never smiles like that. But since we had a family WeChat group, he 
somehow learnt to use WeChat stickers, and all of a sudden I found he was 
no longer the serious father I knew before. He has become so funny and 
even childish. It’s not only my father; my grandfather was also taught to use 
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WeChat this year. He too has become a lovely person, I mean before he 
was just the ‘grandfather’, you know what I mean? … I think that’s best thing 
WeChat has ever brought to me, and to the whole family.’  
 
WeChat stickers (Fig. 5.2) are a popular feature of WeChat. Hundreds of sets of 
stickers like these are available. In traditional Chinese patriarchal society senior 
male family members are supposed to be serious (Jankowiak, 2002), yet because 
of those cute stickers junior family members have started to discover the ‘human’ 
side of their fathers as well as their grandfathers. Meanwhile, for the older 
generation, WeChat also opened a window on youth culture. 
 
 
  
There are two deﬁnite trends of social transformation taking place beneath the 
observations of social media use in kinship discussed here. One is the massive 
rural- to- urban migration, and the inevitable rupture of kinship that occurs in the 
process; the other is the increasing popularity of social media and smartphones 
among low income people and the older population. In Lan’s story we see a 
typical family pattern of rural migrants in diaspora, a situation in which the use of 
Fig. 5.2 Samples of WeChat stickers 
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social media helped to overcome long physical distances and maintain a family 
together; features such as the ‘locked album’ with a password shared among 
family members made ‘remote’ parenting possible. Yan Hong’s story, by contrast, 
reﬂects rather different usage. Here the new facility provided by WeChat (voice 
messaging) has been applied to break the pre-existing routine and hierarchy of 
family life. This may be taken further in the light of the ﬁndings from Shanghai 
that revealed that some new aspects of kinship were ‘discovered’ through social 
media use. From online albums to voice messaging to stickers, social media 
changes the practice of family relationships by providing many new possibilities 
for communication. 
During the period of research (2013/ 2014), the use of social media in 
GoodPath was still largely conﬁned to the younger generation (aged under 35). 
The majority of social connection online was still among contemporaries, and very 
few people connected with any senior relatives on QQ. Communication between 
parents and their adult children, or between senior family members in a big family, 
remained essentially a matter of phone calls. Thus the discussion here about 
social media use in family relationships among rural migrants only speaks to 
situations between young couples, or among junior relatives in a large family. 
However, the use of social media in romantic relationships is now pervasive 
among young people. 
 
5. 2. 2 Romantic relationships on social media  
Every day after work, a group of young female factory workers leave the factory 
plant together, hand in hand. All of them are unmarried young women, and gossip 
about relationships is always the most popular topic. Girls chatter avidly on the 
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10-minute walk from factory to dormitories; everybody is trying to contribute 
something to the daily ‘gossip time’: 
 
‘Hey, did you hear that he just asked for her QQ number? I was surprised 
that he wanted to add her on QQ!’ 
‘Really? I didn’t know he was keen on her. Oh no – it is really bad news for 
his ex-girlfriend. A few days ago I just saw her new QQ status … sounds 
like she really regrets the break-up. Look, look…’  
 
The girl took out her smartphone, showing her friends the evidence she had 
spotted on QQ.  
The very action of men and women adding each other on QQ can easily be 
interpreted as romance, since, in the words of one girl, ‘QQ is not used for talking 
business or other things; QQ is for you to fall in love (tan lian ai)’. It has become 
almost a consensus among young people that one of the major functions of social 
media is to develop and maintain romantic relationships. Xiao Lin, a 20-year-old 
factory worker, sent me QQ messages explaining how QQ helped him to become 
a better lover: 
 
I am much bolder and romantic on QQ … you just wouldn’t say those sweet 
words face to face… And I used lots of cute stickers when we were chatting 
on QQ, which made her find me really funny.’  
 
Many young migrant workers, like Xiao Lin, think they can be a better lover on 
social media. Vivid stickers and emojis enrich people’s expression; an element of 
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time delay allows more scope for strategic communication. Behind the screens 
of their smartphones, people feel more empowered and conﬁdent. Rather than a 
diminished form of intimate interaction, romantic relationships on social media 
have become an efficient modality combining elements of voice, image and text, 
as well as emoji and stickers. There is another reason why social media is 
regarded a place for romantic love: a public display of love offline is usually 
frowned upon in GoodPath. Walking hand in hand was the most intimate 
interaction that one could spot on the street. When Xiao Yu, a 21- year- old 
hairdresser’s apprentice, posted photos of herself kissing her boyfriend on QQ, 
she perceived QQ to be a romantic and liberating place where one can feel free 
to display intimacy as the ‘public’ was different: 
 
In big cities people won’t make a fuss [about kissing in public]. But here 
some traditional people would dislike it … but the good thing is they are not 
on my QQ!  
 
Xiao Yu’s kiss photo elicited many comments. Rather than feeling embarrassed, 
she felt that was exactly what she was looking for: ‘…When you posted something 
like that, you just knew what people would comment. If I am not sure, then I won’t 
post it,’ Xiao Yu explained. To the question ‘Do you think about what kind of 
reaction you will receive when you post something on social media?’, the majority 
of participants, both in GoodPath and in Shanghai, said yes. Moreover in many 
cases the imagined audience and presupposed reaction justify the posting. A few 
days later, Xiao Yu finally uttered the real reason why she posted the kiss photo— 
to warn another girl to stay away from her boyfriend as she assumed the girl had 
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been stalking her.163  It’s so annoying, she is still flirting with him (Xiao Yu’s 
boyfriend) on his Qzone. Is she blind? I am pretty sure she saw the kiss photo on 
my Qzone.’  
In romantic relationships, surveillance on social media can lead to jealousy 
in various ways. For instance, a delayed reply to a WeChat message can make 
the romantic partner feel unimportant, especially when he or she can see on other 
social media platforms that their partner is online. Situations such as that 
described by Cai, a 22-year-old waitress in a restaurant, are very common. ‘I sent 
him a message half hour ago; he didn’t reply, but ten minutes ago, he updated 
his QQ status … that made me feel upset.’ She was always online throughout the 
day when working at the restaurant; the multiple social media platforms her 
boyfriend used allowed her to connect with him constantly, but such an 
environment also made it more difficult for her boyfriend to hide anything from 
her. Many young people share some similar insecurities about their romantic 
relationship, As Zhu, a factory worker aged 20, complained: ‘She [his girlfriend] 
never mentioned our relationship on her QQ. My gut feeling is she is not that 
committed, or maybe she is hiding something from me?’  
Because social media proﬁles are continuously subjected to scrutiny to a 
greater extent than most offline spaces, for many young people such as Zhu a 
romantic relationship gained its ‘legitimacy’ by a public announcement on social 
media. However, in practice, the attempt to make a public announcement may 
backﬁre. Lujia, a factory worker, set up a QQ group of 78 contacts in order to win 
the trust of his new girlfriend. He explained: 
                                                     
163 On QQ visiting will be recorded and shown. However, one of paid services of QQ is 
‘invisible visit’, which allows users to view others’ profiles without being recorded.  
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My girlfriend said she was not sure about my love, unless I show it in 
public (gong kai); if I set up the QQ group and show my love for her then 
she will believe me.  
 
On this QQ group, every few hours Lujia wrote something along the lines of ‘ . . . 
darling you are the most beautiful woman in my life and I love you so much’. 
Clearly not everybody thought Lujia’s declaration of love quite as sweet as his 
partner did, and most people soon quit the group. As one former member 
complained, ‘he thought QQ was his own place to do whatever he wanted . . . But 
why should I read screenfuls of such goosebump- arousing nonsense?’ What 
was evident in Lujia’s case was that ‘audiences’ felt extremely disturbed and 
offended. Unlike posting something on one’s own social media proﬁle, Lujia’s QQ 
group messaging, which constantly tried to grab people’s attention to witness 
something of little relevance for them, was way too aggressive and inappropriate. 
However, in most cases some subtle strategies regarding the public 
display of love on QQ had been applied. It was very common to see a couple talk 
to each other in a way that others would not be able to understand without 
knowing the context of the dialogue. For example, a conversation between a 
young couple on Qzone that could be seen by all the online contacts was: 
 
‘Don’t forget you promised me that you wouldn’t tell her about that.’ 
‘Yes I promised, and I didn’t tell her about that at all, quite the opposite, I 
told her that you said those three words on my birthday, and she was so 
delightfully surprised. I told you she liked you.’ 
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Even though substantial information from the above correspondence was very 
limited, everyone who read the dialogue got the message that these two people 
were close to each other and that their relationship was exclusive. That is exactly 
the reason why, rather than this taking place on the seemingly more convenient 
and private basis of one- to- one chatting, the couple chose to talk secretly ‘in 
public’. Such ‘coded’ intimate talk on QQ between lovers skilfully displayed love 
in public without disturbing others too much. 
The self- exposure of personal relationships on social media is not always 
about positive emotions. Having arguments on social media, for example, is 
regarded as a fatal hit to a romantic relationship. Huang Ling, a 19- year- old 
factory worker, explained the problem: 
 
Each time, when we had some friction, he would update his QQ status 
immediately with things like ‘please introduce girls to me, I need a girlfriend, 
blah blah . . . I really hated him for that! 
 
Two weeks after their break- up, Huang Ling was 
still complaining about her ex’s outrageous QQ 
usage, and every female friend of hers expressed 
the same resentment. As one of her close female 
friends remarked, ‘How could he say so regardless 
of the place and the situation (chang he)?! He just 
wanted her to lose face’. Ling applied some ‘media 
sanctions’ to cope with the break- up’s aftermath. Fig. 5.3 A photo of ‘carved fresh’ 
on Huang Ling’s WeChat 
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First of all she locked her Qzone, which means nobody could view it except 
herself. 
 
I need some space you know. I don’t want people to gossip about my break-
up. Even though they do it out of kindness, I still found it’s so annoying. 
    
Huang Ling’s elder cousin even called her very late at night to ask her what had 
happened when he saw her ‘unusual’ QQ status update. She felt embarrassed to 
explain the reason to her friends and relatives, and therefore locked the only 
channel (Qzone) from which most of her friends got news about her. After four 
days Huang Ling reopened her Qzone, having already deleted all her previous 
QQ status updates. Meanwhile Huang Ling’s updates on WeChat were very 
remarkable, even dramatic. During the four ‘non-QQ’ days she uploaded a large 
number of emotional remarks on WeChat. One day she even uploaded a photo 
of her arm, carved by herself with a steel ruler (Fig. 5.3). The two ‘bloody’ Chinese 
characters she carved on her skin were hate (hen) and love (ai). It seems that 
only carving her own skin would fully express her strong feelings about the 
frustrating break- up. She told me: 
 
Because some of my family members are on Qzone, I don’t want to scare 
my relatives and other friends. Whereas the circle of friends on WeChat is 
much smaller; most of them are just colleagues at the factory, so it won’t 
cause me too much trouble. And he [the ex-boyfriend] will see the photo 
either way as he is also my WeChat friend. 
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If we view Huang Ling’s story together with the accounts of Xiao Yu’s careless 
display of a kiss photo on Qzone and Lujia’s less successful public display of love 
on QQ group, a more comprehensible picture emerges. First of all, we need to 
recognise that social media provides many possibilities; it enables people to 
practise romantic relationships online with much greater freedom than in offline 
situations. Social media has also become an essential arena in which romantic 
relationships take place in daily life. However, a more liberating place online does 
not equal fewer social norms. New norms about what is appropriate or 
inappropriate on social media dealing with romantic relationships emerged 
almost immediately. For instance, the release of private problems between 
couples on social media usually brought immense embarrassment, serving to 
trigger even worse consequences than in an offline situation. Sociologist Erving 
Goffman (Goffman, 1975) used the word ‘frame’ to explain how people’s 
behaviour is cued by elements that constitute the context of action. In the frame 
of social media, people were not only aware of the private/ public nature of social 
media, but also intentionally played around with it to express the exclusiveness 
and intimacy of relationships –  even though not everyone was successful at ﬁrst. 
Also, from the frequently applied and highly valued public displays of love on 
social media, we see how on social media the perceived public gaze is just as 
strong as in the offline situation. Online, young rural migrants may be free from 
the disapproval and judgement of senior relatives and fellow villagers, yet their 
peers’ opinions or those of even strangers were highly valued, and can also 
cause concern. Regardless of what kind of social rules one follows, as long as 
there are ‘others’ the risk of ‘losing face’ always exists, and sometimes the 
uncertainty of who is watching online exacerbates the anxiety. 
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Another point that emerged from the varied use of social media in romantic 
relationships is that, in order to make sense of sociality on social media, a whole 
range of available communication tools must be taken into account. As suggested 
by the concept of ‘polymedia’ (Madianou & Miller, 2012), it makes no sense to 
study only one particular media platform in isolation - the meaning and use of any 
one of them is relative to the others. As is clearly shown in Huang Ling’s situation, 
her choice of WeChat only made sense in comparison with the role that QQ and 
mobile phones played in her social life. Furthermore, in a polymedia environment, 
once one has either the smartphone or a personal computer, the decision which 
media to use is no longer much affected by either access or cost; instead it 
becomes a social and moral choices. For instance, in Lujia’s case, his choice of 
using QQ group messaging to declare his love for his girlfriend had been 
regarded as very inappropriate. The approach of polymedia, as well as the 
arguments put forward about new social norms on social media, are not conﬁned 
to the analysis of romantic relationships on social media. We will now see how 
they apply equally to the analysis of all kinds of relationships on social media. 
 
5. 2. 3 Friendship on social media  
A common belief about social media friends in GoodPath, especially among 
young people, was basically ‘the more the better’. During a survey, when asked 
how many social media friends one had, many people answered 
proudly: ‘Countless, at least hundreds of them!’ Some would further add 
comments such as ‘to make more friends is what social media is for’, or ‘to work 
outside is to see the world and make more friends’. In most cases, having a great 
number of social media friends is regarded as convincing evidence of one’s 
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personal charm and modern taste. Bing Bing, a 23- year- old waitress in a local 
restaurant, articulated the opinion shared by many rural young people: that 
having many friends is an essential part of the experience of being a modern 
citizen. 
 
If you remain in a small village you will never know the importance of 
friendship. But being outside, the world is different; people in cities all have 
many chances to meet new friends and they have many friends, and friends 
will have fun and sadness together, help each other . . . I mean real friends 
will be like that. 
 
Having said that, in ﬁeld work it was not difficult to notice that in offline situations, 
people still tried not to be introduced or referred to others as just ‘friend’ (peng 
you). In most cases, they used expressions such as ‘my fellow villagers’ (lao 
xiang) or ‘my fellow workers’ (gong you). Some ‘extra’ identity was always added 
to the person. ‘Introducing someone as a “friend” does not provide any 
information about the background between the party and yourself’ (Smart, 1999), 
and Chinese society traditionally sees non- kinship ties as less important and less 
formal. Another research piece on a comparison of networking between Chinese 
and American populations seems to reinforce the observation in GoodPath. It 
shows that in China on average 6.6 per cent of the people named were described 
as friends, whereas in the US the figure is 67.8 per cent (Ruan,1993). Nor are 
the Chinese alone in this. In many other societies the concept of ‘friendship’ as a 
form of social relationship only started to gain importance during the processes 
of industrialisation and modernisation, which allowed (or forced) people to meet 
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and work with others outside of one’s kin- ties and regional social networks that 
were conﬁned to certain locations (Bell & Coleman, 1999). The experience of 
friendship seemed to have changed because of the use of social media. Evidence 
in this chapter shows that for migrant workers social media is not only the place 
where they explore and experience friendship, it is also the place where they start 
to value friendship in a different way.  
The story of Feige, a 37- year- old forklift truck driver, presents a typical example 
to illustrate the argument. Feige once had three best friends, whom he called ‘my good 
brothers’ (hao xiong di). The four men used to work in the same section of a factory. The 
connection between people from the same hometown is always highly emphasised 
among rural migrants when it comes to social networks; it is practiced as a golden rule 
in the ‘jungle survival’ environment of factories. Fellow villagers are supposed to help 
each other and cover for each other, and thus form various groups in factories. In terms 
of recruiting new workers, section managers (duan zhang) – those at the bottom of the 
management hierarchy –  have a say. In practice, section managers always try to recruit 
new workers from among their fellow villagers, so that their status in the factory will be 
reinforced. Bullying is common in factories, with victims always being those who have 
neither relatives nor fellow villagers at their workplace. For this reason, Feige and the 
other three workers, who came from different provinces, ‘naturally’ became the victims. 
To cut a long story short, after enduring bullying for a couple of months, these four 
colleagues ﬁnally exploded and provoked a ﬁst ﬁght with the dominant group of over 20 
workers. In the end, these four were badly injured and dismissed by the factory. ‘Even 
though we lost the ﬁght, we won the friendship’, as Feige said.  
It was in this context that Feige, for the ﬁrst time, managed to establish 
some strong emotional attachment to his colleagues. The situation he 
experienced is common among factory migrant workers. For most people in a 
situation where nepotism dominates, it is very difficult to establish a stable 
213 
 
friendship with colleagues who do not come from the same family clan or village, 
unless some dramatic event takes place in which friendship has a chance of 
being valued. Moreover, even if this happens, maintaining such friendship in the 
ﬂoating lives of rural migrants is usually very high maintenance. 
Unfortunately, Feige’s precious friendship did not end well. After being 
ﬁred from the factory, the four men embarked on different journeys. In the 
beginning, though living in different places, they managed to keep contact with 
each other via QQ and phone calls, but as time went by such connections 
gradually diminished. Five years later one of the friends was killed following an 
explosion in the ﬁreworks factory where he worked. The late friend’s widow called 
the remaining three men frequently, asking for ﬁnancial help, and this became 
the last straw that ended these friendships. ‘Sometimes you really have no 
choice: life forces you to become more realistic and you lose your friends’, Feige 
said. From then on he has never managed to have such good friends as those 
three from his previous workplace. However, he does not regard himself as 
somebody who lacks friendship. 
On Feige’s QQ, there are more than 15 QQ groups, among which Feige 
actively participated in three. Members of those QQ groups are mostly factory 
workers with a similar rural background. Feige had never met those QQ friends 
in person, but they seemed to know much more about him than his colleagues 
who spent a lot of time with him every day did. ‘[Online] we are very open- minded, 
and you say whatever you want to say. I told my QQ friends a lot of things’, Feige 
explained. One reason that Feige has never worried that his QQ friends might 
release his secrets is that all the QQ groups he joined were anonymous. Nobody 
in the group knows anyone else real name, offline address or other personal 
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details. Usually people tell each other what they do, however, without giving any 
further details. Feige is very popular among his friends on QQ. People found him 
funny and smart, and always asked for his opinions on social events and news, 
making him an opinion former in various groups. Gradually Feige’s emotional 
attachment to his QQ groups grew to the extent that he could not bear being apart 
from them for even a short time:  
 
When I had to charge my mobile phone and went without it for a while, 
I felt restless and anxious, as if a very important part of me had been left 
behind . . . and when I ﬁnally went back, I couldn’t wait to check my QQ. 
 
The friendship online has been valued highly by Feige, and that is not rare among 
rural migrants. Particularly in the speciﬁc situation of ‘ﬂoating’ life, friends online 
seem to be the only ones who will never change places; in a way QQ itself has 
becomes a loyal friend, always there and never failing people. However, this does 
not explain the reason why failed to maintain his previous offline friendships 
online. In order to answer this question, we need to take a step back and consider 
the expectations of friendship. Here Feige’s comment on his online friends 
seemed to provide a new perspective:  
They [online friends] like me and talk with me because they really like me, 
not because I am rich so that they can borrow money from me, or I am 
powerful so that they can get a job from me. Here everything is much purer, 
without power and money involved . . . The friendship is much purer (geng 
chun) on QQ. 
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Feige regarded the friendship between his QQ friends whom he had never met 
in offline situations as ‘purer’ (geng chun) than offline relationships, as there are 
no pragmatic concerns involved online. Furthermore, for migrant workers such as 
Feige, who are often frustrated by their social status, social media provides new 
possibilities of sociality free from social hierarchy and discrimination. 
Curiously, people who enjoy a high socio-economic status seem to have 
the same problems with their offline friends. Ms Cheng, a local factory owner, 
avoided her school reunion event and the chance to meet her former school 
friends. The reason for that was that the last time she went to a school reunion 
she subsequently received at least six phone calls from her erstwhile classmates, 
all asking for ﬁnancial and other forms of help. As she sadly observed:  
I feel nowadays society is very pragmatic. I am sometime very confused 
and frustrated. They said the relationship between previous classmates 
was the purest one because there is no beneﬁt or interest involved. But in 
my case it was no longer true. 
Ms Cheng was not alone. Many factory owners or local officials, the local rich and 
powerful people, have the same problem: people befriend them for pragmatic 
purposes. A retired local official commented how, following his retirement the 
previous year, he had suddenly found that ‘many friends who used to be nice to 
you kind of disappeared . . . no phone call, no text message, let alone visiting you 
during festivals . . . because for them I am useless now.’  
On WeChat Ms Cheng frequently visited a WeChat group where mothers 
share the experience of raising children. Here she can talk about her struggles in 
dealing with her two teenage children there. It emerged that only on WeChat, with 
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WeChat friends, did Ms Cheng felt feel to release her stress and gain a great deal 
of support: 
 
At home everybody is busy with the factory stuff … but here [the WeChat 
group of mothers] I am a mother: just a mother, not a factory owner. I 
show my weakness and get a lot of support and comfort … I don’t know 
exactly who they are, but I know they are all mothers and we share our 
problems with each other. 
 
Chinese migrant workers and factory owners probably lie at the two extremes of 
the wealth spectrum in this industrial China ﬁeld site, yet both appear willing to 
befriend and communicate with strangers online. In the study of social media, 
arguments as to whether real friendship is possible in a virtual environment, or 
whether social relationships will lose their authenticity in the face of social media, 
are constant (Cocking & Matthews, 2000; Fröding & Peterson, 2012; Turkle, 
2011). This is mainly because of the assumption that one of the inevitable 
consequences of increased technological mediation in social relationships is the 
loss of authenticity. However such arguments assume a foundational American 
discourse in which the majority of social media studies took place (Cocking & 
Matthews, 2000; Froding & Peterson, 2012; Trukle, 2011). In this Chinese ﬁeld 
site, friendships on social media that are mediated by digital technology were 
perceived to be more authentic than offline relationships –  which in many cases 
are highly mediated (or ‘polluted’ as people say) by factors such as wealth and 
social status. Outside of such contested discourses, the premise of anthropology 
is that offline life has always been entirely mediated by all sorts of social norms; 
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there is no such thing as an unmediated relationship, so there is no such 
opposition to authenticity. 
The situation in GoodPath poses a sharp contrast to the huge debate over 
the nature of friendship in digital mediated environment where most of the studies 
were based in American and European societies (Vallor, 2012; Hartup, 1995; 
Tong et al., 2008; Elder, 2014). For the latter, the focus has been on whether 
friendship will lose its authenticity on social media. For the former, however, 
‘friendship’ itself as a modern concept barely existed in a traditional society, given 
the dominance of kinship and regional relations. Here it is on social media that 
people have the possibility of exploring and practising these new relationships 
fully. Viewed from the prospective of China, therefore, the approach of studying 
friendship on social media in pre-existing studies seems to be parochial.  
 
5. 2. 4 Privacy (yin si) on social media  
In the discussion of romantic relationships on social media above, it was found 
that Lujia’s public display of love on QQ group did not go down very well. This 
was in part because his QQ friends felt that his behaviour violated their private 
space on QQ. Yet given the offline experience of living in GoodPath, such an 
emphasis on ‘privacy’ stands out as something unusual.  
Of course, you know people can see you, well it’s their business, I am 
doing my own stuff, normal things, nothing wrong, and why should I care 
that much . . . If you care, which means you are doing something wrong, 
something under the table, so I don’t care. 
The daily life of Mr Ma, a 43-year-old shopkeeper, literally takes place on the 
street. His wife cooks three meals a day on a cylindrical briquette stove on the 
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pedestrian walkway. The couple go to sleep on the bed inside their shop after 
they close the grocery in the evening. In the daytime everybody passes by their 
shop and can see exactly what they are doing. Most people in GoodPath would 
agree with Mr Ma’s views, and it is quite common to believe that if people want 
to avoid the gaze of others there must be something weird going on. 
Strictly speaking, there is no Chinese word for privacy. The Chinese word 
yinsi is widely used when it comes to the topic, but it actually means ‘something 
secret which should be hidden from others’, formed from the combination of two 
characters: yin (meaning hide) and si (meaning secret, with the connotations of 
‘illegal’) (Guan, 1995). Linguistically yinsi in Chinese is not neutral but negative, 
according to the collective culture which highly values the right of the collective 
(McDougall & Hansson, 2002). Privacy refers to something much broader than 
secrecy, and the etymology of the English word ‘privacy’ is suggestive. The basic 
Latin form means ‘being single’ with the implied context ‘being not the solitary 
human being, but rather the individual facing the potential claims of other persons’ 
(Hirshleifer, J. 1980). People keep something private for all kinds of reasons, but 
most of the time keeping private is an act of choosing boundaries and staying 
comfortably within them. In a collective society such as China, however, there are 
social pressures to consider ‘nothing private and to label refusal to disclose 
private information as always being shameful and secretive’.164 In GoodPath one 
can clearly feel such social pressure upon individuals, conscious that ‘anything 
one tries to hide from family members must be something wrong’. The line 
between ‘privacy’ and ‘secret’ in people’s real life is also very thin. Within a big 
                                                     
164 James, Grubman. ‘Privacy vs. Secrecy’. Available at 
http://www.jamesgrubman.com/sites/default/files/Privacy-v-Secrecy.pdf  More than Money 
Journal, Winter 2001. 
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family there is no door (doors are always open) from room to room. Staying at 
home with your room door closed is regarded as something weird, and people 
walk into each other’s places without knocking. The situation among rural migrant 
families is not dissimilar from that described in late imperial Chinese society, 
where ‘privacy was not a legal right but a flexible privilege, the boundary of which 
varied according to one’s social status in specific contexts’ (Yan, 2003: 137).  
 It is difficult to generalise about China in terms of the issue of privacy. 
Current scholarship has been focused on the transformation of the notion of 
privacy in contemporary China, demonstrating emerging emphasis on individual 
rights to privacy and data privacy, as well as young people’s increasing demands 
for Western-style individual privacy (Lt, 2005; McDougall, 2001; Wang, 2011). 
However, most studies only relate to elites, middle-class and urban populations, 
thus appearing less relevant to a specific discussion of privacy among Chinese 
rural migrants. Here ethnographies of ordinary rural migrants and their 
experience of life would have more significance. Furthermore, even though 
research found that more recently in Chinese villages individuals’ claims for 
private space had become evident in the major shift of household model from 
extended family to conjugal family (where couples can keep their independence 
and privacy from senior family members) (Yan, 1997; Yan, 2003), such a trend 
was not found among rural migrant families. This was largely because, unlike in 
villages where spacious houses are possible, rural migrant families simply could 
not afford enough living space to make this a reality.165 From this perspective, 
rural migrants are actually living in an even worse situation than those who 
remained in the villages. The latter may not necessarily have a strong awareness 
                                                     
165
 Though the issue of privacy cannot be reduced to the idea that people have some basic need for 
private space. 
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of privacy in terms of individual autonomy and liberty, but at least they may enjoy 
some private living space.  
 In this context, we can further examine the role played by social media and 
smartphones in rural migrants’ private lives. As previously noted, following Huang 
Ling’s break-up, she chose different social media platforms to avoid scrutiny from 
senior family members. The public/private nature of social media is not only 
recognised, but also applied and manipulated to address various issues in social 
relationships. However, not everybody was as good at handling the situation as 
Huang Ling. Many learned from mistakes.  
 Hudong, for example, a salesman in his early thirties, came from a rural 
migrant family. For various reasons he did not have a close relationship with his 
uncle, who lives in a nearby town. However, as a close relative he was supposed 
to join the family dinner at his uncle’s place. In order to avoid the event he told a 
white lie that he needed to work extra hours. Everything went well until Hudong’s 
niece, who is a WeChat contact of his, accidentally showed photos at the family 
dinner of him having dinner with his friends. Unsurprisingly, Hudong’s uncle was 
furious and a family crisis developed. The ﬁrst thing Hudong did after the ‘WeChat 
leak’ was to block his niece on WeChat. He then sorted his WeChat contacts into 
several categories so that he could tailor each posting’s visibility by privacy 
setting on WeChat. 
 Huang Ling and Hudong both made some effort at protecting their privacy 
on social media. By comparison, for many other young rural migrants: social 
media in and of itself means privacy. Such a view is held by CiCi, a 17- year- old 
hairdresser’s apprentice: 
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I am totally free on my QQ. People who can see my profile are my friends 
and would agree with what I do online: as for those pedantic idiots, they 
can’t view my QQ … That’s my privacy, isn’t it? 
 
The first time CiCi heard the word ‘privacy’ was in a television opera a few years 
ago. The word sounded very fashionable and modern to her. Now, on CiCi’s QQ 
profile, visitors are greeted by this welcome page (Fig. 5.4). The whole page is 
pink; even the model’s nails and texts are pink –CiCi’s favorite colour. Besides 
the model’s ‘cute’ face and ‘cool and rebellious’ hand gesture, the text reads: 
 
I am not a tender and sweet 
girl. I am careless and 
casual; I swear from time to 
time; I hate unnatural 
people; I hate those women 
who pretend to be ‘knowing 
the world’ in front of women 
and ‘knowing nothing’ in front of men … you can play with everything, but 
don’t play with my feelings, whether friendship or love; you are just not good 
enough to play with my feelings. 
 
In the collective dormitory where CiCi lives she has almost no private space. Four 
young women sleep together in two king-size beds, set in a basic room with no 
other furniture. Everyone’s personal belongings can be seen at a glance. Yet for 
Fig. 5.4 The welcome page of CiCi's QQ profile 
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CiCi even that is heaven; when she worked in a factory, a single room held eight 
female workers. As she recalled: 
 
At night, everyone was talking with their boyfriends on the phone, as noisy 
as the food market … there seemed to be no secret at all because you can 
always hear each other and see each other. 
 
In order to have some privacy CiCi started to text more on QQ, rather than 
speaking on the phone, to her then boyfriend. Like CiCi, the majority of migrant 
workers in GoodPath have never owned a private space which is undisclosed 
from anyone else’s viewing. In such a context social media actually offers a place 
where people carve out their own private space. On social media they can ‘shut 
the door’, as Huang Ling did after her break- up, or refuse unexpected visitors, 
as Hudong did on WeChat to avoid conﬂict between relatives. Or, like CiCi, they 
can enjoy the freedom of QQ where there are neither roommates who overhear 
and see everything, nor elder adults to make disapproving comments. 
When looking into the speciﬁc issue of the privacy experience in China, 
among people who grew up in a collective society where keeping private space 
was usually stigmatised, it is safe to say that instead of being a threat to privacy, 
social media and smartphones actually facilitate an increase in experience of it. 
Having said that, the experience of privacy is very contextualised. Such an 
increase of privacy on social media is relative in comparison with a collective 
tradition: social media does increase privacy, but has not yet reached the levels 
of some Western countries. 
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The essence of privacy is not about whether there is a public gaze or not, 
but more about whether individuals feel they have control of personal issues and 
are comfortable in a given situation. The concepts of public and private are 
always relative. When people choose to record their thoughts and stories on 
social media they recognise that these will encounter the public gaze. However, 
given the relative absence of senior participants, this online public is perceived to 
be signiﬁcantly different from the offline public. Gossip offline may easily lead to 
harmful consequences, whereas online chat –  with like- minded peers as well as 
friendly strangers who are not connected to anyone signiﬁcant and therefore do 
not pose a threat –  gives people the opportunity to let their inhibitions down to 
talk openly without too much fear.166 In addition, sharing secrets always makes 
for a strong ‘we-feeling’ among those in-groups who know the secret (Simmel, 
1906). Thus one can often witness people voluntarily exposing private thoughts 
to people online. 
It is safe to say that instead of being a threat to privacy, social media and 
smartphones actually facilitate its increased experience. Having said so, the 
experience of privacy is very contextualised. Such increase of privacy on social 
media is relative in comparison with a collective tradition: social media does 
increase privacy, but has not yet reached the levels of some Western countries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
166 For a further discussion of the role that ‘strangers’ play in society see Simmel, G.1950. The 
Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York, Free Press.  
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5. 3 Conclusion 
A central concern of social life in China is the process of zuoren, which literally 
means ‘becoming a person’ or ‘to make oneself a person’ (Tu, 1985). The 
implication of zuoren is that a Chinese individual is not born as a full person: only 
through the process of self-cultivation and socialisation can a person gradually 
become a moral individual. However, the key to understanding this term is to 
appreciate that in China this process of becoming a ‘full’ person is highly 
socialised rather than just an individual pursuit (Yan, 2013). The relationships 
between kin, romantic partner, friends, classmates and colleagues all contribute 
to the very process of ‘becoming a person’. Zuoren has never been an 
individualising concept in Chinese people’s life. On the contrary zuoren, as a 
colloquial term, is frequently used in relation to social life.  
In GoodPath one can always hear somebody praising a person as 
someone who ‘knows how to zuoren’ (hui zuoren), indicating that this person is 
good at dealing with social relationships. Accordingly, a major criticism applied to 
someone who is awkward in social life or has difficulties in following social norms 
is the phrase ‘don’t know how to zuoren’ – literally meaning someone who has 
not learned how to become a person. From this perspective, the discussions in 
this chapter represent an effort to understand the role that social media plays in 
the process of Chinese individuals becoming full human beings. On social media 
people collectively negotiate what personal relationships are and what they want 
them to be. 
Personal relationships are often the main factor that determines people’s 
sense of happiness, confidence and ability to get by in the modern world. In 
addition to telling us about a medium, communication on social media is one of 
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the best places to see the desires and concerns of modern China, and the 
preoccupation with particular moments in its history. In contrast to the traditional 
descriptions of Chinese kinship and sociality, we can see that the radical effect 
of social media is best understood not simply as cause but rather as an alignment 
with other radical changes experienced in the lives of these rural migrants to a 
factory town.  
This was perhaps a particularly good time to be studying the relationship 
between social media use and sociality in modern China, The population of this 
field site are not only Chinese rural migrants who have travelled from rural to 
urban areas; they are also ‘digital immigrants’ (Prensky, 2001) – a unique 
generation who grew up in the analogue era, but joined the technological 
revolution from analogue to digital. So in order to understand the transformations 
taking place on social media, we have first to recognise the radical difference 
represented by historical rural China, as well as the extreme situation of being 
rural migrants. The ‘hot and noisy’ principle discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter and the ‘discovery’ of privacy on social media highlighted at the end 
appear to bookmark the two ends of the social life explored and experienced on 
social media by rural migrants. Here the continuity of rural social life met and 
mixed with the new practice of modern life.  
The full spectrum of sociality on social media, in return, helps us to 
understand further what social media is. Prior to social media, the main ways in 
which people communicate are either through broadcasting or one- to- one 
conversation. On social media, however, the two ends meet in situations that we 
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have called ‘scalable sociality’. 167  Here there are two scales, one from the most 
private to the most public, and the other from the smallest to the largest group. 
For example, as we have seen, Hudong’s change of his WeChat privacy setting 
was to scale down his WeChat posting from full public broadcasting to more 
limited broadcasting; Lujia’s public display of love, in contrast, led him to scale up 
his private and small group message to a more public statement conveyed to a 
larger size of group. Meanwhile Yan Hong’s strategy of using WeChat voice 
messaging is intended to ‘transplant’ information from one private group to 
another; her slight adjustment of the group size from two persons (the couple) to 
three persons (the couple and her mother- in- law) made a signiﬁcant change to 
her relationship with her mother- in- law. Similarly, by locking the QQ album, Lan’s 
couple created a most private and exclusive space in the middle of public 
broadcasting on QQ. All these case studies show how social media as scalable 
sociality allows people to gain much better control of their social life. 
  
                                                     
167 See the detailed explanation of ‘scalable sociality’ at Miller, D. et al. 2016. How the 
World Changed Social Media. London: UCL Press. 
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Chapter 6 
The new generation and coming of age on social media 
 
 
6. 0 Introduction  
The appropriation of social media in various kinds of social relationships 
described and analysed in Chapter 5 provides the context for this chapter. This 
chapter casts a spotlight on young people — the majority of the migrant 
population in GoodPath. These young people are referred to as ‘the new 
generation’ of migrant workers who have remarkably different characteristics and 
behaviour patterns from previous generations of migrant workers (Wang 2001). 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the new generation is the most active user of 
social media, especially in terms of visual genres which portray strikingly different 
characteristics compared to what is posted by users in Shanghai — postings such 
as ‘chicken-soup-for-the-soul’, ‘fantasy’, or ‘anti-mainstream (FZL)’ posts. To fully 
understand their online behaviour, again one has to take a step back to get a 
more comprehensive picture which includes the offline living experience.  
 This chapter starts with the inquiry of rural migrant youth in general, and 
the role rural-to-urban migration plays in rural youth’s life. Based on 
ethnographical material, the second section first describes the perceived gap 
between expectations and reality, which leads to a presentation of the use of 
social media which has integrated into the process of coming of age and has 
become an important approach for young people to gain their new identity as 
urban citizens. Following the argument made in Chapter 4 about social media 
and efficacy, ethnographic material discussed in this chapter further showcases 
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the embedded efficacy of postings on social media, and the ways such efficacy 
provides a possible way for the new generation to actually live in their imagined 
future lives. In order to keep continuity and coherence, this thesis adopted the 
term ‘new generation’ from previous existing mass and academic discourse to 
refer to the young generation of rural migrants. However it is important to note 
that since the end of 1990s when the ‘new generation’ as a phenomenon started 
to gain mass and academic attention (Wang, 2001; Fang, 2011; ACWF, 2011; 
Fan & Chen, 2014), the term itself has undergone some changes. To put it in a 
simple way, the ‘new’ in the early studies 15 years ago has become no longer 
new in terms of age and value system. For example, in the 2013 Report of 
Chinese floating population development, the new generation was defined as 
rural migrants born after 1980s. The oldest born after 1980 was 34 years old in 
2014 when the field work took place, and in GoodPath, the average age in 2013 
of first-time rural migrant parents was 23,168 which means most of the ‘new 
generation’ who were born in the 1980s and the 1990s had produced an even 
newer generation. Thus to put things in perspective, it is more accurate to refer 
to the cohort discussed in early studies as the ‘second generation' and the cohort 
discussed in this thesis as the third or fourth generation who were born in the 
1990s or even after 2000. Moreover, in this thesis, the ‘new generation’ not only 
refers to the biological age of the young rural migrants, but also the strong self-
awareness of ‘being new’ and the desire to be distinguished from the older 
generation(s) among the young rural migrants as illustrated in this chapter. In 
particular, the ‘new generation’ in GoodPath discussed in this thesis shared some 
common features, including: 1) the majority was in the age of 16-25; 2) the 
                                                     
168 Data collected from the local clinic in 2014. 
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original home villages of the majority were the least developed rural areas in 
China such as mountain areas in Guizhou, Yunnan, and Jiangxi; 3) the education 
the majority received was limited: even though all of them were literate, more than 
half of them did not manage to finish middle-school. 
 
6. 1 A sketch of the new generation of migrant workers 
To provide a general description of a whole generation is certainly not an easy 
task given the remarkable diversity in terms of personal experience, regional and 
community culture. A representative story of an individual from the field work 
would help us to first grab some of the most striking features of the new 
generation of rural migrants. Among all the young people I got to know very well, 
Da is probably the most eloquent and very good at expressing his opinion.  The 
reason his story is selected to represent the cohort is not because he is the 
average, but because on the one hand his story consists of a lot of elements 
which I have witnessed many times in many other young rural migrants, on the 
other hand, his personal experience and personality have amplified these 
common elements so that it provides a revealing view. 
 When I was introduced as a PhD student to Da by a common friend, Da 
tossed his head and said: “wow, PhD sounds too profound. Well people like us 
don’t know university knowledge, and we don’t need to know as such school 
knowledge is useless. But don’t underestimate me, I got my PhD from the 
“society” university (she hui da xue)169. After so many years of floating around 
                                                     
169 Here Da applied a well-known saying among Chinese which compares the society to 
a university where people can gain important knowledge and experience. This metaphor 
originally came from the autobiographical book ‘My Universities’ (1923) by Russian and 
soviet writer Maxim Gorky (1868-1937). As the founder of Soviet literature, Gorky’s 
work was greeted with rapturous applause in red China and boasted wide readership.  Mao 
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(piao) and eating bitterness (chi ku). I bet you know nothing about what I have 
learnt!” 
 Da has the maturity and confidence beyond his real age. This 23-year-old 
factory worker is viewed as an experienced man among his peers who has ‘seen 
the world’ (jian guo shi mian) — which in his own words is ‘a PhD graduated from 
the society university’. It took Da eight years to gain this ‘PhD’. When Da was 
only 15-years-old, he dropped out of school and “ventured into the world” (chuang 
shi jie), following a fellow villager who described the world outside the village as 
somewhere full of new things and chances to make money. After two-years of 
working with the fellow villager at various construction sites across China, the 
friendship between these two fell apart since the latter could always find an 
excuse for not returning money he owed Da. Since then, he has washed dishes 
at a seafood restaurant in Guangzhou, guarded the entrance for a night club in 
Shanghai, even helped at a periostracum cicada170 booth at a Chinese traditional 
medicine wholesale market in Wenzhou. And most of the time he worked as a 
factory worker in various factories in coastal China from Shenzhen in the south 
to Jiangsu in Southeast China. 
 The years of ‘floating around’ (piao), and “eating the bitterness of tough 
life” (chi ku) gave Da the credit to become an opinion leader among his peers. To 
many things Da seemed to have an opinion. He would compare the management 
of factories owner by Taiwanese in Shenzhen and the factories in GoodPath 
which are owned by locals, and draw the conclusion that the Taiwanese factories 
                                                     
also applied this metaphor in public to urge youth to undergo re-education in the 
countryside and in factories. The ideology behind this metaphor was especially welcomed 
during the Cultural Revolution where the value of pretorian was dominant. Also see Gold, 
T. 1991. ‘Youth and the State.’ The China Quarterly 127: 594-612. 
170 Periostracum cicada: a raw material in traditional Chinese medicine.  
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in Shenzhen were much more modern and efficient than those in GoodPath, but 
to work in GoodPath, factory workers could enjoy more freedom and more chance 
to be lazy (tou lan) because of the loopholes of management. Da always talked 
of factories in Shenzhen he once worked at with a lot of pride, claiming, “If you 
have never worked in those really modern factories, you can never say you have 
seen the world!” Shenzhen, as the earliest developed economic area is certainly 
regarded among migrant workers as one of most modern places in China. 
Therefore, whenever Da mentioned his experience in Shenzhen, other factory 
workers who have never been to Shenzhen would cast him a look of admiration 
and envy. Da emphasised a couple of times how he became a confident person 
thanks to the experience in Shenzhen: 
 
‘I still remember the first time I came to a factory in Shenzhen, and I was 
so scared and could not even answer the questions asked by the guy 
who was in charge of recruiting new workers. I also dared not to look him 
in the eyes when I reported my age, you know at that time I was using a 
fake ID card which showed I was already 18 years old.171 Going out and 
work (chu lai da gong) was to overcome those weaknesses in my 
personality, and now, as you can see, I am afraid of nothing. There is 
nothing I have not yet experienced (wo shen me mei jing li guo).’ Da once 
said.  
 
                                                     
171 Da was actually only 16-years-old at that time. To use others’ ID cards or fake ID 
cards is a common practice among rural migrants who are either too young to be enrolled 
or do not have their ID cards with them for various reasons.  
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Da is admired as being articulate (hui shuo hua) among his peers, and the story 
of Da — what he feels disappointed about, what he is looking for and what he 
feels proud about — articulates some shared values among young rural migrants. 
Things we can thus learn about the new generation through Da’s story are the 
following: 
 First, the great opportunities and wealth brought about by the economic 
reforms have channelled the priorities of life from scholarship to 
entrepreneurship.172 Young factory workers, even though being at the bottom of 
the hierarchy of entrepreneurship, started to agree with the dominant values of 
experience from working in various factories, building sites, and in the service 
sector. Such change actually has already been recorded in a study of Chinese 
youth two decades ago: ‘Young workers seemed to have lost the work ethic, and, 
like rural and urban private entrepreneurs, scrambled for money and consumer 
goods. The obsession filtered down to school children who began to drop out of 
school arguing that “studying is useful but doesn’t bring money”’(Gold, 1991: 
610). 
 Second, migrant workers have a hierarchical judgement of various cities 
in China according to their modernity, and a rural migrant youth can be judged by 
where they have been because it is believed that the modernity of a place they 
have seen and experienced has significant influence on the level of modernity of 
the person.173 They are also valued according to the quantity of places they have 
                                                     
172 Here, entrepreneurship refers to two main types in China: the first is small-scale 
business in retail and services known as getihu (self-employed), the second emerged 
during the economic reform, with larger scale of business, known as siying qiye (private 
enterprise). See Liao, D., & Sohmen, P. 2001.’ The development of modern 
entrepreneurship in China’. Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 1(1), 27-33. 
173 The similar situation is also observed by Fang’s field work among young rural migrants in 
China’s Special Economic Zones in Shenzhen, whereas in her study rural youth considered 
Shanghai as a more modern place than Shenzhen. See, Fang, I-Chieh. 2011. ‘Growing Up and 
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been to because mobility is regarded as a symbol of the modern world or modern 
lifestyle (Sun, 2009). ‘Having seen the world’ (jian guo shi mian) is valued as an 
important criterion for rural youth to gain higher social status among peers. This 
attitude is closely related to the first point that young rural migrants see gaining 
experience in various places in China as important social resources, and to 
graduate from the ‘society’ is equally, if not more important, than the graduation 
from school. 
 Third, the desire to jian guo shi mian (having seen the world) reflects a 
more general and urgent desire: to change one’s identity. As one of Da's friends 
said: “…No matter what you do, jianguo shimian (having seen the world) is very 
important. If you have the experience, then others, including your parents will 
respect you. If you always stay at home, people will think that you are still a kid, 
knowing nothing. Otherwise, they will look down upon you.” Rural-to-urban 
migration, is no longer a purely economic activity, it is has become an essential 
‘rite of passage’ for rural youth through which they gain full membership in their 
communities and the wider society (Fang, 2011). Therefore, ‘floating around’ 
(piao), and ‘eating the bitterness of tough life’ (chi ku), as Da argued, has been 
rendered as some necessary cost that one is supposed to pay in the process of 
coming of age.  
Last but not the least, there is pervasive disillusion with formal school 
education among young rural migrants. They regard in many cases what a 
society can offer as more valuable than what the education system can offer. For 
them, society itself is a university, as Da commented. Even though almost 
everybody knows the saying ‘knowledge can change one’s fate’ (zhi shi gai bian 
                                                     
Becoming Independent: An Ethnographic Study of New Generation Migrant Workers in China’. 
PhD thesis. London: LSE. 
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ming yun), fewer and fewer rural youth believe so or regard this saying as 
applicable to themselves. Such phenomenon seems to be prevalent not only 
among rural youth in GoodPath, but also among many rural youth nationwide. 
Education is still regarded as the means to upward mobility,174 whereas among 
rural migrants such means has become too difficult to be feasible.175 Education 
is no longer regarded as the greatest hope for China’s poor and China’s rural 
population. 
 
6. 2 ‘Education just isn’t my thing’  
To further understand the causes which lead to the particular attitude of the new 
generation of rural migrants towards education, we need to consider a wider 
social environment. Starting with the analysis of a popular story shared by a few 
informants on their Qzones, this section provides the ethnographic evidence of 
the observation that education, generally believed to be highly valued in Chinese 
society, is actually valued in a far more utilitarian way. Many, if not most, rural 
                                                     
174  In the study of Chinese social mobility, scholars have long paid attention to the 
importance the imperial examination system as the major means for vertical mobility 
based on individual ability and talent, which has functioned in China for over a thousand 
years. See Hsu, F. 1949. ‘Social Mobility in China’. American Sociological Review 14(6): 
764-771. 
175 Since 2011, increasing numbers of reports have pointed out the problems of the 
dropping proportion of rural students in Chinese universities, especially the top ones. For 
example, in 2010, only 17 percent of freshmen at Tsinghua University, the top university, 
came from rural areas, even though rural students comprised 62 percent of those attended 
the national university entrance examination. Even though the percentage of rural 
students in universities has increased a bit since 2011 when the government and 
universities made an effort to reduce the growing gulf between cities and the rural, it has 
to be noted that for the rural youth to succeed via the formal education system has become 
more and more strenuous and tough. Also see 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-08/17/content_13136303.htm  
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migrant parents as well as rural migrant youth in my ﬁeld site did not see success 
in school as a priority.  
Being asked whether she felt regret about dropping out of school at such 
a young age, Bobo, a 19-year-old factory worker who dropped out of school two 
years ago, answered with a shrug: 
 
Well, I know you would say knowledge can change one’s life, but actually 
education is not that useful for us … Education just isn’t my thing, and I 
don’t want to waste money or time on it.  
 
On Bobo’s Qzone, there was a story about education she shared a year and half 
ago (May 2012), with the comment ‘so true’. During the field work, I saw the same 
story shared on social media profiles by 4 young factory workers, 2 middle-aged 
factory workers, 2 factory officers, 1 factory owner, 1 local shop owner, and 3 
middle school students from rural migrant families. As Chapter 4 argued, popular 
stories on social media actually function as the folk tale in the digital age which 
safeguard certain widely shared values, social norms and moral rules among 
certain social groups. This story, which is popular among different age and social 
groups in GoodPath, throws some light on our understanding of the local view of 
education. So let us first look at the story with the title ‘Qiang and Ming’. 
 
6. 2. 1 The story of Qiang and Ming 
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When Qiang was a child, he spent the whole day idling around in the village where 
he lived. His parents became very worried about him, thinking he would end up 
achieving nothing. On the other hand, his neighbour Ming studied very hard, and 
all the villagers believed that he would become somebody one day.  
 When Qiang and Ming were both 19 years old, Qiang, not surprisingly, 
failed the university entrance examination. He then followed other villagers to 
work outside the village on a highway construction site, earning monthly wages 
of 3,000 RMB (US$ 500). Ming by contrast received an offer from a top Chinese 
university to study road and bridge engineering, with a tuition fee of 5,000 RMB 
(US$ 850) per year. When they were both 23 years old, Qiang’s parents arranged 
a marriage for him. The bride was a very capable and virtuous village girl. 
Meanwhile, Ming had fallen in love with a girl from the city. The following year 
Qiang brought his new wife to the construction site to look after him. Meanwhile 
Ming finally graduated and got a job in a construction company.  
 For Qiang, as a worker, life was not too bad. After work he had plenty of 
time to enjoy playing cards and watching television. Ming’s life as an engineer 
was much more stressful. During daytime he had to visit various construction 
sites, and in the evening he had to work extra hours. Since he was too busy, his 
girlfriend finally broke up with him. When they were both 28 years old, Qiang had 
already saved up 200,000 RMB (US$ 35,000) and had become the father of two 
children. He went back to his village, where he built a new house and opened a 
pig farm. Meanwhile Ming finally gained his intermediate engineer qualification 
certificate, but was still single. So finally he accepted an arranged marriage. For 
his new family Ming bought an apartment in the city on a mortgage; each month 
he had to pay the majority of his salary to the bank. 
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 By the time Qiang and Ming were both 35 years old, Qiang had made a 
fortune from his pig farm. Ming, in contrast, was actually in debt because of his 
monthly mortgage and the high cost of his son’s education. When they were both 
50 years old, Qiang had become the grandfather of three grandsons. He enjoyed 
the sunshine in the village every day. Meanwhile Ming finally got his senior 
engineering qualification certificate – but he still had to work very hard every day.   
 When both men were in their seventies Qiang fell ill. He held his wife’s 
hand, saying: ‘I have lived for almost 70 years. I have sons and grandsons. I am 
so satisfied with my life.’ Ming also held his wife’s hands, saying: ‘I was always 
busy, never at home. I know you have suffered a lot for decades. I feel so sorry.’ 
Soon Qiang recovered, thanks to the clear air of the countryside and fresh 
vegetables and meat from his own farm. However, Ming was not so fortunate: 
years of intense work and stress, plus a poor quality of life under the busy pace 
of the city, finally took their toll. He soon passed away. The story concludes with 
the scene of Qiang in his eighties, standing in front of Ming’s tomb and sighing 
with emotion as he reflects: ‘we only live once, and how different we are.’  
 It seems as though the life of rural migrants has been dramatically 
romanticised in this story. Some Chinese experts176 have suggested that urban 
white collars workers may very well be its original target audience. There certainly 
is a rather dark sense of humour in the recognition that ‘after all the struggles to 
succeed, a senior engineer’s life may end up even worse than a rural 
                                                     
176 The researcher consulted two journalists and a university lecturer on literature upon 
the authorship of the two stories during her one-month period of research in Shanghai, 
July 2013.  
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migrant’s’. 177  Having said that, the story also became popular among rural 
migrants with a different interpretation. The popularity of this story reflects the 
pervasive disappointment in the current education system and the perceived 
outcome of the education, especially among the rural migrant group.   
 
6. 2. 2 Shrinking value of education 
Half a century ago in China, university education almost always ensured a ‘job 
for life’ and a secure urban identity.178 However, this is no longer axiomatic in the 
context of a market economy with no job guarantees; the massive expansion of 
university enrollment in China179 which not only means that graduates are no 
longer regarded as the ‘elite’, but also has led to severe unemployment problems 
among Chinese university graduates (Bai, 2006; Li, 2007; Lee & Warner, 2007). 
Moreover, in China, where top universities are state-owned, the tuition fee for the 
first tier university is the cheapest or may even be free. By contrast private 
                                                     
177  Such self-deprecation among the urban population has become an internet 
phenomenon in China. People intentionally depict themselves as ‘losers’ (diaosi) in order 
to vent the frustration about society and mock various severe social problems in 
contemporary China, including high fees for education, the high price of housing, 
environmental pollution etc. It’s worth noting that most people who described themselves 
as ‘losers’ online actually possess a decent education and are university students or white-
collar workers. It is very rare to see rural migrants describe themselves as ‘losers’ online, 
especially they have already suffered a lot from being socially stigmatised in this vein. 
For a detailed analysis of diaosi internet culture see Yang, P. et al. 2015. ‘Diaosi as 
infrapolitics: scatological tropes, identity-making and cultural intimacy.’ Media, Culture 
& Society. 37(2): 197–214.  
178 Phrases like Du chu lai or du chu qu (literally meaning to study one’s way out of the 
countryside) were used to refer to the situation in which rural people become urban 
residents through receiving higher education in the city, followed by getting a white-
collar work or a non-manual job in the city. Also see Murphy, R. 2014. ‘Study and School 
in the Lives of Children in Migrant Families: A View from Rural Jiangxi, China’. 
Development and Change. 45(1):29-51. 
179 The acceptance rate of colleges now is higher than 70 per cent. 
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universities, which generally do not rank as high as first tier state universities, 
charge a far higher tuition fee to students unable to get into state universities. 
This means that students pay more for less qualified universities. For rural 
students from migrant families, who grow up with relatively poor educational 
resources and limited family guidance, resulting in lower grades in the university 
entrance examination, it has become very difficult to get into first tier universities. 
Studies investigating the academic performance of rural students, especially 
those ‘left-behind’ children, from Chinese rural migrant families, present a very 
pessimistic picture (Xie, 2009; Ye, 2005). In this study, many young factory 
workers were once left-behind children who dropped out of school before the age 
of 16 or 17, and rural students also include those who had migrated with their 
parents and attended local schools. Nevertheless, the situation of those rural 
students who attended local schools was not much better than the situation of 
left-behind children.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the separation between rural migrants and the 
local residents is severe. Such separation even exists on the level of the local 
primary school. In the only primary school in GoodPath, most of the students 
(around 85 per cent) come from migrant families. There were five classes for each 
grade, divided in turn into four ‘outsider classes’ (waidi ban) and one ‘local class’ 
(bendi ban). Better teachers were allocated to the ‘local class’, which only 
enrolled local students. A local teacher explained the reason:  
 
…[Local] parents were so worried that their children will pick up bad habits 
from those ‘wild kids’ from rural migrant families … which in many cases 
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was true. You cannot expect children to be well-behaved if their parents 
do not care about their school performance and they have no discipline at 
home.  
   
What the teacher said reflects the situation that in the education of rural migrant 
children, help provided by rural migrants’ families was scarce as rural migrant 
parents were just too busy and too tired with factory work. As a result, they had 
no spare energy and time to look after their children and, on top of it, as many of 
them admitted, they were also lacking the capability to guide their children (mei 
neng li).  
In terms of family education, Anagnost (2008) notes that in the face of the 
global market, urban Chinese parents are often anxious about their children’s 
future because they fear they cannot manage to give their children right guidance 
to prepare for the future. Whereas compared to their anxious urban counterparts, 
the parents of the generation of young migrant workers have even less of an idea 
about what is happening in the neoliberal economic system and, rather than 
guiding their children, are in fact often reliant on their children to guide them (Zhou 
1999). Mr. Huang, a 35-year-old factory worker who has three young children 
remarked:  
 
Let me ask you, how much you earn from doing a PhD? Well, I definitely 
can’t afford my kids to go to universities… and to be honest, it is just not 
worth it. University students are everywhere nowadays, probably even more 
than factory workers, and many of them can’t find a job to feed themselves. 
241 
 
If the family is rich, then fine…if not, like us, it is not worth it. My social 
network (guanxi) can only help my kids to find a job in factories, you know, 
beyond that, they can rely on nobody. Ok in order to work in factories, you 
need to be able to read and write, and to use machines, or a computer…but 
you don’t need universities to teach you these. My older son who is only 
eight years old can play smartphones better than me. He can even teach 
me. He is smart, I want him to do business…doing business doesn’t need 
university neither, look at those millionaires [factory owners] here, none of 
them went to university. Actually they were lucky that they didn’t go to 
universities, you know, education makes people slow and too well-behaved. 
Doing business is different, different rules to follow!  
 
On the one hand, the high cost of higher education, in terms of financial burden, 
effort and time investment, lies in sharp contrast to the high unemployment of 
university graduates, and to the fact that entry-level white-collar workers 
nowadays often earn similar or even lower salaries compared to factory 
workers. 180  On the other hand, the fact that most of the factory owners in 
GoodPath who were once peasants with little education managed to become rich 
and successful thanks to the opportunities allowed by economic reforms and 
                                                     
180 In 2015, the average entry-level monthly income of university graduates was 2687 
RMB (US$448) http://mt.sohu.com/20150827/n419890767.shtml; whereas in GoodPath 
the average income of factory workers on an assembly line is 2600 RMB (US$433), and 
factory workers in heavy labour sessions, such as steel cutting, earned around 4500 RMB 
(US$750). Having said so, it is not accurate to compare the mere figures of salary as for 
university graduates the attainment from workplace includes a series of social benefits 
including social insurance and paid holidays, whereas factory laboring does not offer any 
other welfare. Also there is considerable space for income increases in university 
graduates’ jobs, which usually do not exist in factory jobs.  
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without having gone through university education, seems to further reduce the 
perceived value of education among rural migrants in GoodPath. Thus it 
understandable that many rural migrants in my field site regarded education, or 
higher education to be a waste of time — years are spent pursuing a useless but 
expensive university certificate which could have been used to earn money in 
factories. Faced with such pragmatic concerns, many young people from rural 
backgrounds choose to drop out of school and work in factories at a very young 
age. Such decisions are generally supported, or at least not opposed, by their 
families. 
The story of ‘Qiang and Ming’ exactly reflects the attitude towards 
education among rural migrants in my field site, an attitude which is surprisingly 
different from the well-known high valuation of education to many Chinese 
(Kipnis, 2011) as well the purpose of migration.181 Having said so, it is worthwhile 
noting that rural migrants’ attitude toward education is a result of a series of 
complicated factors including the experience of the urban labor market and family 
size. Researchers have observed that rural migrants who work in big cities, rather 
than in small factory towns like GoodPath, value education more highly and are 
thus more willing to invest in their children’s education.182  
                                                     
181 A rich literature has demonstrated that children’s education is central to domestic and 
transnational migration. For example, see Huang, S, and Yeoh, B. 2005. ‘Transnational 
families and their children's education: China's ‘study mothers’ in Singapore.’ Global 
networks 5(4): 379-400; Waters, J. 2006. ‘Geographies of cultural capital: education, 
international migration and family strategies between Hong Kong and Canada.’ 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 31(2): 179-192. 
182 In fact, as shown in Rachel Murphy’s research among rural migrants from Jiangxi, 
many parents had to migrate in order to earn enough money to support their children’s 
education, and many left-behind children see ‘work hard’ as the way to repay their 
parents’ sacrifice for them, and the perception of the ‘bitterness’, the harsh life, their 
parents suffered in migration further pushed the children to study hard in order to avoid 
the same lives of their rural migrant parents. See Murphy, R. 2014. Op. cit. The situation 
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6. 3 ‘Without discarding the old there would be no coming of the new’ 
In Da, we see a representative rural youth who has lost confidence in education 
and threw himself into the floating labour market at school age, hoping the 
powerful current of rural-to-urban migration will finally bring him to a place where 
he can be regarded as a grown-up modern citizen. When rural youth leave their 
villages for factories and cities, what they gain is not only a wage which relieves 
economic pressure on their families, but also various degrees of autonomy from 
their parents and the rural communities. Compared to the overarching desire for 
‘growing up’ and ‘becoming a part of the modern world’, earning money in a way 
seems not even that important. It is also worthwhile to note the goals for ‘growing 
up’ and ‘becoming modern' have no gender difference — both young men and 
young women shared the same desire even though the specific standards are 
gendered.183 
 In practice, ‘growing up’ and ‘becoming modern’ are complementary as for 
many the first step of becoming modern is to set a clear boundary with their rural 
past, which also means becoming independent from their families and rural 
communities, financially and socially. The use of social media in the next section 
                                                     
observed in Murphy’s research seems to be quite different from that observed in 
GoodPath. The main reason is due to the different generations and different experience 
of labor market. In GoodPath the majority of rural migrants are the young new generation, 
and many of them had already regarded themselves failed in the educational system when 
they were still left-behind children. Also the level of education required to work in 
factories in GoodPath is much lower compared to the labour market in big cities, which 
also made people underestimate the outcome of education. 
183 The second part of Chapter 7 will focus on the gender issue of young rural migrants, 
examining how young women and young men negotiate and challenge their gender role 
in the process of growing up and becoming modern in different phases of life.  
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further illustrates the ways in which young rural migrants tried to achieve their 
goals of migration in their everyday life.  
 
6. 3. 1 The new pattern of social life online  
Based on the analysis of 105 migrant workers’ QQ profiles, Chart 6.1 shows that 
non-kinship relationships are dominant on rural migrants’ social media. The 
majority of social connections on social media come from migration. Here people 
got more chances to have interaction with various kinds of people, such as 
‘colleagues’, ‘other friends’ and ‘online strangers’. The labels of different social 
relationships followed the colloquial terms and categories used by participants in 
this survey. For example, many people would add ‘other’ to ‘friends’ to indicate 
those friends were not their classmates, nor fellow villagers, nor colleagues. Nor  
 
 
Chart 6.1 Distribution of QQ contacts among rural migrants in GoodPath 
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are the categories mutually exclusive: most classmates are fellow villagers, and 
some of the colleagues to whom people became connected on QQ were relatives 
or fellow villagers. 
In comparison with the control group in Shanghai,184 several of these 
figures for rural migrants on the chart stand out. One notable feature is the 
relatively small ‘classmates’ group. Classmate ties are usually extremely 
important in Chinese society (Smart, 1999); the age-class grouping in school 
facilitates the formation of friendships and cliques, and the significance of the 
classmate friendship becomes greater over time (Fried, 1969). In Shanghai, more 
than 36 per cent of social media contacts are education-related (classmates, 
school friends), whereas the concepts of ‘classmates’ and ‘school friends’ are 
very ambiguous among rural migrants, many of whom dropped out of school 
early. Furthermore, more than 80 per cent of participants in Shanghai had never 
added strangers on social media, let alone made friends with them. In contrast 
‘online strangers’, referring to contacts without any offline social connection, 
stand out as an important part of social media contacts among rural migrants.  
In practice, being connected is one thing: keeping in touch is another. In 
fact, mere figures of the distribution of various contacts do not tell even half the 
story. The word ‘zombie’ (jiang shi) was frequently used by many young people 
to refer to those online contacts with whom one hardly had any form of interaction 
(online chatting, commenting or sharing). Some people would keep those 
‘zombies’, as a large number of contacts on social media is regarded as an 
achievement. For many rural migrants, previous colleagues and fellow villagers 
                                                     
184  As mentioned in Chapter 1, a one-month period of research was conducted in 
Shanghai. For this specific comparison 35 social media profiles of people in Shanghai 
were examined.  
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have become ‘zombies’ on QQ.   
 Not that this is necessarily a problem. Lu Li, a 25-year-old waitress at a 
local restaurant, has become more and more reluctant to keep in touch with her 
best childhood friend on QQ. Yet when she left the village six years ago both of 
them had opened QQ accounts in order to keep in contact: 
  
To be honest I feel the only thing we could talk about was childhood 
memories and nothing else. I am not interested in her life in the village and 
she couldn’t appreciate my sense of fashion, style or imagine the ups-and-
downs in my life here …We no longer live in the same world, you know … 
but no harm in keeping her on my QQ. You look better online with more 
friends than less, don’t you? 
 
Even though some young rural migrants are like Lu Li who don’t mind keeping 
the ‘zombies’ on social media for the sake of ‘looks better or popular’, it is not 
unusual to see people frequently delete their online contacts, especially on 
WeChat where the contact list is invisible to others. And as mentioned in the 
beginning of Chapter 4, to check whether one still remains on their friends’ 
WeChat contact lists has even become a popular practice among rural migrants. 
Baozi, a 23-year-old apprentice cook at a local restaurant, once deleted almost 
20 WeChat contacts:  
 
The leader at our restaurant, Lao Zhang, the guy with a very quick mind, 
told me that the level of contacts on my WeChat reflects the level of myself. 
He is right, I need to get to know more better level (gao shui ping) friends to 
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improve myself. Some of those [the WeChat contacts he deleted] are indeed 
my fellow villagers (lao xiang) but we rarely talked. I guess we don’t have a 
common language, as those who stay in villages worry about different things 
in their life. To be honest the amount of fellow villagers you can rely on when 
you are in trouble is really limited…well, without discarding the old there 
would be no coming of the new (jiu de bu qu, xin de bu lai)”. In the end Baozi 
applied a Chinese old saying to justify his screening of online contacts.  
 
Even though fellow villagers are widely regarded as reliable social resources for 
rural migrants to get a job or find a partner (Feng et al, 2002; Zhao, 2003), Baozi 
only kept a couple fellow villagers on his social media185 who he thinks he can 
get along with well (liao de lai) or who are really ‘useful’ (you yong) and willing to 
help. 
 The experience of ‘working outside’ (da gong) has broadened the horizons 
of migrant workers, and so an invisible division started to separate people who 
had remained in villages from those who have already experienced ‘the outside 
world’. Even though physical distance was no longer a real obstacle, given the 
communication technology now available, rural migrants failed to keep many of 
their previous social connections: a non-physical barrier had developed between 
the experiences and mindsets of these two groups that is perhaps even more 
difficult to bridge. Gradually those rural contacts have become ‘the old’ in Baozi's 
eyes, and therefore have to be discarded in order to create space for the new. 
‘The old’ not only include rural contacts, their old, past village life, but also include 
                                                     
185 Baozi actually deleted mobile phone numbers of various contacts even more frequently, but 
that was mainly because he knew many of his contacts change their mobile phone numbers 
frequently in the process of moving from one place to another, therefore there is no need to keep 
the old numbers.  
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the parent control or family control in general. To break down of the pre-existing 
structure of social relationships is perceived as an essential part of growing up 
and become a modern citizen — to use the terminology of Victor Turner (1969) 
in characterizing rites of passage that is the creation of ‘anti-structure’, while to 
use Baozi’s words, that is to discard the old. Baozi’s attitude about the old and 
the new is consistent with what previous research has suggested. For example, 
Jacka (2006: 134), notes that rural migrants are interested in ‘exploring the world, 
trying new experience, testing new identities and developing themselves’. The 
search for ‘autonomy, hopes and aspiration’ (Jacka, 2006:138) is the key factor 
in their decisions to leave home. Also nearly every young rural migrant in Fang’s 
PhD research reported that one major reason they left home villages was to 
‘become independent’ from the older generation which makes it possible for them 
to experience something new, fit into and then take part in ‘modern China’. Young 
factory workers are willing to learn and welcome new things, no matter what. They 
are very open to new values and discourses (Fang, 2011). 
 In this thesis, from the popularity of FZL (anti-mainstream) and ‘chicken-
soup-for-the soul’ postings mentioned in Chapter 3, to the development of 
friendship with strangers in Chapter 5, the desire to ‘discard the old and embrace 
the new’ expressed itself in many ways on the use of social media. Moreover, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, for many migrant youth, social media has carved the 
anti-structure space where they started to experience the ‘privacy’ from the 
control of rural collective life, which makes a boundary between the old and the 
new more possible.    
 It has been argued that under China’s emerging market economy, Chinese 
youth have developed ‘neoliberal subjectivities’ which motivate them to talk 
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openly about their hearts and their feelings (Rofel, 2007: 4). Whereas, to talk 
openly without having to worry about the surveillance and judgements from the 
seniors has always been the problem. When looking into the specific issue of the 
privacy experience in China, among people who grew up in a collective society 
where keeping private space was usually stigmatised, which is especially true in 
the highly collective living situation of rural migrant youth. 
 
6. 3. 2 The rise of rural youth 
More generally speaking, the increased experience of privacy enjoyed by the new 
generation beyond of the control of family and rural community reflects the 
phenomenon of the ‘rise of youth’ amongst the rural migrant population which has 
been described in the research of rural youth by Yunxiang Yan (Yan, 2003) where 
young people are getting increasing control of their own life and have no problem 
of going against the wishes of their parents and other senior family members in 
the rural community.  
 In neoliberal China, youths have developed ‘a self-conscious enthusiasm 
for coherence in their search for a new cosmopolitan humanity’ which ‘emerged 
out of the upheavals and excitement within the uncertainties of social life’ (Rofel, 
2007: 197), and that is a situation the older generation of these rural youth have 
never encountered and thus have no experience to share. For the new 
generation, the problems they need to deal with during their migration, in many 
cases, are about sorting out their own future. Many rural youth put their parents 
at a position which has limited say in their personal life because the authority of 
parents seems to have gone. Many young rural migrants rarely show respect to 
their parents in any obvious way and they feel their parents don’t understand 
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them. Linxiao, the 21-year-old factory worker, is one of them. Whenever she 
talked of her parents Linxiao never tried to hide her contempt:  
 
I rarely talked to my father anyway, he is grumpy and spent most of his 
time boasting in front of his friends. As for my mum, well, she came to me 
either to complain about my father or ask me to buy something for her…I 
am doing my duty as a daughter. I earn my own money, I take care of 
myself, and I make decisions for myself. 
 
 When Linxiao needs some advice in terms of job hopping, daily shopping, or 
romantic relationship, she turned to Liusisi, a fellow villager’s previous colleague 
who she got to know well and became good friends with on QQ. Liusisi is 3 years 
older than Linxiao, and worked at a massage shop in Shanghai at that time. In 
Linxiao’s eyes Liusisi is somebody who has experienced a lot of things and thus 
knows how to give her advice. These two good friends even went shopping online 
together while they were chatting on QQ. Liusisi would send Linxiao a few links 
to dresses or clothes on Taobao online shop and let her choose. And Liusisi 
promised Linxiao that whenever she comes to Shanghai, she can stay at her 
dormitory room and she will show her the big Shanghai. ‘I see her [Liusisi] as my 
older sister, to be honest she is closer to me than my parents or any relatives.’ 
Linxiao said. 
 Substantially, in the case of the new generation rural migrants, the rise of 
youth power and decline of family elderly lies in the fact that the family household 
as a production unit no longer occupies the central position in the economy, social 
life, and ideology that it used to hold historically (Davis and Harrell, 1993; Whyte, 
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1990; Gold, 1991). After the communist victory, from education, employment, 
residence, marriage, fertility to social relations and life style, the party-state 
moved forcefully to control the life course of all Chinese with the widest scope 
with children and youths (Gold, 1991). Within individual families, grown children 
no longer have to listen to the orders of parents about what they should do or 
whom they should marry. Instead, they are encouraged by the party-state to 
make their ‘own’ choice following the ideology introduced by the communist party 
(Whyte, 1990).  
 Furthermore, in rural-to-urban migration, the distance between urban 
areas and home villages, as Jacka (2006) argued, pose a big challenge to 
effective family control especially when the senior family members are left-
behind. Meanwhile, Fang (2011) attributes the reasons for the ‘rise of youth’ to 
their financial contribution, their newly established knowledge and social 
connections — these not only give rural youth a new identity within the household 
but further makes them become the ‘public face’ of their natal families. Young 
migrant workers generally do not pay much attention to their parents’ suggestions 
because they feel that the experiences their parents went through in their youth 
are not applicable or relevant to them. As the first generation migrant workers, 
their parents or even grandparents went out mainly in order to earn money and 
support their families, who still lived in rural areas. All these researches point in 
the direction that in rural community family elders no longer have sufficient 
material resources, political support, and moral authority to hold sway over their 
adult children. 
  
6. 4 The gap between the dream and the reality 
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So far, we have seen that in order to grow up to become a modern citizen, the 
new generation bade a determined farewell to their rural family backgrounds and 
family control and even the formal education which in their eyes has lost meaning 
in the modern world which values the entrepreneurship more than scholarship. 
However, it seems that to say goodbye and to cut off one’s connection is much 
easier to achieve than to really take part in the modern world. Although the factory 
might be the convenient way available to the rural youth to gain access to the 
‘modern world’, it does not really provide the appropriate conditions for them to 
integrate into modern society. 
 
6. 4. 1 Become ‘visible’ on social media  
A factory manager once remarked that the logic of the assembly line lies in 
perceiving humankind to be part of the machine. When asked whether he knew 
any of the factory workers personally, given that he spends most of his time in 
factory workshops, the answer was ‘No, it’s not necessary’. In vast factory 
workshops, monotony on a daily basis is the grand narrative, eclipsing 
individuality. Most of the time migrant factory workers are ‘invisible’ people. In the 
age when the availability of information has exploded, the scarcity of attention is 
always palpable to everybody; it has indeed been argued that attention has 
become the real ‘currency’ of business for an individual (Davenport, T. and Beck, 
J. 2001). In the factory, young workers struggle to form a stable identity against 
the background of the alienated/ impersonal and differentiated environment 
produced by industrial capitalist society.  
Liping, a 22-year-old factory worker, seems to have her own 
understanding and strategy of ‘visibility’. She once complained that I was always 
253 
 
‘invisible’ (the QQ status) online, which is true. The ‘invisible’ status means that 
people cannot tell whether the user is online or not. There are six online status of 
QQ: I am online; Q me (chat with me); Away; Busy; Do not disturb; and Invisible. 
However, there are other ‘hidden’ options in the advanced setting. Right click any 
QQ contact’s avatar, in the drop down box, and you will see a few more options 
including one meaning ‘visible to him/her in invisible status’ (yin shen dui qi ke 
jian). This enables the selected contact to always ‘see’ you, even when you are 
‘invisible’ to others. For Liping, such kind of tailored ‘visibility’ has some significant 
meaning in a relationship —‘It is like I am always there waiting for you, you know, 
very close and exclusive.’ Liping explained.  
 ‘To see’ is different from ‘to look’; the latter happened all the time in social 
life, but did not necessarily lead to the former. Migrant workers such as Liping 
generally all suffer from ‘attention deficit’; they are always the attention givers, but 
rarely become attention winners. In this sense social media is the only place 
where these workers can enhance their social visibility and see themselves as 
they want to be perceived. Moreover, in offline life, even when rural migrants 
become an attention winner, more often than not, they are associated with the 
unpleasant aspects of urban life. The reality that the modern world does not 
welcome these young rural migrants, views them as dirty and uncivilised, and 
makes them become a scapegoat for all kinds of social problems has been 
extensively noted by other researchers (Douglas, 1991; Rofel, 1999; Pun, 1999, 
2005; Jacka, 2006).  
 Rofel argues that rural migrants in post-socialist China are subjected to a 
process of ‘othering’, in which they are characterised as ‘potentially hindering 
China from reaching modernity’ because ‘in their very existence’, they ‘bring the 
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past into the present’ (Rofel, 1999: 106). Similarly, Jacka argues that ‘the figure 
of the rural migrants is a signifier of ‘otherness’ against and around which 
dominant national ideas about identity are constructed and reproduced’ (Jacka, 
2006: 31). Among all the indignity discourse rural migrants suffered, the term 
suzhi (human quality) is the most frequently-used term. People living in cities use 
expressions such as ‘low suzhi’ or ‘without suzhi’ to refer to rural people whom 
they regard as intrinsically inferior. By contrast to the depiction of peasants under 
Mao as heroes of socialist progress (Rofel, 1999: 106), in the discourse of suzhi, 
peasants and their lifestyle are measured on the scale of modernity and end up 
being stigmatised as ‘backward’, with rural migrant workers cast as a threat to the 
‘project of national modernity’ (Jacka, 2006: 31). The following section starts with 
the observation of daily use of suzhi on young rural migrants’ QQ and further 
sheds light on the questions of human agency and resistance in the context of 
the appropriation of social media. 
 
6. 4. 2 To attain a higher suzhi on social media 
JiaDa is a 23-year-old forklift driver in a factory. He sees himself as a ‘wolf’ – an 
animal that is always ‘cool, alone and very masculine’ – and he named his QQ 
group in similar vein as ‘the youth who are like wolves and tigers’ (ru lang si hu 
de qing nian). This QQ group includes JiaDa’s168 online friends, all of whom are 
also rural migrants. The group’s profile includes a ‘group album’ (qun xiangce), 
and ‘group notification’ (qun gonggao). The group notification reads: ‘I hope 
everybody may be a person with suzhi.’ (Fig. 6.1) 
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What exactly is 
Suzhi? Suzhi as a concept 
that has been constantly 
discussed in many academic 
studies of Chinese society 
means ‘human quality’ or 
‘population quality’ and is a 
concept deeply associated 
with the Chinese urban–rural 
divide and the national modernisation since the 1980s (Anagnost, 1997; 
Anagnost, 2004; Murphy, 2004; Yan, 2008)186. As a political keyword, suzhi made 
its debut in 1986, when the party-state officially designated it through a resolution 
passed by the 12th Party congress, emphasizing the agency of suzhi in history, 
and the urgency to improve ‘the moral suzhi and the scientific and cultural suzhi 
of the Chinese nation’ (Yan, 2008: 112). And in the process of economic reform, 
the term suzhi has become more centrally and comprehensively linked with the 
national goal of modernisation (Yan, 2008: 112). In 1997, the definition of suzhi 
given by the party newspaper People’s Daily was ‘the general level of the 
physique, intelligence, ideology, and ethics of the people of a country in the 
course of transforming nature and society’.187  In particular, in the context of 
modernisation, suzhi derives part of its ideological potency through its 
                                                     
186 See a detailed discussion of Suzhi at Murphy, R. 2004. ‘Turning peasants into modern Chinese 
citizens: “population quality” discourse, demographic transition and primary education.’ The 
China Quarterly 177: 1–20. 
187 “Remin Ribao Carries Editorial Entitled ‘Concentrate Efforts on Improving the Quality of the 
People of the Nation,’” Xinhua News Agency, 20 October 1997.  
 Fig. 6.1 The group notification of JiaDa’s QQ group 
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reinforcement of related systems of valuation already embedded within Chinese 
development discourse, such as town versus country, developed versus 
backward, prosperous versus poor, civilized versus barbarian, and cultured 
versus uncultured (Murphy, 2004: 3). ‘Suzhi marks a sense and sensibility of the 
self’s value in the market economy. As such, it is often used in the negative by 
the post-Mao state and educational elites to point to the lack of quality of the 
Chinese laboring masses’ (Yan, 2008:113).  
 In the promoting of suzhi, the party-state ‘calls on people to take 
responsibility for their own welfare in a competitive world’ (Murphy, 2004:5). In 
the suzhi discourse, rural migrants were simultaneously categorized as the group 
of ‘low quality’ and thus need ‘remedial attention’ from the party-state which is 
playing the ‘pastoral’ role in transforming backward citizens into modern citizens 
(Ong, 1999).  The ironic reality is that rural migrants, being the hidden source of 
wealth production in China’s economic ‘takeoff’, are blamed for holding back 
China’s development. The rural migrants’ presumed lack of value masks the fact 
that value is produced by the living labor that is extracted from it — the derogating 
coding of the rural migrant and its productivity as having low quality justifies the 
extraction of surplus value while it also serves to legitimise new regimes of social 
differentiation and governance (Anagnost, 2004: 193). 
 Meanwhile, following the logic of neoliberalism, the party-state then places 
the responsibility for raising suzhi of rural migrants squarely on their own 
shoulders. The party-state preaches the quality of ideal citizenship, fostering this 
through the discourse of suzhi and supporting “individuals in their efforts to raise 
their suzhi and reach xiaokang (a comfortable standard of living)” (Murphy, 2004: 
4). In other word, the party-state actually claims that, in order to enjoy the 
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prosperity that is offered by economic reform, citizens must take the initiative to 
improve themselves, casting off their low suzhi dispositions. In this 
conceptualization, individual responsibility, rather than individual right is 
emphasised (Murphy & Fong. 2006). 
 The poignant subtext of the notification on JiaDa’s QQ group (‘I hope 
everybody may be a person with suzhi.’ ) is that rural migrants actually regarded 
themselves as ‘low suzhi’. And rather than seeing the government having the 
responsibility to improve their life, they urged themselves to find a way to improve 
their low human quality. Such inferiority complex of rural migrants echoes with a 
number of researches among various marginalized groups of Chinese people 
which illustrated that regardless of the cause of their marginality, most of them 
come to internalize the fastidious judgement of ‘mainstream’ society that they are 
‘backward’ or ‘uncivilized’ (Murphy & Fong, 2006). For example, the farmers living 
in poverty in Murphy’s research also explicitly attributed their hardship to the lack 
of suzhi (Murphy & Fong, 2006: 21); and Tibet youth in Yi’s study also see 
themselves to be of poor suzhi (Murphy & Fong, 2006: 59). 
 Nevertheless, JiaDa’s group notification delivers a clear message, that is, 
within social media people can effectively create a world of self-respect that 
accords with the dominant ideals of modern China. But how? To answer this 
question, one has to first keep in mind the discussion of efficacy of social media 
postings in Chapter 4, and then have a closer look of what JiaDa and other young 
rural migrants posted on their social media platforms in the following section.  
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6. 5 The modern future on social media  
In GoodPath there is a popular saying that helps people to deal with the tough 
life they lead at present: ‘bitterness first and sweetness will follow (xian ku hou 
tian).’ It is a belief that one day, when enough money is saved and everybody has 
settled down, one will finally lead a happy, urban-style life without worries. Before 
that, however, one has to endure the bitterness in life. Such a philosophy of life 
was mentioned again and again by many migrants, ranging from their early 
twenties to their late fifties, although none of them managed to say when exactly 
the ‘sweetness’ will arrive – ‘one day’, as people always said. The belief that 
things will be better ‘one day’ gives meaning for the current struggle to keep 
going, but what exactly does the future look like in peoples’ minds? The visual 
material on the new generation’s social media provide a revealing picture.  
 As shown on Fig. 6.2, photographs displayed in JiaDa’s QQ group album 
were collected from online, the most important criteria of an ideal future are ‘being 
cool’ and ‘being modern’ according to JiaDa. Images such as ‘modern city 
landscape’, ‘consumer culture’ (luxury cars and other goods), ‘sex’, smoking, 
large sunglasses, denim and some audacious gestures from the West such as 
the ‘f**k-off’ gesture are regarded as ‘modern’ and ‘cool’.  
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6. 5. 1 Be the ‘middle-class’ consumer on social media 
Through JiaDa’s wide online collection of luxury cars, alluring ladies and all the 
other ‘cool’ and ‘modern’ things, we also come to acknowledge the consumer 
culture among low-income rural migrants. In such ‘floating’ lives, an imaginary 
existence built around an urban, luxurious lifestyle can provide an alternative 
Fig. 6. 2 A collection of photos on JiaDa’s QQ 
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‘reality’ (Ngai, 2003). One can sense rural migrants’ acute desire for these luxury 
goods, especially for the foreign ones. From the early 1980s, fostered by the 
government’s bid for socialist modernization - that still “claims socialism to 
legitimise itself, but must nevertheless demonstrate that legitimacy by being more 
successful at capitalism than capitalist societies” (Dirlik & Zhang, 1997: 8), 
consumerism has been regarded as the motor of production and thus highly 
praised. Almost overnight, the previous negative image of the West as imperialist, 
capitalist and exploitative was transformed into an inspiring, desirable, and 
positive image (Latham et. al., 2006). Compared with the Marxian concerns about 
class struggle and social inequality, which has been held as a dominant motif in 
Mao’s era, the Weberian model, which see middle-class not only as an economic 
position, but also as a social status that can be cultivated in everyday practice 
(Ren, 2013), seems to provide a more suitable approach to understand the 
pervasive positive attitude about middle-class taste and lifestyle among Chinese 
working-class. In particular, it is worthwhile to notice that unlike in Western 
Europe and America, in China the industrial and consumer revolutions were so 
collapsed into one decade that it is even difficult to tell which came first (Croll, 
2006). For Chinese factory migrant workers, such simultaneous/dual process 
explicitly set the trajectory of the attainment of new identities in rural-to-urban 
migration — from ‘peasants’ to ‘factory workers’, and simultaneously to 
‘consumers’. Indeed, for these migrant workers “consumption symbolized the 
new freedom after years of controlled scarcity and the ensuring reduction in the 
defining features of work, occupation, class origins or class labels” (Croll, 2006: 
23). 
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 Accordingly, since the 1990s, the implication of suzhi has been extended 
from a discourse of development to encompass the minute social distinctions 
defining human quality in practices of middle-class consumption and social 
mobility (Fang, 2011). Certainly, it is hard to deny that modern lifestyles work as 
an ‘imaginative stimulus’ generally all over the contemporary world (Crapanzano, 
2003). However the suzhi discourse in China legitimates the national economic 
plan through a particular version of this imaginative stimulus of modernity. In the 
suzhi discourse, to pursue a modern lifestyle and foster ‘a valuable self’, or ‘higher 
human quality' is not only a natural desire, it has become a collective desire, and 
social responsibility that individuals have an obligation to fulfill (Anagnost, 2004). 
 One day JiaDa came to me and claimed: ‘You know what, our factory 
owner’s wife has a similar car (the brown luxury car on the photo) parked just 
outside the factory plant – isn’t that cool?’ He said this as proudly as if he owned 
the Porsche Panamera himself. Like JiaDa, many factory workers talked of the 
luxury cars belonging to factory owners with a trace of pride. People took 
photographs of the cars, or even photographs of themselves with the cars. The 
fact that they could not afford such an expensive car did not seem to bother 
people, as far as one could tell. On the contrary: they seemed to celebrate the 
moments in their offline lives when they encounter the glamorous things that they 
have been collecting online. Ownership of images of such luxury cars, either by 
collecting photographs of cars or purchasing virtual cars online, or even just 
taking photographs of a car, is viewed as a way of engaging with the modern 
world which they hope one day to inhabit. To some extent, as a form of recreation, 
the producing of visual materials of the conspicuous consumption, just like 
window shopping, has become both a means and an end in itself, with the 
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consumer lifestyle and dream worlds encountered, gazed upon, and recorded on 
a daily basis. 
 In a way JiaDa does own a luxury car somewhere else. YY is another 
social media platform that he uses specifically for playing massive multi-player 
online games. This is where he keeps his car: online, not offline. On YY, there 
are not only fast cars, but also ‘noble titles’ which bring users privileges. The titles 
include ‘baron’, ‘earl’, ‘duke’ and ‘king’, all depending on how much you pay. For 
example, the lowest, ‘baron’, costs 250 RMB (US$ 42) for the first month and 100 
RMB for each subsequent month, while to be able to use the title ‘king’ online the 
user has to pay 120,000 RMB (US$ 20,000) for the first month and 30,000 RMB 
for each following month (i.e. the equivalent of US$ 75,000 for the first year).  As 
shown on the screenshot (Fig. 6.3), section 1 is the photograph of the live show 
broadcaster of this channel; section 2 is a list of top monthly contributors (people 
are encouraged to buy gifts for the broadcaster); section 5 is a list of gifts one can 
purchase; section 6 is a virtual avenue for nobles who come in their luxury cars 
(a baron’s car is a Smart car, and a king’s is a Rolls-Royce Phantom). Here on 
section 6 the news feed reads: ‘Let’s welcome Viscount so and so to this show in 
his Mercedes Benz SLR!’ 
 JiaDa bought himself a baron title which cost him 250rmb per month (the 
Smart car was thrown in for free with the title) – almost one-tenth of his monthly 
salary and more than the monthly rent of his small room. ‘Well, maybe I can never 
afford a real car, but here I can,’ he said half-jokingly. Now it’s easy to think how 
silly it is to spend the equivalent of a monthly rent to buy a useless virtual car just 
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in order to impress others and feel good. However, when we compare this to 
people who splash out millions on real luxury cars or yachts not only to buy a 
mode of transportation but also to achieve social status, what JiaDa did to make 
himself ‘feel good’188 actually seems rather understandable. 
 Nevertheless, the use of photography to create a new reality is not unique 
to the digital age. Already in the 1860s, slide shows were very popular among 
Chinese peasants. People from the countryside, who had never had the 
opportunity to travel, learned about foreign places through such slide shows, 
discovering the world that existed beyond their villages.189 Whilst the images 
people view on smartphone screens  today are very different from those that their 
relatives saw 150 years ago, it seems that the motivations behind the two 
                                                     
188 In the inspiring study of individualisation of rural youth in contemporary China, 
anthropologist Yan Yunxiang observed the phenomenon in which the previous idea of 
‘being a good person’, with the social expectation of self-sacrifice in a collective society, 
has gradually given way to an individual pursuit of ‘feeling good’ with an emphasis on 
self-development. See Yan, Y. 2009 The Individualization of Chinese Society. Vol. 77. 
Oxford: Berg. 
189 Ibid. 
Fig. 6.3 The screenshot of YY 
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viewings are in fact very similar. A century ago people went to a photographer’s 
studio to have a portrait photograph taken with a foreign backdrop. An elaborate 
‘paper’ car, for example, might be integrated as a prop in such a portrait (Dikotter, 
2007) which shows that although the definition of a fancy car may have changed, 
the technique of achieving a ‘modern’ self remains similar. JiaDa’s case shed 
light on the social implication of conspicuous consumption and the role social 
media plays in the effort of portraying oneself as the consumer. While in JiaDa’s 
case the self-image cultivation online mainly manifests itself in consumption of 
goods, others, like Lily in the next section, have taken a step even further. 
 
6. 5. 2 Life on social media 
Today a photography studio is located at the digital centre in GoodPath. All the 
young women in the town seem to dream of taking a nice set of ‘art photos’ (yishu 
zhao). Lily, a 19-year-old factory worker from a Chinese inland village, was 
delighted when the chance arose to create her own art photos:  
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I always wanted to, but I didn’t save up 
enough money for that. Last week they 
launched a sale, and with 50 Likes on 
WeChat 190  I can have a basic set of art 
photos for half the price.    
 
It took the stylist two and half hours to make 
up Lily’s face. Large amounts of foundation 
were applied to her skin and ‘fake eyelashes’ 
were glued to her eyelids, while meticulous 
hairstyling sculpted her straight hair into 
perfectly shaped curls. Finally, when all was 
complete, Lily was helped into an evening dress with padding at the breast and 
folds that exaggerated her figure. In just a few hours the stylist had transformed 
a factory girl into a generic look-alike film star, no longer recognisable to her 
parents or closest friends (Fig. 6.4). She explained why: 
 
I wanted to record my youth, the most beautiful phase in my whole life. 
One day I will get married, and no longer be young. 
 
Yet such a perspective made her decision of taking ‘art photos’ seem even more 
bizarre. Why would she consider such a ‘once-in-a-life-time’ look to be the 
‘record of her youth’? According to the stylist, all the young women attending 
the studio are satisfied by the evening dress on offer; none of them had ever 
                                                     
190 See the explanation of ‘collection likes’ on WeChat in Chapter 2. 
Fig.6.4 An ‘art photo’ of Lily 
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worn one before. As the judge of fashion and beauty, his job seemed more like 
a punching machine in a factory, producing identical beauties from factory 
workers: 
 
My job is to make them fashionable and beautiful, no matter how plain 
they may be; after the styling and Photoshop everybody looks equally 
fashionable and beautiful. They don’t need to have an idea as I know how 
to deal with everything.  
 
In photography studies among Chinese people, Bonnie Adrian’s examination of 
bridal photography, is one of the few book-length ethnographic studies. The 
situation recorded in her ethnography 15 years ago among middle-class young 
urban women in Taiwan bore some surprising similarities with nowadays 
situation among young rural migrant women in mainland China. Adrian argues, 
western style art photos which transformed the images of bride-to-be beyond 
recognition are not just middle-class conspicuous consumption under the 
influence of western cultural images of beauty, but also a significant ritual which 
marked a woman’s ‘last time’ to enjoy high status as a young, attractive, 
independent women before she becomes burdened by household work and 
familial demands —‘Photography is prized not for its ability to capture lived 
experience but for its capacity to create ‘memories’ markedly different from the 
goings-on of everyday life.’ (Adrian, 2003: 10) 
The acknowledgment of the ‘creativity’ of photography provides us a 
different perspective to interpret Lily’s use of her ‘once-in-a-life-time’ studio ‘art’ 
photographs. Actually what Lily wanted is not to record her youth, but to have a 
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beautiful youth created in the studio and preserved in an image. Such youth 
should be as beautiful as the photographs she collected on QQ (Fig. 6.5). 
Lily updated her Qzone at least once a day. It is neat and clean, using the 
colours of light blue and white. Online Lily is surrounded by a group of admirers, 
and talks as if she was a princess who is waiting for true love. In GoodPath she 
is not alone at all; she lives with her parents, younger brother and sister, while 
almost 40 other members of her large family live nearby. Lily’s parents work in 
the same factory. The five members of her family inhabit two small rooms and 
share a toilet with two other rural migrant families. In summer the family wash 
themselves in the shared bathroom, which is without a shower: a plastic bucket 
and a plastic washbasin serve as a shower set. There is used toilet paper and 
dirty water on the floor, and the wall is stained. However, the toilet at home is still 
Fig. 6.5 The ‘princess-style’ images that Lily collected on her social 
media  
The text with the photos reads: ‘In my life I have always been dreaming 
about my true love; he will treat me very well, protect me from all the 
uncertainties, instability, sadness and loneliness. However, I have always 
known that such a person will never turn up.’ 
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much better than the one at the factory plant, which people usually forget to flush 
after using it, something welcomed by swarms of flies. In winter, when 
temperatures fall below 0°C (32°F) roughly once a week, the family go to a public 
bath to shower because there is no heating or hot water at home.  
 At home Lily shares the bed with her 11-year-old sister in the upstairs 
room, also used as a storage room of the small grocery downstairs run by the 
landlord (Fig. 6.6). In summer, during the day, the indoor temperature can exceed 
38°C (100°F) and there is no air conditioning. One day after work Lily was 
‘working with’ her smartphone, a Huawei smartphone which she had bought for 
1,850 RMB (US$ 308). She was captivated by the ‘online world’, as if she had 
completely forgotten where she was. After a while she looked up to see me. I was 
still sitting there, sweating like a pig. ‘Life outside the mobile phone is unbearable, 
huh?’ she smiled. 
 Lily’s remark leads to the question ‘where do people live?’ In GoodPath 
there are very many young factory workers such as Lily, who actually live 
Fig. 6.6 The room Lily shared with her sister 
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simultaneously offline and online. We need to understand where people live, 
without assuming that the offline is necessarily more real or more material.  
 In research on Javanese modernisation in Kampung, a residential town 
not renowned for its charm, the anthropologist James L. Peacock argued that the 
local theatre show, Ludruk, played an important role in the daily lives of working-
class people there (Peacock, 1968). One Ludruk story is that of a young woman 
from a humble background who managed to gain higher social status through 
marriage and personal development, becoming able to enjoy modern city life. 
Peacock argued that the reason for the show’s huge popularity was that it 
enabled the working-class audience to participate in a purified and modern life. 
He observed that the show ‘provides its participants with a series of symbolic 
actions which lead them to repudiate elements of Kampung society and 
vicariously move out of that environment into extra-Kampung realms of sexual 
and social happiness’ (Peacock, 1968). The parallels between Chinese rural 
migrants’ use of social media and Javanese workers’ engagement with Ludruk 
shows is striking.  
 Rural youth find ‘there is no way out in the countryside’ — staying in the 
rural village is not really a viable alternative today — but the only alternative is to 
locate themselves as ‘low-quality strangers’ in the city (Yan, 2003: 583-84). When 
sociologist Yan depicted a very negative future waiting for rural migrant youth, 
the potentials of social media had not yet been discovered. As we have seen in 
this chapter so far, nowadays the offline life of the new generation rural migrants 
seems to be not very much improved compared to a decade ago, whereas the 
online space provided by social media, to some extent, fulfills the gap between 
the dream and the offline life. For many rural migrants, what they post on social 
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media reflects the far more interesting and modern world in which they want to 
live in the future. In a way, therefore, they already live in a future visualised and 
conceived in advance on social media. We are actually witnessing a dual 
migration: one from villages to factories, and the other from offline to online. 
 
6. 6 The coming of age of young rural migrants on social media 
This simultaneous migration from offline to online is of extreme significance for 
the new generation who has, in effect, announced their separation from the rural 
life, yet, found their desire to be a modern adult does not come naturally in the 
factories. Many of them soon realised that to integrate into modern China is much 
harder than to separate from a rural village. The period when young migrant 
workers stay in the factory is a period which is associated with dramatic changes 
from a rural kid to a full member of modern China, however the factory itself is 
actually not the place where these changes take place. Evidence from my 
ethnography shows that social media actually plays an essential role in the 
coming of age of the new generation. 
 The phase of youth is a period of transition between one’s childhood and 
adult life. However, for young Chinese rural migrants the phase of youth is 
shortened by around 5 years compared to their peers in cities. In most societies, 
the coming of age means “to pass through and beyond the social dependence 
associated with youth” (Cole & Durham, 2008: 7). The period from the age of 15 
to the early twenties has become the time when young people from rural 
communities left villages and entered the workplace for the first time, where they 
gained financial independence. By contrast, most urban young people remain at 
school at this age, and are still financially dependent.     
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 Achieving financial independence at such an early age effectively 
catapults young rural migrants into adulthood. In the case of young rural migrants, 
the personal development is definitely not an age-prescribed ‘natural’ process. 
Psychologists have tended to assume that human development is an age-
prescribed process, whereas anthropologists have emphasised cultural and 
social variability in defining the concepts of childhood, youth and adulthood and 
the transitions between them (Cole & Durham, 2008). In the transition from youth 
to adulthood, schooling plays an important role. What those young rural migrants 
missed was not just formal education, but the longer time in schools and colleges, 
usually providing a relatively flexible and safe environment for a more gradual 
coming of age (Bucholtz, 2002). At school young people usually spend a great 
deal of time with their classmates and school friends; through this interaction their 
personalities and social skills are developed and their world views are shaped. 
The missed or significant shortened time in education has hindered the personal 
development and social lives of young rural migrants. Once they embark upon 
rural-to-urban migration they hardly have any quality time with peers, given the 
high mobility they experience and the limited places to spend time after work. It 
is in such a context that we can further explore the role played by social media in 
young rural migrants’ lives.   
 Given the lack of formal schooling, the importance of social media for 
China’s young rural migrants lies in the fact that: first, social media is an essential 
form of informal education for rural migrants. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
popularity of the posting genre ‘archive’ reflects the situation that it was through 
social media many rural migrants engaged with reading and learning on a daily 
basis. On social media, rural migrants gained knowledge such as self-help, 
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nutrition, work, health and financial advice. ‘This appropriation of social media for 
storing and reviewing knowledge exemplifies the way populations convert 
particular platforms into tools for learning’ (Miller et al., 2016: 74).  
More importantly, social media compensate for the lack of adequate 
schooling by offering a place in which young rural migrants can meet peers, and 
where they have the freedom from their families and fixed social norms to imagine 
something different. Like young people around the world, the ideals of 
individualism and autonomy find expression in a slightly rebellious gesture 
(Kjeldgaard & Askegaard, 2006). These gestures, reflected from the ‘fantasy’ or 
‘FZL’ genres of images, have become a set of new norms agreed upon by young 
people on social media. This gives young people the security that they are 
sufficiently rebellious and have a similar modern consumer taste (Rosen, 2009), 
all of which can easily be recognised and approved by their contemporaries. On 
social media to be anti-mainstream is the mainstream among rural youth. The 
gesture of ‘anti-mainstream’ is an efficient way of becoming part of mainstream. 
 Furthermore, it also is a ‘loud’ way to claim self-awareness. Rural migrant 
youth pay a lot of attention to their appearance as they regard one’s appearance 
as an important sign or landmark of becoming/being urbanite. Similarly, they pay 
even more attention to the appearance of their online look which is mainly done 
through the careful management of their social media profiles and online 
communication. In this sense, activity on social media has become an essential 
part of social life. It bears some similarity to the experience of school, allowing 
social media to provide a place for young rural migrants where they can be 
‘educated’ by themselves or by their peers into adulthood.  
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 In some previous studies on Chinese rural youth, researchers noticed that 
youth culture in rural China was not really rebellious or counterculture (Kipnis, 
2001); it was rather an attempt to follow the mainstream culture of urbanity by 
conforming to key characteristics of modernity, including being fashionable, 
materialistic and individualistic (Yan, 1999). However, the fact is that in the eyes 
of older relatives and villagers in rural communities, the pursuit of being urban is 
already ‘counterculture’ enough in the face of traditional, established rural culture. 
Furthermore, most previous studies of young people were carried out in rural 
areas, but the culture of young rural migrants in townships and cities is different.  
 Just imagine one of the most common scenes in GoodPath: young factory 
workers in their early twenties, wearing the uniforms they described as ‘ugly as 
shit’, working upon repetitive and uniform tasks on assembly lines for 10 hours 
per day, 29 days per month … and when they finally get back to their dormitories 
they log on to QQ profiles and upload some really cool images of young people 
wearing the fanciest and most bizarre costumes or exaggerated make-up and 
hairstyles. When they are laboring in factories, most of their attention and effort 
is actually focused on preparing for their coming of age and figuring out how their 
current situation relates to their imagined future. The anti-mainstream (FZL) 
visual we saw online cannot really tell what happened offline; only when we put 
the online and offline aspects together can we fully appreciate the message 
delivered by the FZL or fantasy visual.  
 In Marius the Epicurean, Walter Pater wrote: ‘We need some imaginative 
stimulus, some not impossible ideal, such as may shape vague hope and 
transform it into effective desire, to carry us year after year, without disgust, 
through the routine work which is so large as part of life’ (Pater, 1911: 173) On 
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social media, rural youth can take a break from the unification imposed by heavy 
industry which has occupied most of their offline time. On social media these 
young people get inspired by all sorts of fantastic images, freeing their 
imaginations to go as far as they can. They may aspire to fast cars or to have a 
wedding like a princess, to be slightly funky or to create slightly edgy selfies. 
Above all, such imagination and aspiration can be easily conceived and 
visualised by images rather than text. The relatively low levels of education 
received by young rural migrants no longer prevent them from expressing 
themselves vividly and accurately. For example, Xiangjun, a 20-year-old factory 
worker, always shares ‘chicken soup for the soul’ memes with only one word: ‘I’ 
(wo) explained that he felt these images had simply expressed everything he 
wanted to say, so he just needed to add a word ‘I’ to indicate ‘that’s exactly what 
I think’. When people feel they are not especially articulate in text and speaking, 
the visual can be particularly empowering. In a social media context this means 
they can articulate their feelings by simply sharing a meme edited by others. 
Postings on social media are actually crucial to understanding the new generation 
of factory rural migrant workers. While analogue photography recorded life as it 
was lived, social media can be used for the opposite purpose of envisaging a life 
to which people aspire, articulating this far more effectively in visual terms than 
they could in words or text. Once again we see how social media has gained 
immense significance as ‘another place’ in which migrants come to live: one that 
takes them further towards their intended destination than mere offline life can 
do. 
 In traditional Chinese society, children did not have a demarcated period 
of childhood since children were encouraged to behave like ‘mini adults’ and enter 
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adult life as early as possible (Gold, 1991). According to Gold, only boys in well-
off families enjoyed the status of youth as a distance life stage, whereas most 
children received ‘little schooling’ and education and made ‘an early transition 
from childhood dependency to work’ (Gold, 1991: 597). However, this system 
was challenged by ‘new values and norms introduced from abroad’ (1991: 598). 
In the communist era, most family power shifted to the party-state, and the stage 
of youth was thus redefined and closely managed by the Party (Gold 1991). To 
put things in perspective, in the particular case of the new generation of rural 
migrants, we can still see the trait from traditional rural community where young 
people are supposed to ‘grow up’ and enter the world of adulthood as soon as 
possible; we also see the decline of the authority of the family as the 
consequences of the communist party’s youth strategy as well as the finical 
independence rural migrant youths gained in the neoliberal market. It is evident 
that the party-state control of the youth has become less direct but remains 
though especially through the discourse of suzhi. More importantly, there is a 
huge void left by the absence of adequate schooling and family education. That 
huge void is mainly filled by social media. For the new generation of rural 
migrants, social media is a form of ‘post- school’ education and schooling that 
implies their ‘coming of age’.  
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Chapter 7 
Social media, politics and gender  
 
 
7. 0 Introduction  
Chapter 4 focused upon social relationships seen through the lens of social 
media. Throughout that chapter, however, it was clear how far such relationships 
may also involve issues of power that have to be negotiated and are often 
exposed through being posted online, for example in the relationships of parents 
to children, in- laws and other family members. The focus in this chapter is 
directed more clearly towards this issue of power, exploring two of the most 
important regimes within which issues of power predominate. The ﬁrst part will 
concentrate on the political sphere, which as will become clear may start with 
questions about state power but is actually mostly about power relationships 
between those present on the ﬁeld site. This is followed by a consideration of 
gender, which will emerge as one of the most dynamic ﬁelds of power in 
contemporary life: both migration to factories and migration to online have had an 
impact on this.  
 These two ﬁelds of ‘gender’ and ‘politics’ both stood out from the mass of 
ﬁeld work, but in quite contrasting ways. In the case of gender, it was because of 
its ubiquitous presence on social media; in the case of politics because of its 
conspicuous absence. For most people whose knowledge of China comes mainly 
from news reporting in the West this will come as no surprise, and it may be 
assumed that there is quite a simple explanation. Political content would be 
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subject to censorship whereas most gender issues would not. As we have seen 
for almost every topic covered in this thesis, however, an ethnographic account 
provides very different and often unexpected insights into the nature of Chinese 
social media. Often this means starting by questioning what terms such as 
‘politics’ mean in this very different context. Similarly we shall see that once again 
there are quite speciﬁc issues regarding this particular ‘ﬂoating’ population. 
Gender relations may not only be different from other parts of China, but an 
ethnography can reveal how they may have radically changed even in 
comparison to a previous decade. This is really the primary aim of this chapter.  
The two topics also work together as will become evident, since 
exploration of the political field quickly descends from issues of formal politics to 
the sphere of more personal relations that could be termed micro-politics – a term 
that applies equally well to the issues of gender as found through the role of social 
media in peoples’ daily life (Coltrane, 1992; Morley, 2000).  
Topics such as gender and politics also stand out because we have many 
preconceptions around them, and often want evidence to ﬁt with a particular 
stance or concern. However, the task of ethnography is to try and resist the 
temptation to make evidence ﬁt such preconceptions or interests. Instead we will 
ﬁrst try to examine in some detail how both gender and politics actually circulate 
on social media, and then to explain these in terms of the wider ethnographic 
evidence – the actual concerns and relationships of this particular group of 
people. 
 
7. 1 Social media and politics 
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Politics is one of the least common genres of posting on social media among rural 
migrants, as shown in Chapter 3. On the other hand, a proliferation of studies 
claim digital media to be a potentially powerful tool for spreading democracy, 
encouraging political participation, carrying forward social justice and 
empowering civil society (Shirky, 2008; Shirky, 2011; Yang, 2003). So what does 
the political silence on social media among ordinary Chinese tell us? 
To date studies on Chinese politics in the digital age have tended to 
concentrate on Chinese online censorship and on political participation online 
among political elites and activists (Zhang, 2006; Shirk, 2011). Rarely has equal 
attention been given to the majority of the population – the ordinary people 
(especially non-political activists), including a massive working-class population. 
‘What is ordinary people’s attitude to politics?’ and ‘How do ordinary Chinese 
people experience, perceive and talk about politics offline and online?’ are still 
questions requiring answers.  
The discussion will start with an examination of Chinese online censorship. 
From there discussion proceeds through four case studies, intended to show how 
factory owners, local middle-class citizens, ordinary rural migrants and rural 
migrants with a high level of education all occupy their respective place in the 
political spectrum. The discussion will focus on the political attitudes and 
consequential social media behaviour of these four different local social groups. 
By considering these different situations and perspectives, we reach a better 
position to discuss the role social media plays in ordinary Chinese people’s 
political lives, and to explore the relationship between political engagement on 
social media and the governance of the Chinese party-state. 
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7. 1. 1 Internet censorship in China 
In the 2014 report of World Press Freedom Index, 191  China (PRC) was 
categorised as a country with a ‘very serious’ situation of press freedom, the worst 
ranking on the scale. From nationwide and multi-level media monitoring systems 
to the Great Firewalls, from Google’s withdrawal from mainland China to the 
jailing of dissident journalists, bloggers and activists, it has been widely known 
that the Chinese party- state has long kept a very pervasive and tight rein on both 
traditional and new media (Feng & Guo, 2013). 
Generally speaking, censorship in China is implemented in a ‘three-layer-
filtering’ system which includes at least three types of approaches 
simultaneously: Great Firewall, keyword blocking, and manual censoring 
                                                     
191 http://rsf.org/index2014/en-index2014.php  
Fig. 7.1 Internet censorship in China  
280 
 
(Fig.7.1). The two cartoon figures on Fig. 7. 1 are official mascots for Chinese 
internet police. 
The ﬁrst ﬁlter is so- called the ‘Great Firewall’, which blocks off certain 
websites and social media services (such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) 
from mainland China. The second ﬁlter is ‘keyword blocking’, which automatically 
prevents people from publishing content containing banned keywords or phrases 
online. Given the nature of the Chinese language, however (different characters 
can have the same pronunciation, and many characters look similar), people can 
easily replace those banned characters with alternatives, either possessing 
similar sound (homophones) or similar shape (homographs) (King et al., 2013). 
The third ﬁlter is thus the last line of defence, in which ‘improper’ information that 
slipped through the cracks of the previous two ﬁlters will be censored manually. 
Given the huge amount of information online, the labour invested in ‘manual 
censoring’ is remarkable: it includes 20,000– 50,000 internet police (wang jing) 
and internet monitors (wang guan) nationwide, around 250,000– 300,000 ‘50-
cent party members’8 (wu mao dang), and up to 1,000 in- house censors hired 
by each individual website for the sake of ‘self- censorship’ (Chen & Peng, 2011). 
Having said this, as a recent piece of research from Harvard on Chinese 
censorship pointed out, criticism of authority will not necessarily be censored: the 
real goal of censorship is to reduce the possibility of collective action by clipping 
social ties, regardless of the nature of the collective movement is (whether 
against, in support of or completely neutral about the authority in question) (King 
et al., 2013). That is to say, it is possible for individuals to express their political 
opinions freely as long as such free speech will not lead to any potential collective 
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action. From this view, Chinese people may be said to be “individually free but 
collectively in chains” (King et al., 2013). 
This Harvard research is a large- scale quantitative analysis of Chinese 
censorship. However, the data informing this research was all collected from 
public media platforms to which researchers have easy access, such as Weibo 
and other BBS online forums. As for private media platforms, neither QQ nor 
WeChat, the two dominant social media platforms, were covered by this research. 
The reason, as Chapter 2 noted, is because the privacy settings on these two 
social media platforms are much stricter than on public digital media platforms. It 
is impossible to gain access to content on personal social media proﬁles unless 
the researchers themselves become online ‘friends’ of millions of individuals, 
which is also impossible. Given that both public digital media platforms and 
personal social media proﬁles are subject to the same censorship mechanism, 
the Harvard research throws light on our understanding of the censorship of 
personal QQ and WeChat. In the light of such reports the responsibility of the 
ethnography, with its access to hundreds of personal social media proﬁles of 
ordinary Chinese people, is to provide a more detailed and nuanced picture that 
simply cannot be achieved from merely quantitative analysis. 
 
7. 1. 2 The living experience of politics, offline and online 
The section above is clearly significant in addressing one of the most common 
questions, namely ‘What do ordinary Chinese people think about internet 
censorship and how do they deal with it?’ Yet the problem is that both question 
and answer tie the issue of politics almost entirely to the question of censorship. 
What if the majority of ordinary Chinese people are not particularly engaged with 
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issues of censorship, nor feel that they have any particular experience of internet 
censorship on their social media profiles? The section that follows is very different 
because it is derived not from questions posed by outsiders, but is rather an 
attempt to engage with the practices encountered through the ethnography. This 
leads to a much broader interpretation of politics, in which issues of censorship 
are not particularly prevalent. 
 
7. 1. 2. 1 ‘Be in love with the government, but don’t marry it’ 
Family- run businesses constitute the mainstream business model in GoodPath. 
More than 90 per cent of factory owners were formerly local peasants, and more 
than one- third of them have no education above middle school. Factory owners 
often attribute their success to the opportunities of ‘doing development/ 
industrialisation’ (gao kai fa) led by the state party and local government, and 
regarded themselves as the group of people who ‘got rich first’192 (xian fu qi lai 
de). During this time China started to introduce the market economy and 
struggled to throw off the shackles of Maoist egalitarianism (Fan, 1997). Mr Lee, 
the factory owner in GoodPath, who was born in a neighbouring village and 
became a billionaire in his early 40s by opening three massive factories, once 
said gratefully: ‘It’s thanks to Deng: otherwise I would be just a peasant, farming 
all day long’.  
It is commonplace that local factory owners see the policies established 
by Deng which were friendly to private enterprise as the main reason why they 
escaped from rural life to become those who ‘got rich first’. As stakeholders, 
factory owners usually hold a very cautious political attitude; as Mr Lee 
                                                     
192 ‘Let some people get rich first’  was the famous quote of Deng Xiaoping, the de facto leader of China 
from 1978 until 1992, to which this refers. 
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said: ‘You’d better just focus on business, don’t touch politics at all.’ However, 
this concept of ‘don’t touch politics’ is really about not having an overt political 
stance; it in no way detracts from the practical problems that make constant 
dealing with the government a necessity. Keeping a good relationship with local 
government was essential for factories. In practice, this meant keeping a good 
personal relationship (guanxi) with local government officials, as social structure 
in China ‘rests largely on ﬂuid, personal- centred social networks, rather than on 
ﬁxed social institutions’ (Yan, 1996: 14). 
There was very limited political content on factory owners’ social media proﬁles. 
One of very few politics- related postings on a factory owner’s WeChat read: ‘Be 
in love with the government, but don’t marry it.’ Mr. Zhu, a factory owner visiting 
from a nearby town and the source of this post on WeChat, further explained:  
 
We [factory owners] should always show love for them [local officials] so 
that they won’t make trouble for our factories, but we should be cautious 
about making a commitment to any speciﬁc official, just in case things 
change. 
 
By showing the love, Mr. Zhu meant maintaining a guanxi with local officials. 
Guanxi can be used as instrumental tool to gain potential benefits, but not all the 
social connections will lead to a guanxi, since this needs maintenance and 
investment (Smart, 1999). The common practice was to engage with local officials 
through various leisure activities, for which it would be necessary to pay.  
Previously, the most common one would be to have elaborate dinners together. 
Since the middle of 2013, however, people in GoodPath had also become 
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sensitive to the strong impact of the nationwide ‘combating corruption’ 
campaign,193 so dining in public with officials was avoided. As Mr. Zhu explained:  
 
These officials had become very cautious about public appearances, since 
if anybody takes photographs of them having a meal with us in restaurants 
and uploads them to the internet, they will be in trouble. But, you know, 
there is always an alternative way of keeping good guanxi with them.  
 
It is true that there are alternative ways of keeping a guanxi with officials. The 
way Mr. Zhu dealt with a local official is through WeChat. Mr. Zhu’s niece was the 
high school classmate of the daughter of the deputy director of the local police 
authority. During the Chinese New Year in 2014, the WeChat red envelope 
game194 was popular among students in his niece’s class. Knowing that, Mr. Zhu 
transferred money to his niece’s bank account and asked her to send several 
WeChat red envelopes containing 2,000 RMB in cash in total (around US 
$340) online to the deputy director’s daughter. ‘2,000 RMB is nothing to me, just 
a small gift. But it is enough to make a teenager very happy, and parents always 
want to see their children happy, you know’ Mr. Zhu explained. 
Even though 2,000 RMB is almost a month’s salary for a factory worker, 
this amount of money is deﬁnitely ‘a small gift’ in the owner’s eyes compared to 
potential penalties his factory would face if it had problems with the police. In this 
case, guanxi ties up the exchange between money and power and is officially 
regarded as bribery (Fan, 2002). However, ordinary Chinese people do not 
                                                     
193 ‘China cracks down on GRAFT’, China Daily, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014crackongraft/ (Accessed February 2016) 
194 See the introduction of WeChat red envelopes in Chapter 2.  
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necessarily regard it as such, since ‘gift exchange’ is so essential and pervasive 
in the daily practice of guanxi (Dunfee & Warren, 2001). As we have seen in 
chapter 4, such a concept of doing guanxi through gift exchange has also been 
widely applied to the relationship between people and deities. More importantly, 
here social media is definitely not the place to express political opinions. Instead, 
it is an efficient tool to maintain a good guanxi with government officials. 
Besides keeping guanxi with the government, the way in which factory 
owners managed their factories showed some genuine understanding of the 
national policy of avoiding the threat of collective actions to ‘maintain stability’ 
(weiwen) (Chen, 2013). The recruitment principle of local factory workers is to 
‘avoid recruiting factory workers from the same village or from the same family’ 
because it is much easier to manage factory workers who are not connected. 
Incidents in the past had involved a whole group of factory workers quitting their 
jobs together; the factory consequently lost the labour for a whole assembly line 
overnight and was unable to deliver orders on time. This principle was always 
difficult to follow, however, as relatives and fellow villagers provide the essential 
network in rural migrants’ job-hunting. Ensuring that factory workers are not 
connected is thus always a big headache for employers. As one explained:  
 
I asked my people in charge of recruiting new workers to observe them 
[rural migrants] ﬁrst. If they are lively (huo po), we are not going to take 
them. People who are sociable are not suitable material for factory work; 
they can easily be distracted, get bored about things, become 
discontented about things, and in the worst case they will arouse 
dissatisfaction (tiao shi) in others. 
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This suggests that the local governance of factory workers by their employers is 
closely aligned to the very same principle of Chinese internet censorship. Both 
aim to remove the potential for collective action. It has been commonly 
anticipated that as China experiences increasing economic growth, private 
entrepreneurs will begin to claim their political rights and thus promote the 
process of democratisation.195 However, the ﬁndings among factory owners do 
not support this optimistic view. Chinese entrepreneurs turn out to be the least 
politically active, generally supporting the party-state (Chen & Dickson, 2008) and 
wanting to keep the status-quo.196 Factory owners represent the very few local 
residents who actually own the majority of local wealth. Beneath that level exists 
a much wider spectrum of local residents, who, despite not managing to become 
super rich still see themselves as living relatively prosperous (xiaokang) lives. 
The political attitude of this local middle class, explored in the next section, 
represents the mainstream of local residents in GoodPath. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
195 For example Marxists argued that democracy arose because it helped capitalists in pursuing 
their economic interests. See Sanderson, S. 2013. Sociological Worlds: Comparative and 
Historical Readings on Society. New York, London: Routledge. 
196 A few accounts also confirm this status quo-oriented attitude among Chinese entrepreneurs. 
For example, see Pearson, M. 1997. China’s New Business Elite: The Political Consequence of 
Economic Reform. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Dickson, B. J. 2008. Wealth 
into Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. Tsai, K. 2007. Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in 
Contemporary China. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
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7. 1. 2. 2 Politics as a football game 
Mr Huang is a typical local middle- class resident, now in his late forties. He was 
born and grew up in GoodPath and now owns a grocery shop. In his shop, under 
the transparent table mat of the cashier’s desk,  
Mr. Huang kept his newspaper clippings. One of them is an entire 
newspaper of photographs of the top leadership of Chinese Communist Party. To 
Mr Huang’s surprise, his cat always chooses to sit right on the portrait photo of 
Chairman Xi. He wryly observes that ‘40 years ago, I would probably have been 
put in jail just because somebody saw my cat sitting on the face of the great 
leader’. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, a colleague of his uncle was 
prosecuted, charged with despising the great leader, Chairman Mao, as he had 
used a newspaper featuring an image of Mao to make insoles. Mr. Huang ended 
his insoles story with a robust, conﬁdent statement: ‘So we are both lucky you 
know, that we live in such a peaceful and reasonable age, and China is so 
powerful in the world.’ Clearly, he was content with the status quo and full of 
national pride.  
On his Qzone, Mr. Huang’s favourite political topics were the rise of China 
and some historical anecdotes of political struggles –  reﬂecting his oft-repeated 
view that ‘men should care more about big affairs of state (guojia dashi) and leave 
those insigniﬁcant household trivia to women’. However, none of his political 
interests were in the sphere of local politics. The unwritten rule shared by people 
was that local political issues should appear only in offline situations rather than 
on social media. On social media, Mr. Huang is a typical example of ‘passive 
political participation’. To be able to talk about politics, including making innocent 
jokes about politicians, seems to be an important and necessary social skill for 
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local middle- aged men, helping them to appear smart and masculine in front of 
their peers. For this purpose, social media was mainly used to ‘watch’ politics, in 
the way that football fans watch a match, rather than to ‘do’ politics. Similarly, 
when people watch a football match very few would question the basic rules of 
the game. On the contrary: the premise of fully enjoying the game is a 
sophisticated knowledge of all the rules and the ability to follow them. Like Mr. 
Huang, many local middle- class men have a reasonable knowledge of the rules 
of ‘playing’ politics in China, but it is highly unlikely that they would challenge 
them. The parallel between following sport and politics is even closer, since both 
have become important components of contemporary Chinese ideas of 
masculinity. Local middle- aged men use social media to make fun of politics and 
to make innocent jokes; they gossip about politicians with their male friends in 
quite a similar fashion to the way in which they joke and talk about watching 
football (Sabo & Panepinto, 1990).  
Both factory owners and the local middle class support the status quo, and 
their social media behaviour seems to be consistent with this attitude. In the next 
section, the situation is found to be different among rural migrants. The very 
concept of ‘rural migrant’ is itself a direct product of political developments in post- 
Communist China. This population is also one of the most vulnerable social 
groups, facing all kinds of social problems in the face of the rural– urban divide 
and pervasive social discrimination (Feng et al., 2002). However, on their social 
media profiles there were very few references to politics, especially local political 
issue of immediate concern.  
  
7. 1. 2. 3 ‘I have no interests in politics, but being a Communist Party member is 
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so useful’  
After several sleepless nights Makang, a factory migrant worker in his thirties, 
decided to stay at the factory for another six months even though his disabled 
father and three- year- old son, who had remained behind, desperately needed 
him to come back. The main reason for his decision was a ‘probationary 
Communist Party member’ certiﬁcate which he had not yet received from the 
factory party branch. If he chose to quit his job at that moment, all his previous 
efforts would be in vain: the village party branch would not recognise the political 
screening undertaken at the factory party branch unless he had already obtained 
a ‘probationary Communist Party member’ certiﬁcate. 
To join the Chinese Communist Party involves an extremely rigorous and 
long screening process lasting at least three years. Applicants ﬁrst need to attend 
study sessions, make a sustained effort to join party activities, submit self- 
assessment reports regularly and subject themselves to monitoring by the party 
branch on a daily basis (each applicant is assigned two Party liaison members, 
who monitor and assess the applicant’s political loyalty, work performance and 
social relationships). Two years of monitoring is followed by a closed- door 
evaluation, in which an applicant’s political background, as well as that of his or 
her parents and other important kin, is examined. If the candidate passes the 
evaluation, he or she will become a ‘probationary Communist Party member’, 
who will be under closer monitoring by the Party branch for another year before 
ﬁnally being accepted as a formal member (Bian et al., 2001). 
‘I have no interest in politics at all, but being a Party member is so useful’, Makang 
explained. The Communist Party membership is viewed as a scarce political 
resource that in practice can be turned into economic beneﬁts (Morduch & 
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Sicular, 2000). The situation is more obvious in villages, since in China direct 
democratic elections only take place at village level (O’Brien & Li, 2000). In 
villages local Communist Party members enjoy more political rights than ordinary 
villagers, meaning they enjoy not only higher social status, but also better welfare 
and some ‘grey’ income. For instance, if a village wants to sell collectively owned 
farmland to developers, only local Communist Party members have the right to 
vote on the decision. As mentioned previously, naturally those who can vote 
become the target of developers to make guanxi. To join the Party has become 
extremely difficult in villages. Current Party members always try to keep the 
balance of political power among various big families in a village, thus the 
allocation of the Party membership is in most cases pre- decided. For most 
villagers, like Makang, who do not come from a big family with political inﬂuence, 
one of the alternative ways to join the Party was through the factory outside the 
village.  
Now it is not difficult to understand why Makang decided to make such a 
huge effort to join the Party. For him, such an active and direct political 
participation was perceived as nothing to do with politics. The pursuit of Party 
membership was more like purchasing an insurance to provide some of the 
security that he had not yet experienced in ‘ﬂoating’ life.  
None of the topics discussed above had ever appeared on Makang’s 
Qzone. Here there are very few reference to politics; over a whole year, there are 
only ﬁve postings about politics out of 59. The ﬁve postings consist of two ‘anti- 
Japan’ posts, one ‘anti- corruption’, one about the social inequality suffered by 
rural migrants and one about the rise of China as an economic and political 
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power.197 Posts were consistently on the national or even international level; even 
though some specific local events did appear, all of them referred to events in 
other parts of China. The pattern of MaKang’s political postings on social media 
is typical among rural migrants: local political matters, which have most 
immediate concerns to people, have hardly any visibility on social media. 
Furthermore, on rural migrants’ social media, postings about the 
leadership of China were usually very positive. The positive image of Chinese 
leadership on public internet arena is the result of political propaganda (Brady, 
2009), but the equally positive impressions on personal social media indicate the 
fact that many people appear to believe it. For example Yan Mei, a migrant 
worker, commented ‘In China the high officials (da guan) of the leadership are 
very good; only local officials (xiao guan) are not good’. She also gave a well- 
known anecdote of the previous premier Wen Jiabao as an  example: in 2003, 
Premier Wen pledged to help migrant workers expedite payment of unpaid wages 
during his surprise inspection tour after an ordinary rural migrant woman had 
made a complaint to him about the wages owed to her husband by a local 
construction company. 198  The extensive administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation that China has experienced since 1980 benefited economic 
development remarkably. However, such decentralisation also led to the situation 
in which regional bureaucrats are supposed to take full responsibility when 
problems occur, and so become the target of complaints (Li, 1998).  
However, such complaints about regional officials are rarely vented on 
social media. The same Yan Mei who said that ‘only local officials are not good’ 
                                                     
197 See the ‘political’ postings in Chapter 3 of this volume.   
198 ‘Relief for migrant laborers’, China Daily, 6 December 2013.  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/06/content_287881.htm  
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was involved in a demolition dispute. Her family spent three months discreetly 
approaching various individuals who may have some guanxi in the local 
government to help them to remedy their situation, rather than airing their 
grievances publicly on social media. People are clearly aware of the negative 
consequences that online exposure of local issues could potentially provoke. 
A family member of Yan Mei described the position, which also accounts for the 
political apathy of most rural migrants who see themselves as insigniﬁcant 
individuals in political life: 
 
You want to solve the problem, rather than making it into a bigger one. 
Online is for those who want to make big news, or those who had no other 
choice left … for our powerless ordinary people, to ‘play politics’ (wan 
zhengzhi) is meaningless and dangerous; you have no chance of winning 
unless you are super lucky. 
 
For most workers joining the Communist Party is not really a likely option. Indeed, 
their relationship to politics of any kind is fairly tenuous. This is partly because as 
a ‘ﬂoating’ population that does not expect to remain in this particular area 
indeﬁnitely, they assume they have little at stake in relation to local politics itself –  
even though political decisions may in effect have a considerable impact upon 
them.199 They also assume that no one of any importance would have any real 
interest in what they think or say. But equally, much as they might wish to be 
engaged in anything political, they would not have considered social media as an 
                                                     
199 Also see the sub-genre of ‘passing travellers’ images on rural migrants’ social media profiles 
in chapter 3.  
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appropriate place for such activities –  the very idea of social media is for them 
so closely related to everyday communication, and also to everyday fantasy, that 
it would not occur to them that politics should feature there.  
Not everybody took an indifferent attitude towards politics, however, and 
a few did appear politically active. ‘Phoenix man’ Da Fei, discussed below, 
represents this minority group. 
 
7. 1. 2. 4 The ‘phoenix man’ and his political life 
 
‘Around 99 per cent of the people who work on the assembly lines are rural 
migrants, and only one per cent of the people who sit in the offices are rural 
migrants.’ The seemingly exaggerated situation described by a senior factory 
manager actually seemed to be consistent with ethnographic observation. The 
situation arises partly from the fact that local people do not want to take on heavy 
labour on assembly lines, while the poor educational qualiﬁcations of most rural 
migrants prevent them from gaining more advanced office jobs. But it is also 
partly due to the management model of local factories, in which factory owners 
tend to hire relatives and local people, rather than rural migrants, as officials and 
managers.200 Given such a rigid rural–urban divide at the workplace, Da Fei, a 
young man from a rural background with a university education, almost achieved 
a miracle by becoming a senior manager. The term ‘phoenix man’ (fenghuang 
nan), from the traditional saying ‘a phoenix soars out of a chicken coop’ (jiwo li 
feichu fenghuang), is used to refer to this type of rural male –  one who came 
                                                     
200  See the discussion of paternalism and nepotism in family enterprises in south China at 
Poutziouris, P. et al. 2002. ‘Chinese entrepreneurship: the development of small family firms in 
China.’ Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 9(4): 383–99. 
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from a humble beginning, but made his way through school and managed to rise 
to an urban life.201  
‘Phoenix man’ Da Fei was also one of the few who constantly showed his 
strong dissatisfaction with politics, both online and offline. In the factory his 
main job was to increase efficiency by reducing cost – a task that proved 
almost impossible in the face of pervasive nepotism. Firstly, most of the 
senior managers were relatives of the factory owner, and all tended to 
protect their own interests rather than work with Da Fei to cut costs. 
Moreover, nepotism existed from top to bottom: everybody tried to put their 
relatives or fellow villagers into ‘juicy’ positions, expecting that this would 
be reciprocated in the future. Da Fei was turned down when he tried to get 
real information concerning scrap rates from the assembly line, for 
example, because the worker in charge of reporting the scrap rate was the 
son-in-law of a section manager; the section manager’s family in turn was 
dealing with the steel recycling business, which benefits from a suspect 
scrap rate for steel products in the factory. 
 As a result, after a year all Da Fei’s efforts proved to be in vain: his only 
‘achievement’ had been to offend all the managers and their relatives in 
the factory. As a result, he became the most unwanted person 
everywhere, offline and online. When Da Fei joined the factory, he was 
added to the WeChat group of all the senior managers. Initially Da Fei was 
welcomed as he brought interesting news to the group. Gradually he felt 
the collective hostility against him, as nobody responded to his messages 
                                                     
201 See ‘When a “phoenix man” meets a “peacock woman”’, China Daily, 26 August 2009.  
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/26/content_8617800.htm 
295 
 
in a group chat at all. The tension became white- hot when a senior 
manager (a relative of the factory owner) wrote on the WeChat 
group: ‘Why do we need an “outsider” to sort out the family business?’. 
Two days later Da Fei found that he had been removed from the chat 
group. This WeChat event was the last straw: it made Da Fei quit. Two 
weeks later he also left GoodPath. Da Fei’s frustrating political struggle 
offline extended to his Qzone. Here political postings account for the 
majority. ‘The internet is the only weapon we have to push for democracy; 
online the people’s voice will be heard by the world!’ he once said proudly. 
A typical political posting on his Qzone read: 
Those at the top of the power hierarchy always stand high above, enjoying 
their privileges and welfare, never affected by the situations of economic 
development. However, ordinary people have to live a tough life. For those 
who live at the bottom of society, except being submissive to oppression, 
what else can they do? What a pathetic country. 
 
Like this one, most criticism about corruption, nepotism or the political system on 
his QQ expressed strong negative personal opinions. However, none of them 
were censored, which seems to reinforce the argument that the Chinese 
censorship system does in fact allow people to release very negative emotions 
and criticism online as long as there is no possibility of these causing collective 
action.  
The reason for highlighting Da Fei’s story in this section is not just that he 
was one of the very few political activists in GoodPath who continued to ﬁght 
nepotism and to criticise all sorts of social problems online: more importantly, Da 
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Fei’s story throws light on a key ﬁnding – that in the political lives of ordinary 
people, the really crucial and effective censorship does not come from the far-
reaching party-state, but from one’s personal relationships. Internet censorship 
did not prevent Da Fei from expressing himself online; it was the entire 
management team that struck the fatal blow by removing him from the WeChat 
group. This suggests that from an ethnographic perspective we gain little from 
using highly generalised terms and concepts such as democracy.  
Instead we need to understand the particular arenas of power and control 
that operate mainly through social consensus locally in places such as GoodPath. 
In effect the mass population voted against Da Fei. The issue was not one of 
democracy, however, but of local and personal feelings and local hierarchies and 
groups. So overall the abstraction of political discourse is far less important than 
the everyday practice of local culture. Furthermore, Da Fei’s claim that ‘on social 
media the people’s voice will be heard by the world’ seems to be over- optimistic. 
Certainly he was absolutely right about the possibilities allowed by social media, 
which theoretically empower everybody to make their content available to the 
world. However in the age of Web 2.0, the information ﬂow works differently – 
‘the power is no longer in the hands of those who control the channels of 
distribution; the power is now in the hands of those who control the limited 
resource of attention’ (boyd, 2010). Social media studies on public- facing social 
media platforms, such as blogs, Twitter and Chinese Weibo (microblog), have 
pointed out that in practice only a tiny percentage of social media users have 
inﬂuence in terms of information diffusion. The spreadability of the majority of 
social media proﬁles is very limited (Meraz, 2009; Romero et al., 2011; Ding et 
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al., 2013). The deficiency of information spreadability is even more pronounced 
on relatively closed social media platforms such as QQ and WeChat. 
Furthermore, we might expect that with social media people would share 
information beyond their previous groups. However, a comparison of the sharing 
of 145 social media proﬁles of factory workers and 55 proﬁles of middle- 
class Chinese in Shanghai produces evidence to suggest that they do not. Over 
a period of four months only one out of 6,000 articles (0.03 per cent) was found 
to have been shared in both groups, though 5.1 per cent of articles are shared 
within the factory workers group and 1.6 per cent within the Shanghai group. In 
the case of rural migrants, the possibility of the same information being shared 
within the social group with similar social economic status is 170 times higher 
than the possibility of it being shared across groups with different socio-economic 
statuses. So while most academic debates are concerned with the problems of 
sharing information from the West into China, for all intents and purposes one 
also has to acknowledge the limitations of information ﬂow between two different 
social groups within China. 
 
7. 1. 3 Conclusion  
In terms of the technological functions of Chinese social media there is simply no 
reason why Chinese social media cannot work as BBM did in the London riots 
(2011) or as Facebook and Twitter did in the Arab Spring (2011). The degree to 
which social media assumes a political function is totally determined by the 
people who use it, rather than by the affordance of the technology. The key point 
is that the majority of Chinese people use social media differently – or to be 
precise, they use it in ways that make sense within a Chinese context.  
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The main ﬁnding has been the wide diversity in the way that the various 
meanings of ‘politics’ are interwoven with social media across the four different 
social groups used here to represented the population of this ordinary factory 
town. The case studies started from the co-operating and pragmatic political 
attitude held by most local factory owners and concluded with the critical attitude 
displayed by a few ‘phoenix men’. In between are local, middle- class residents, 
especially men, who view politics as a form of entertainment, and ordinary rural 
migrates who either appear totally indifferent to political participation, regarding 
themselves as insigniﬁcant people who are unable to change anything, or see 
coping with politics as a survival skill. What they view as real politics can be totally 
unseen, and the ‘seen’ politics can have nothing to do with real politics. The 
ethnography also shows that formal government internet censorship does not 
influence the online political expression of ordinary Chinese; the way Chinese 
people do guanxi does. 
 In a way all of this conclusion is pre-empted if we are sufficiently sensitive 
to the key Chinese term, which in this case is guanxi. Because although we 
translate guanxi as a practice of social relations, as noted in Chapter 1, it is 
equally regarded as integral to political relations in China. From their perspective, 
ordinary Chinese people join ‘politics’ through guanxi, rather than through any 
direct relationship to a political institution. Even in the case of factory owners, we 
have seen how they deal with local government issues mainly through developing 
and maintaining personal relationships with local officials. For ordinary people, 
not in any case likely to engage with formal politics, ‘politics’ is perceived and 
practised almost entirely as guanxi (Jacobs, 1982). The key point of this regarding 
the book as a whole, however, is that instead of looking to see where people post 
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politics on social media, we need to recognise that social media is now integral 
to guanxi. It almost therefore makes no sense to ask what is, or is not, political 
on social media.  
It has probably not escaped notice that every example in this section was 
male. As mentioned above, in some ways more overtly political expression may 
be regarded as masculine, in the same way that a keen interest in football might 
be. Yet that also tells us something important about the politics of gender, to 
which we now turn (Ortner, 1997).  
 
7. 2 The impact of social media on gender  
For anthropologists gender is never just a biological given. It refers to the social 
norms pertaining to gender identities as men and women, and the types of 
relations that exist between them –largely social and cultural constructs (Ortner 
& Whitehead, 1981). These expectations and social relations are aligned in turn 
with people’s other relationships. So when we think of social media and its 
attendant technologies, for example, we recognise that these also have gendered 
associations familiar from stereotypes, such as the concept of the nerd or 
the geek.  
In GoodPath an integral part of social media was deeply involved in many 
aspects of gender relations. People gossiped on social media, where they spent 
a lot of time patrolling and speculating there, and they shared and commented 
upon memes or articles online. Both women and men, young and old, joined the 
‘debate’ about what makes a good woman or a good man. 
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7. 2. 1 The good women of China202 
 
After dinner, a group of women in their forties sat in a circle, chatting. They 
were gossiping about a young woman, the girlfriend of one of the women’s 
sons. 
 
She is definitely pretty ... but the problem is she is not anfen at all. I saw her 
mingling with different guys several times; you’d better warn your son to look 
out…  
 
Anfen refers to the ideal situation of a well-behaved woman who knows (and 
adheres to) what she should and should not do in a family situation and in 
public. In Chinese the word ‘an’ means to be content, while ‘fen’ refers to one’s 
social role and fate. Thus together anfen means to be content with one’s given 
lot, to know its boundaries and never to go beyond them or even think about it 
(Rowe, 2001). Based on Confucianism, the traditional Chinese family was 
organised around a rigid hierarchy of age, generation and gender, where elder 
men held the say within a family and young women were the least significant 
(Baker, 1979). In such a context to be a good young woman is not only to 
accept an inferior social status, but also to feel content about it. Any challenge 
to such a situation would be regarded as bu anfen (not anfen) – a very negative 
description of a young woman, indicating her failure to meet the requirement 
of submission and to perform an appropriate social role. 
                                                     
202 This subtitle is to show respect for the book The Good Women of China, written by Xinran 
Xue. The book, which features extraordinary true stories of ordinary Chinese women, reveals the 
real life of Chinese women in the post-Mao era to the West as never before. See Xue, X. 2003. 
The Good Women of China: Hidden Voices. London: Random House.  
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In GoodPath flirting with the opposite sex in public was considered 
damaging to a young woman’s reputation, whereas it was acceptable if men 
did so. Also young women were not supposed to take the initiative (zhudong) 
in romantic relationships, as courting was seen as a man’s job. Nowadays 
even though virginity is no longer regarded as the most important virtue of 
young women,203 and premarital sex no longer regarded as a very shameful 
thing for women, a frequent change of partners still provokes raised eyebrows. 
Young women in a romantic relationship for more than a year are supposed to 
get married – having a public relationship without getting married is considered 
strange. Young people are ‘supposed’ to get married and have their ﬁrst child 
no later than the age of 25. A married couple without a child was also regarded 
as strange, inviting speculation that there was ‘something wrong’ and 
subjecting them to gossip. It is very common to see older people ask young 
couples whether they are married or whether they have any plans for having a 
child. To conclude, the mainstream ideas of gender in GoodPath are in many 
ways still conservative. 
However, the situation is not the same on social media. Partly because the 
older generation, who holds the idea that anfen is essential to be a good woman, 
have not yet become active users of social media, young people have enjoyed a 
greater say online. On social media the association of anfen is something totally 
different. Fig. 7.2 shows a popular meme among young factory workers, both 
                                                     
203 In traditional Chinese society, sexual purity and sexual loyalty was the essential measure of 
women’s value, reflecting a male-dominated society in which women were considered as 
equivalent to property. Men pressured female relatives to maintain a good reputation by strictly 
obeying all the rules of proper behaviour, including the suicides of widows, and bans on widow 
remarriage. See Chow, K. 1994. The rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China: Ethics, 
Classics, and Lineage Discourse. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
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female and male. The text embedded on the image reads: ‘Youth: a heart which 
is not anfen.’ 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, some anti-mainstream (FZL)204 memes demonstrated 
rebellious gestures and were very popular among young people. On this meme, 
anfen equates with the non-adventurous – something to be abandoned by young 
people, who should do something modern and cool instead. More importantly, 
when young people embrace the general urban idea of being adventurous, they 
also accept a gender claim that, young women should not be anfen. Other 
postings on social media also demonstrated a trend that the pursuit of gender 
equality has become ‘mainstream’ among young women online: 
 
                                                     
204 See details of the anti-mainstream (FZL) genre of visual posting in Chapter 3.  
Fig. 7.2 A typical anti-anfen meme posted by young factory workers 
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 I feel regret that I got married before reading these wise suggestions 
[‘chicken soup for the soul’ articles about love and relationships].205 When 
my family arranged things [marriage] for me, I was too young to 
understand what love is.  
 
So declared Yueling, a 21-year-old factory worker, who got married when she 
was only 19. Her husband is also a factory migrant worker from the same village. 
What made Yueling feel regret was the following: compared to those ideal 
husbands depicted on the posts she shared on Qzone, her husband appeared to 
know nothing about romantic love. At the end of the ﬁeld work, Yueling 
‘disappeared’. Her husband conﬁrmed that she had been arguing for a divorce 
for a while, and when she was turned down by him, she ran away from home, 
leaving her three-year-old son. For many young female rural migrants those posts 
were the ﬁrst time ideas of marriage and romantic relationships were publicly 
discussed, along with a focus on gender equality and the pursuit of happiness. 
Some young female migrants even reported that they felt very shocked when for 
the ﬁrst time they read from friends sharing on QQ about what a marriage should 
be, and the proper way that a man should treat his wife.  
During the 15 months of field work, as far as the researcher knows, six 
migrant young women left their husbands or had an affair, mainly because they 
finally realised their marriages were not what they wanted. Even though married 
men secretly had some affairs, or in most cases purchased sex,206 none of them 
                                                     
205 See details of the genre of ‘chicken soup for the soul’ postings in Chapter 3.  
206 There are approximately around 150 to 250 sex workers in GoodPath, all of them rural migrant 
women. The market is huge and low-end, with customers, all rural migrant men, paying around 
50RMB to 100RMB (US$8–16) per time. The income of a sex worker is usually two to three 
times that of a female factory worker.  
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divorced their wives for the same reasons as the women mentioned. Among the 
six women, five were married to fellow villagers at a very early age, before they 
experienced rural-to-urban migration; four207 of them also shared a large number 
of postings about romantic love and ideal marriages on their Qzones.208  
However, to put things into perspective, the number of women who make 
a signiﬁcant change in their gender relations remains small. In practice, the 
situation is more mixed and complicated. It is always difficult to determine 
whether social media is merely a place that is reﬂecting wider changes in society 
or if it is in and by itself a liberating and empowering tool for young women seeking 
to escape from the oppressive gender norms of the offline world. The argument 
that digital media provide opportunities for people to be able to perform and 
create identities freely online has also been emphasised by feminist internet 
scholars (Vogt & Chen, 2001; Van Doorn & Van, 2008). Also, as Chapter 6 has 
already shown, public displays of intimacy are more acceptable on social media 
than offline, and many young people see social media as the only place where 
they can be romantic. Thus from this perspective social media, as a relatively 
liberating place, strikes a balance with the offline situation where mainstream 
social norms remain conservative. For these reasons it seems clear that social 
media is not merely a reﬂection of other changes, but has emerged as a factor 
and a force within them.  
On the other hand, it is difficult to ignore the strong continuity of gender 
images of femininity between offline and online. For example, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, cute and sweet images were very popular on social media, especially 
                                                     
207 The researcher only had access to the social media profiles of four of them. 
208 The story of one of the couples has been presented in the painting ‘Marriage battle’, part of 
the ‘visual ethnography’ project. Please visit http://www.visualethnographyxy.co.uk/#!big-
paintings/c1t44  
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among young women. Among such images the gesture of ‘sajiao’ is an important 
strategy (Qiu, 2013). In Chinese to be ‘jiao’ is to be delicate, dependent and 
vulnerable; to sajiao means ‘to deliberately act like a spoiled child in front of 
someone because of the awareness of the other person’s affection’ (Hunt, 2011). 
Unlike what is often the case in the West, a Chinese woman who deliberately 
presents herself as dependent and vulnerable, emphasising her weakness and 
helplessness in order to get her way, is not criticised, since this has no negative 
connotations. In a way sajiao is actually a highly manipulative way in which young 
women can survive and succeed in a patriarchal society; to some extent it reflects 
an indirect shift of power in the dominant gender power structure (Farris, 1995). 
The common gestures of ‘sajiao’ involve pouting with big puppy eyes or covering 
half of one’s face to show shyness and vulnerability. The images of sajiao on 
social media visually connect the expressions from a small animal to little girls 
and then to young women (Fig.7.3).  
Such behaviour can seem to pay dividends in the offline world, as Xiao Ying, a 
19-year-old factory worker, observed. ‘People always say that a woman who 
knows how to sajiao will enjoy a good life … I agree, men take that … those who 
sajiao in front of the section manager even got a smaller workload.’ On Xiao 
Ying’s Qzone there are many photos of little girls and young women, as well as 
some selﬁes of herself, all in sajiao poses. Like Xiao Ying, many young women 
smartly spot the fact that gender differences are not only a source of women’s 
oppression, but also a source of power if applied well. For this reason, the 
traditional gender norms of a woman, in which she appears vulnerable and 
inferior, were actually strengthened and reinforced on social media. 
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When young women became mothers, their social media profiles 
witnessed a clear image shift, manifested in a great many beautiful food images 
shared from the internet (Fig.7.4). In many societies, including China, married 
women are stereotyped as the primary care-givers (McDowell, 1999). Cooking 
seems in addition to be universally associated with motherhood (Avakian, 1998), 
Fig. 7.3 Typical images of sajiao on social media  
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and in China it is believed that one of the core criteria of being a ‘good mother’ is 
to cook well (Jing, 2000). 
 
 
 
  
 
On Fig. 7.3, he text reads: 
How do you keep your children healthy? Young women, when you are 25, 
or just older than 22, you will be ‘upgraded’ to being a mother. As a young 
mother, there are so many things to learn … However, there is nothing 
more important than taking care of your children and making sure that they 
Fig. 7.4 Typical images of food on social media  
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are healthy. An experienced mother shares several recipes with you 
here… 
 
Among all the food images, photographs of soup seem to be dominant. The 
emphasis on images of soup among young mothers online is not a coincidence. 
In Chinese cuisine soup is valued as one of the most nutritious dishes (Li & Hsieh, 
2004). The cooking of soup usually requires a long period of time, patience, 
delicate heat control and a fair knowledge of ingredients. As such it makes a 
natural analogy to caring for children, also always considered time-consuming 
and requiring a good deal of patience, understanding and an ability to control the 
‘heat’ in the relationship. Thus the frequent sharing of soup photos, the way in 
which young mothers crafted an ideal motherhood online, actually reinforced the 
pre-existing dominant ideals of femininity. 
 
7. 2. 2 Men: from opposition to feminisation  
On the other hand, men apparently appeared less keen on the fact that more and 
more women were beginning to seek a more equal pattern of gender relations, 
especially when they found their girlfriends and wives to be among them. Some 
became nostalgic like Fuqiang, a 31-year-old factory worker: 
  
Things have changed a lot nowadays; it’s impossible to have a woman 
who is happy to cook for you and wash clothes for you without nagging 
you to buy expensive items for her. Women are much more demanding 
these days. 
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Fuqiang witnessed how his once anfen wife had become more and more difficult 
to control.  
He always advised his fellow workers to be careful about their partners’ 
use of QQ, as in his eyes QQ was largely responsible for the bad influence on 
women. Dong Jing was one of Fuqiang’s colleagues who was getting worried 
because of this advice. 
In 2013 Chinese lunar New Year, 23-year-old Dong Jing went back to his 
home village in the mountain area of the province of Guizhou209 to undergo 
several blind dates arranged by his family. Fortunately for him, one girl’s family 
selected him.210 Given that Dong Jing only had two weeks’ leave in the village 
before he went back to the factory, the engagement ceremony took place 
immediately after the two families made a deal. Three months later Dong Jing 
went back to his village to get married after having seen his bride only twice. 
According to Dong Jing, the main job he did is to ‘sow human seeds’.  
 
On Dong Jing’s Qzone there were some very early postings (memes) 
about love, indicating how much he was looking for romantic love. Since he got 
engaged those postings have disappeared, seeming to bring a close to his 
previous fantasy about a girl he had met two years ago in a factory where he 
once worked. Just before he wanted to take a further step, however, he 
discovered that a section manager in the same factory was his rival. Unlike Dong 
                                                     
209 The province with the lowest GDP in China.  
210 There are a number of accounts of Chinese rural marriage which indicate that the role of 
parents in marriage decisions is dominant. Today such a situation remains still largely the same 
in those remote villages where most rural migrants in GoodPath come from. See Xu, X. and 
Whyte, M. 1990. ‘Love matches and arranged marriage: a Chinese replication.’ Journal of 
Marriage and the Family. 52: 709–22. Pasternak, B. 1986. Marriage and fertility in Tianjin, 
China: Fifty years of transition. Honolulu: East–West Population Institute. 
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Jing, the section manager had his own office room with an air conditioner. 
Furthermore, he had a local hukou. To cap it all, the section manager was a 
Communist Party member, which entitled him to enjoy better social beneﬁts (fuli) 
than non party members . . . Compared to all that, Dong Jing had nothing to offer. 
It was after that frustrating experience of having to give up this girl that Dong Jing 
ﬁnally accepted the idea of an arranged marriage, encouraged by his parents’ 
nagging to get married as soon as possible. 
Like Dong Jing, more than half of the rural migrant young people in 
GoodPath ended up with marriages arranged by their families,211 even though 
some of them had various experiences of romantic love before. Marriage 
indicates a re-allocation of resource between the two families united by the 
marriage.212 It has long been recorded in anthropology that in traditional societies 
marriage is not a personal affair between two individuals; it rather involves two 
kin groups and thus constitutes a community event (Schlegel & Eloul, 1988; 
Harrell & Dickey, 1985). People tend to regard arranged marriages as more 
‘reliable’ than free love in terms of compatible family background, financial 
capability and lifestyle. For young rural migrants it is not very easy have a long-
term relationship in their ‘floating’ lives, and even more difficult to find a partner 
                                                     
211 Arranged marriage among young people from rural areas still remain the mainstream among 
rural migrants, especially those from the poorest areas. See also the news report of blind dates 
and arranged marriages in Chinese rural areas among migrants who have returned for the Chinese 
New Year. ‘Marriage in rural areas with Chinese characteristics: the busy season of blind dates 
during the period of Chinese lunar New Year’. zhongguo shi nongcun hunlian: chunjie qijian 
pinfan xiangqin. Xinhua Net, 4 February 2014. http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2014-
02/04/c_119211913.htm 
212 As for the purposes of marriage in rural China, the literature is very rich. The main purposes 
include ‘continuance of a family line’, ‘a way to increase hands in the field’, ‘formation of 
alliances’, ‘provision of old age support and security’, etc. See Wolf, M. 1972. Women and the 
Family in Rural Taiwan. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Potter, S. and Potter, J. 1990. 
China’s Peasants: the Anthropology of a revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Riley, N. 1994. ‘Interwoven lives: parents, marriage, and guanxi in China.’ Journal of Marriage 
and the Family 56:791–803. 
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who also meets the family’s expectations. For young men the family’s approval 
and support is essential, since the bride price (cai li)213 required by the bride’s 
side is normally way beyond an individual’s financial capability. In Dong Jing’s 
case his family had to borrow from a number of relatives to provide at least 80,000 
RMB (around US$13,300) in advance. This amount of money was only the 
average according to the local standard, even though it represented about 8–10 
years’ worth of savings of a young couple, both of whom work in a factory.214  
Dong Jing’s new wife was shy and nice, four years younger than him; she 
had never been outside her village and had dropped out of school in order to help 
with housework at home. All those features made her an obedient (anfen) and 
virtuous (xian hui) woman –  a good woman and a perfect wife in fellow villagers’ 
eyes. After they got married Dong Jing gave his wife a brand-new iPhone4, which 
cost him two months wages. At that time nobody owned such a high-end (gao 
dang) smartphone in their village. The first-ever iPhone arrived  as if it had a halo, 
and won a lot of ‘face’ (miazi) for the bride and her family. Nowadays the couple 
mainly keep contact on QQ via smartphones, which cost nothing after pre-paid 
data packages.  
                                                     
213 In traditional society, daughters would eventually move out and join the husband’s family, 
adding to its labour resources. ‘Bride price’ has been seen as a direct compensation for raising a 
daughter of the bride’s natal family, and it is often negotiated between two older generations. To 
see a detailed discussion of the different practices involving betrothal gifts in China cf. Croll, E. 
and Croll, E. 1981. The politics of marriage in contemporary China. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Also see a discussion of the changing norms of betrothal gift, in which 
individual brides and grooms negotiate with their parents over control of the gift, at Yan, Y. 2005. 
‘The individual and transformation of bride wealth in rural north China.’ Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 11: 637–58. 
214 With the rising income in the countryside, rural China has witnessed a revival of hefty bride 
prices and extravagant wedding celebrations. See also Min, H. and Eades, J. 1995. ‘Brides, 
bachelors and brokers: the marriage market in rural Anhui in an era of economic reform.’ Modern 
Asian Studies 29: 841–69. 
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However, one thing had been bothering Dong Jing, especially after his 
colleague Fuqiang’s warning of the bad influence that QQ exerts on women. One 
day his newly married wife shared an article with beautiful photographs of ‘top 
honeymoon destinations worldwide’ on her QQ profile with a comment that read:  
 
My husband has never taken me to anywhere, let alone those 
honeymoon places. What I have is zuo yuezi [‘sitting the month’, meaning 
confinement in childbirth]215… 
 
When he read this Dong Jing’s first reaction was ‘From where did she get all this 
urbanite nonsense of honeymoons?’ To express his disapproval and 
dissatisfaction he intentionally ignored the posting by not commenting on it. 
Making no response is quite unusual, since he always commented on his new 
wife’s QQ postings – not only because such action showed his affection for her 
in public, but also because it marked his position as ‘the husband’, and so 
hopefully warned off other male contacts on his wife’s QQ:  
 
I hope she will get the message … I mean a honeymoon is something for 
foreigners or urban rich people. If she is not anfen, and always dreams 
about something I can’t give her, she won’t be happy. 
 
                                                     
215 The phrase ‘sitting the month’ refers to confinement following childbirth. A Chinese 
traditional post-natal treatment, it basically requires the woman to remain at home for one whole 
month after her labour. There are many taboos during the confinement period which include no 
body washing, no outside activities, no salty food, etc. See Pillsbury, B. 1978. ‘“Doing the 
month”: confinement and convalescence of Chinese women after childbirth.’ Social Science & 
Medicine. Part B: Medical Anthropology 12: 11–22. 
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Dong Jing’s case was typical among rural migrant men whose attitude towards 
gender relations seemed to be ambivalent. On the one hand young men, just like 
young women, appear to show a great passion for Western-style romantic love, 
which unfortunately often has to compromise with traditional expectations in the 
end. However, once they entered married life men expected their wives to behave 
in accordance with the traditional social norms of anfen which they had both 
previously opposed. The reason for this contradiction is that even though 
traditional social norms constrain romantic love, they are in favour of a superior 
male position in a marriage. Dong Jing’s story also indicates a situation 
encountered by many rural migrant women once they have entered married life. 
Many are placed under huge social pressure to revert to a conservative gender 
role, even though before marriage they may have deﬁed convention and been 
women who are not anfen. In practice, different couples had various problems 
and solutions, but most lived in continual tension between modern and traditional 
ideas of gender relations in a marriage. 
Also, as Dong Jing’s story shows, there is a great pressure and urgency 
for rural young men to get married.216 There are several reasons for this. First, 
because of son-preference within patrilineal family system,217  China has the 
highest male to female sex ratio at birth (SRB) in the world, particularly at 
                                                     
216 So far a number of gender studies and media attention have focused on the phenomenon of 
Chinese ‘leftover women’ (sheng nv). However, such phenomena only occurred in urban China 
where highly educated, professional women may have ‘failed’ to get married or chose not to for 
reasons such as high expectations of the partner, different choice of lifestyles supported by 
financial independence and so on. See To, S. 2013. ‘Understanding Sheng Nu (“leftover women”): 
The phenomenon of late marriage among Chinese professional women.’ Symbolic Interaction 
36(1): 1–20. Gaetano, A. 2014. ‘“Leftover women”: Postponing marriage and renegotiating 
womanhood in urban China.’ Journal of Research in Gender Studies 2: 124–49.  
217 Find detailed analysis of the reasons for son preference in Rural China and its social 
consequences at Murphy et al. 2011. ‘Son Preference in Rural China: Patrilineal 
Families and Socioeconomic Change.’ Population and Development Review 37(4): 
665–690. 
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(140:100) in poor rural areas where most rural migrants come from (Zhu, 2009). 
Second, as Chapter 1 has mentioned, hukou has always been one of the biggest 
obstacles in preventing rural migrants from settling down in cities. There are two 
ways for a rural resident to obtain urban hukou, one through property investment 
and the other through marriage. Given the financial capability of rural migrants, 
the latter is the only viable choice. However, that choice in practice is only 
available to women. Marriage is a strategy by which rural women in 
disadvantaged positions achieve social and economic mobility (Fan & Huang, 
1998).    
In GoodPath all the local marriages between people with rural and urban 
hukou were between rural women and urban men. In Chinese society, like many 
other societies, the tendency of the marriage market is for women to marry men 
of higher socioeconomic status, especially when there is a shortage of women.218 
All of this reinforces the evidence that getting married at all has become very 
difficult for rural migrant men. On the other hand, in traditional Chinese society 
getting married and becoming a parent is crucial to a sense of identity for men 
(Pimental, 2000). A man remaining single may be considered not an adult, even 
not truly a man (Watson, 1986). Single rural migrant men all felt the crisis of their 
situations, and a remarkable number of them felt a profound sense of failure 
(Zhou et al., 2011). Meanwhile the social status of rural women, especially young, 
unmarried rural women, has been enhanced by such a skewed gender 
imbalance.  
Now look back upon the ‘folk tale’ shared widely on social media in 
Chapter 4, it is therefore arguable that among rural migrants there is a clear-cut 
                                                     
218 The technical term for this ‘marrying up’ is hypergamy. Also see Xu, X. et al. 2000. ‘Social 
and political assortative mating in urban China.’ Journal of family issues 21(1): 47–77. 
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awareness of the increasing unbalance between the young female and the young 
male as well as the deteriorative tension between the rich men and the poor men 
in marriage market.219  
Chinese rural migrants as a whole are a disadvantaged group at the 
bottom of Chinese social stratification. Most gender studies of Chinese rural 
migrants seem to focus only on females in manufacturing and service sector (Lee, 
1998; Chan, 2002; Chan & Pun, 2010; Chang, 2008; Jacka, 2006; Gaetano, 
2008; Gaetano & Jacka, 2013; Yan, 2008), presupposing that females are the 
disadvantaged of the disadvantaged. To the best of my knowledge, only Lin 
(2010, 2013), Kim (2015), and Shen (2015) looked at men’s experiences in rural-
to-urban migration. It is true that gender inequality is prevalent in Chinese society, 
and that in rural areas the situation is more severe and in various situations the 
daily struggles of rural women manifest in different ways.220 However, what some 
rural migrant men posted on their QQ suggested that the position is not the same 
as people assumed when we scrutinise the in-group gender discrepancy among 
Chinese rural migrants. Actually some rural migrant men had already sent the 
message via their social media postings. 
                                                     
219 As revealed in Tiantian Zheng’s research, rich businessmen in Chine see having a ‘second 
wife’— many of them are pretty rural young women, as necessity to prove that sex potency and 
to against the socialist morality and socialist state. In which case, urban rich men in practice can 
manage to have more than one partners whereas many young rural men can’t ‘afford’ one. See 
Zheng, T. 2006. ‘Cool Masculinity: Male clients’ sex consumption and business alliance in urban 
China’s sex industry’. Journal of Contemporary China, 15(46): 161–182. 
220 For a better understanding of the current situation of women in rural China please see 
Jacka, T. and Sargeson, S. eds. 2011. Women, Gender and Rural Development in China. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  As a collection of empirical studies, this book explores the 
ways in which rural women negotiate with local institutions and gender relations in their 
daily life. In addition, it provides an overview of the impact of population and education 
policies as well as global, institutional, and local discourses on the living experience of 
gender relations and development of women in rural China. This book also pointed out 
that the younger rural women were much more aware of their rights compared to the older 
generation and the ways they struggled for their rights and benefits were also different.   
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The previous section has 
showcased the way in which sajiao 
(vulnerable and cute) images on social 
media offered a means for young 
women to strengthen their traditional 
gender roles. However, on social media 
sajiao is not the exclusive privilege of 
young women. It has been very 
common to see men apply sajiao too. 
For example, a middle-aged rural 
migrant man posted a photo of his wound online (Fig. 7.5), saying: ‘I cut myself 
accidentally; I need someone to comfort me and bring me some fruit!’  
Such anti-masculine behaviour can be explained by ethnography. First, 
traditional social expectation for a filial man to get married and pass on the 
patrilineal line (chuan zong jie dai), still remained as an important standard for 
men to meet, especially in rural context (Shen, 2015). Whereas as mentioned 
above, it has become extremely difficult for the rural young men to become 
competitive in marriage market in contemporary China. Second, Chinese men 
are supposed to take the main, if not full, responsibility of supporting the family. 
However, such traditional expectations conflicted with the financial situations and 
personal capabilities of rural migrant men. As a result, in many cases male rural 
migrants are actually under much greater pressure in daily life, and feel 
permanently frustrated by the fact it is impossible to meet social expectations.  
 The disadvantaged situation of young rural male is actually nothing new in 
history. As the most vulnerable group, rootless and homeless people have always 
Fig. 7.5 A typical sajiao posting by a 
middle-aged male rural migrant  
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according to records been treated harshly and brutally discriminated against. The 
inability to provide betrothal gift has always been a key source of anxiety for rural 
male (Parish & Whyte, 1978; Wang & Wason, 2006). The marriage market 
traditionally ensured that virtually all the rootless and homeless poor were men 
(Kuhn, 1768). Recently Yang’s study (Yang, 2015) among migrant workers in 
catering sector in Shanghai spot a similar situation that compared to young 
female migrant workers, young male migrant workers actually were more likely to 
be looked down upon in different ways — they not only suffered from harsh 
discrimination from customers, but also denigrated by female workers because 
being a male pantry helper and table servers they were regarded failed to meet 
the social expectation of ideal masculinity. Nevertheless, even though labouring 
in heavy-labour sectors in factories is seemingly appeared to be more masculine 
than serving tables in catering sectors in terms of stereotypic association between 
work and gender, the social contempt upon young male factory workers is 
actually no less. That is because: first the ideal masculinity in contemporary is no 
longer in line with the image of proletarian factory workers with revolutionary spirit 
and physical strength in Mao’s era (Chen, 2002), but more linked with 
entrepreneurial masculinity, emphasising men’s ability to make money and be 
equipped with well-connected social networking (Farrer, 2002; Osburg, 2013; 
Zheng, 2006; Lin 2013).  
To summarise, it is no exaggeration to say that male rural migrants actually 
constitute an equally, if not more, disadvantaged group. Compared to offline 
situations where men are supposed to respect masculine norms that do not 
include romanticism, weakness and sensitivity, social media provides the 
relatively free place where rural migrant men can experiment with what they 
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cannot be in their offline lives – for example, as adopting the strategies of a young 
woman and playing sajiao to get their way in society.  
Having said so, it is also evident that the balance of gender relation shift 
in favor of the male after marriage when married women no longer enjoy any 
advantaged position in the marriage market and factory job market.221 This is a 
remarkable turnaround for a society that has always been known as an example 
of entirely different gender asymmetries.  
 
7. 3 Conclusion  
This chapter has dealt with two key topics where there is considerable debate 
regarding the possible impact of social media. Does social media reinforce 
conservatism, facilitating criticism and subsequent change, or is it a vicarious 
arena in which things are performed that appear to be consequential but –  
precisely because they are only online – have no signiﬁcant impact offline? In 
both cases this chapter has tried to present concrete evidence that allows us to 
assess these different possibilities. With regard to politics, for example, the 
evidence supports the point that: rather than empowering or encouraging political 
participation, the use of social media tends to diminish any motivation for turning 
discontented thoughts into actual political action. In many ways social media 
rather helps to monitor and channel public opinion (yulun daoxiang) and so further 
legitimate the Chinese party-state. People use social media to make critical, 
sometimes angry222 points about their lives in general, without turning these into 
                                                     
221 Similar situation has also been documented in Fang, I-Chieh. 2011. ‘Growing Up 
and Becoming Independent: An Ethnographic Study of New Generation Migrant 
Workers in China’. PhD thesis. London: LSE. 
222 Tong, J. 2015. 'The formation of an agonistic public sphere: emotions, the internets 
and new media in China.’ China Information 29(3): 333–51. The article argues that this 
may be having wider consequences for elite urban populations. 
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specific attacks on local politicians. Yet this is also where we see a difference 
between the spheres of gender and politics, since social media has not become 
a significant terrain for imagining an alternative life within an alternative political 
regime. When it comes to gender and people’s more personal lives, however, 
that is exactly what social media is becoming important for.   
The focus on gender is in turn important in helping us to reassess social 
media’s role. From the images of soup posted by young mothers to anti-anfen 
memes shared by young women and those seemingly confusing sajiao 
photographs on the proﬁles of middle-aged men, social media has served to 
reinforce, disrupt or simply shift gender roles in different situations.  
As we have just seen, a signiﬁcant break with the social norms of femininity 
and masculinity occurred in GoodPath when people publicly performed 
unconventional gendered selves on social media. This was complex to analyse, 
as the same person can behave differently on social media in different phases of 
life. For example, when young women retreated from anti-anfen public life into 
the private institution of motherhood, their gendered images on social media 
changed accordingly. So social media in and of itself is a powerful tool, but not 
necessarily the key transformative factor. In addition, we need to reﬂect on some 
of the underlying factors that have had an impact on peoples’ conceptions of 
gender. These include ﬁnancial capability, the shifting marriage market and the 
job market. However, it is the overall migration, with its search for an engagement 
with modernity, that explains most fully why there is also some acceptance of this 
modern conceptualisation of gender.  
Already we have seen how in issues of gender both men and women are 
starting to imagine worlds that were unprecedented in their prior offline lives. But 
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since this refers to a ﬁeld of relationships that is certainly undergoing change, it 
is not simply an alternative fantasy world – indeed what emerges quite clearly is 
that we cannot reduce this to a dualism of online ‘fantasy’ opposed to offline 
‘reality’. One of the reasons for this is that creativity, imagination and 
transcendent other worlds have always been part of everyday life. The conclusion 
of this chapter will become clearer as we progress to the final conclusion of this 
thesis, which focuses on the relationship between online and offline.    
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion: The Dual Migration  
 
 
8. 0 Introduction 
This thesis starts with a claim that, in effect, this is a study of two migrations taking 
place simultaneously, both on a vast scale - one is from rural to urban, the other 
from offline to online.  
At first this may appear to be simply a ‘neat’ attention-seeking analogy. It 
might seem glib to try to equate the vast upheaval represented by a population 
leaving its ancestral home for the alienating environment of a huge factory system 
to the increasing use of smartphones and social media. But now, however, having 
reached the end of the thesis, it should be clear that this was never intended as 
a mere analogy. That it is entirely possible that the study of social media has 
revealed a migration as profound and as consequential as the physical movement 
with which it coincided.   
 
8. 1 The deep rupture offline 
The journey of the rural-to-urban migration is first of all a deep rupture. It started 
with the downfall of the rural collective community and family control, and then 
took form as a turbulent ‘floating life’ leading to severe social exclusion. At the 
start of this thesis we saw the example of Dong, the young factory who dropped 
out of school when he was 16, trying to escape the boring and depressing life of 
a child left behind by his parents to embrace the modern life that he had dreamt 
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of instead. As Chapter 6 argues, for many young Chinese factory workers, unlike 
their parents, the decision to break with that rural life was not determined purely 
by the pressure of poverty. Many were willing and determined to take what they 
saw as the first step towards a better life. However, what they were not prepared 
for is the frustrating gap between the dream of becoming modern and the reality 
of being denied, excluded, and even totally ignored as mere cogs in massive 
factory machines.  
In GoodPath, we have witnessed the estrangement between the locals 
and rural migrants – a situation already evident in the local primary school, where 
children from local and migrant families were strictly segregated in diferent 
classes. we have also seen how anxiety about guanxi (social relations) has 
become pervasive, to the extent that it has become a common practice among 
rural migrants to check whether one has been deleted from others’ WeChat 
contacts lists. What was happening in GoodPath was also taking place in 
hundreds of other similar ‘transitional towns’ across industrial China, places in 
which hundreds of millions of migrant workers were striving for a better life. 
However, rather than being a ‘good path’, the life path they followed was a 
narrow, winding, and uneven one. 
 The term migration can refer to a simply process by which people start 
from a fixed location A and end up in a new settled location of B. But the migration 
of Chinese people from villages to factories has always led to them been termed 
a ‘floating’ population since the regulations of hukou household registration 
system did not really allow them to settle down as local residents in urban areas 
(Goodkind & West, 2002). One of the direct consequences of such a floating life 
is passivity. Many migrants seem apparently content with the status quo and less 
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motivated for change, since efforts to improve either living and working conditions 
or to establish local networking are frustrated and begin to feel pointless. 
Therefore, as noted in Chapter 3, the word ‘passing traveller’ (guoke) resonated 
among migrant workers, becoming a popular term on the memes they posted and 
shared on Qzone. The mindset of being a ‘passing traveller’ coats the ‘floating’ 
life with a protective layer consisting of an attitude of pretended indifference. 
People appear less interested, or even entirely uninterested, in their current job, 
their place of residence and those they meet in their daily life. This was 
considered further in Chapter 7, which revealed how this ‘passing traveller’ 
mindset also partly explains the extremely low political participation rate among 
rural migrants, both online and offline. All in all, the absence of feelings of 
belonging and the rupture experienced within the urban/industrial space was fully 
expressed by Guo Biao, a factory worker, in Chapter 1: ‘It [GoodPath] is just 
where I work…of course it’s not a home. Home is where you go back once a year 
to celebrate Chinese New Year.’ 
 Even though many migrant workers, like Guo Biao, tended to see their 
home villages as their real ‘home’, this thesis has revealed how their new reality 
is not that straightforward. In Chapter 4, Hua, the factory woman in her late 
thirties, whose youth had been spent as a rural migrant, commented that 
‘homeland is the place you always miss, but will never return to’. Most migrant 
workers who had spent large parts of their lives ‘floating’ from one factory town 
to another experienced at some point a poignant moment of recognition: that their 
‘floating’ journeys had led them to cross a point-of-no-return. As discussed in 
Chapter 4 one may visit one’s home village once a year, but returning to live there 
is almost impossible. Three decades ago Chinese peasants finally gained the 
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freedom to leave their homes.223 Three decades later they have realized that, 
along the way, they have somehow lost the ‘freedom’ to go back.  
 Confronting rural migrants’ sense of alienation from both agricultural and 
industrial communities, a natural question then takes shape: where do (or can) 
these people really live? No more illuminating answer can be given to this 
question than the emic view of Lily, an ordinary young factory worker. I met up 
with her one summer evening in the small, run-down bedroom that she shared 
with her younger sister. It was hot and humid, and Lily’s sigh acknowledged this 
with a helpless smile: ‘Life outside the smartphone is unbearable!’ What she was 
claiming was that the place she most enjoyed living in, and where she felt most 
alive, was on her Qzone, inside the online world. The online has become the real 
home for most migrant workers who feel they do not belong in either villages or 
factory towns. 
 
8. 2 The profound reconstruction online  
Lily’s remark leads us to the other side of the story – the profound reconstruction 
in forms of individualisation and modernisation now taking place alongside this 
profound break. In fact, thanks to the vast empty space left by the rupture caused 
by migration, the personal pursuit of individual value and modernity has gained 
legitimacy and become more radical. Once affordable budget smartphones 
provided the material wherewithal, the perceived gap between aspiration and 
reality pushed young migrants to embrace to their utmost the new possibilities of 
social media. In such an environment young people from rural backgrounds ﬁnd 
                                                     
223 Three decades ago, rural-to-urban migration was illegal under the strict hukou 
household registration regulation. 
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their post-school education and coming of age on social media. Here they 
discover and explore not only friendship, but also a new understanding and 
practice of various social relationships, including encounters with strangers 
online. They gain awareness of privacy, and often their ﬁrst living experience of 
it, on social media, and all their diverse personal aspirations about a modern life 
and a modern identity ﬁnd their fullest expression on social media rather than in 
offline life.  
For anthropologists it is important to set this discussion alongside the kinds 
of material presented in Chapter 4. Chinese folk religion, popular among rural 
migrants, is very different from religions such as Christianity and other systems 
of belief. It follows a set of pragmatic principles, related not to a transcendent 
world, but rather what might be called ‘magical practices’, intended to gain luck 
and prevent misfortune. Understanding the magical quality of those religious 
beliefs helps us to appreciate that social media may itself be invested with 
‘magical’ properties. Even as erecting a physical temple constructs a particular 
kind of sacred place, so does creating a particular online space in which we can 
now circulate images of deities and other ideal images.  
Such an awareness led on to the subsequent developments explored in 
Chapter 6. These revealed the ways in which the new generation of rural migrants 
use social media to align themselves with what they perceive as the new styles 
of ‘cool’ and ‘modern’ –  for example by purchasing a virtual fast car or noble title. 
As far as social media users are concerned, migrating to online has brought them 
closer to the cool, stylish world of modern China with its images of wealth and 
successful pop stars to whom they want to get closer. Knowing how folk religion 
works among migrant workers, we should at least not dismiss the real power of 
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such ‘magic’ on social media. In Chapter 6 the widely held survival philosophy 
‘bitterness first and sweetness will follow’ (xian ku hou tian) further reﬂected the 
fact that the ‘ﬂoating’ life itself is future- oriented –  namely the imagination of a 
guaranteed, sweet future that helps people to survive today’s bitterness and 
stress. In other words, millions of Chinese rural migrants are always living in an 
anticipated future, rather than in the problematic present. In this sense the magic 
they experience on social media is no more ‘virtual’ than the role of magic in their 
pre-digital lives. It works, and is perceived as an intrinsic part of actual life. Real 
life is not where rural migrants live offline, which is constantly insecure and in ﬂux. 
Instead they rely upon their ability to engage in the imaginative construction 
online of what they might one day become. That is where millions of people 
now live.  
At this point the focus moves to Chapter 5, which provides the core 
evidence of what it is now like to live inside social media. The chapter describes 
a key expression for this experience: ‘hot and noisy’ (renao), which is exactly 
what people want this space to be like. It is not just a person who has to spend 
boring and exhausting hours in a factory who wants to spend their leisure time in 
this online world. Such space also attracts those who are shy or lonely; a person 
who constantly feels the pressure of living up to the social standards of being a 
good man or a good woman; a person who no longer feels connected to the 
village from which he or she once came; a person who does not bother with offline 
friendships in this factory town, since tomorrow he or she may be living 
elsewhere. All of these people turn to the online for their sociality or self- 
expression. Here they seek the familiar ‘hot and noisy’ experience that so many 
now miss in offline settings.  
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The claims made concerning the reality of dual migration are thus based 
on evidence presented over several chapters of this thesis. We can thus say that 
the images discussed both in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 6 are not just fantasy. 
They are in effect solid visual technologies that give people a better sense of 
where they live and where they belong.  
Most studies of social media in China have focused on the use of social 
media among urban populations, who have easy access to a whole range of 
digital technologies and are supposedly social media savvy. This thesis argues 
that it may actually be Chinese rural migrants –  a relatively digital have-less 
population, still in the process of becoming ‘modern’ – who provide a more 
appropriate subject for such research. This is because China’s rural migrants may 
in certain respects represent a more radical population, notably in how they fully 
embrace the possibilities that online can offer. In the global project224 of which 
this study is one part, it has been found that the online world of people in various 
countries more closely correspond to their offline world. Yet in the case of 
Chinese rural migrants we have encountered an unprecedented rupture, severing 
the constraints of traditional social expectations (‘what they should be’) and 
shifting the focus on to potential and aspiration (‘what they could be’), given 
expression through the advent of social media. In this sense Chinese rural 
migrants epitomise a genuine ‘social media population’ that provides an 
unusually clear guide to the new possibilities represented by social media.  
We need to put this discovery in perspective. The frustrations of their 
offline lives are certainly important, but poverty is not the only reason why 
Chinese factory workers embrace social media to this extent. After all, many 
                                                     
224 http://www.ucl.ac.uk/why-we-post 
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people who do not live in conditions of poverty are also migrating part of their 
lives to online. Most people in most places are experiencing some variant of this 
offline to online migration, though generally less extreme in form and more 
integrated into their offline lives. Moreover, social media was not the ﬁrst –  and 
is not the only ‘place’ where ‘magic’ takes place. Films such as Muriel’s Wedding 
which predate the digital era portray the imagining and pursuit of a glamorous 
wedding as more important than the wedding itself –  a fantasy that dominates 
the daily life of a middle- class Australian girl. An even greater claim could be 
made about the precedent represented by religion. For much of human history, 
and for most societies, religion has been a major, if not the single most important, 
component of many peoples’ lives.  
This thesis refuses to regard online life as something virtual, inextricably 
opposed to another world of ‘real’ life, nor as a substantive part of people’s ‘real’ 
life. However, it is still possible to argue that the situation of these Chinese factory 
workers is exceptional, as the consequences of such an immersion in online life 
are both more radical and profound. The ruptures experienced by migrants more 
generally in their lives have opened them up more fully to the possibilities of this 
new online life. This explains the basic narrative of this thesis. In China a vast 
population has embarked upon an offline journey from their villages to factories. 
Yet it is the parallel migration online that has so far allowed them to journey 
beyond the factory, to engage with an experience of the modern life that inspired 
this journey in the ﬁrst place.  
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Appendix 1  
Questions on the theme of ‘polymedia’ 
 
 D 
Basic questions  
 
No. Content N.B. 
1 Age; Sex; Title; Income; Live with a family or not; 
job; immigration (how long) or not 
Questionnaire 
2 How many digital devices do you have? And what 
type? Which individual and which shared? 
Questionnaire 
3 Which Digital communicative channels do you have 
an account with? 
Questionnaire 
4 What is your basic communication package?  
(ie: Social Media + email + mobile phone + ...) 
Questionnaire 
5 Put in order of what you think most personal/ 
informal/ private to least personal/ informal/ private: 
(list of all the digital communicative channels) 
Questionnaire 
6 How much do you pay for each digital device? 
What’s your mobile phone contract/plan and Internet 
plan?  
overall budgets of individual or family 
Questionnaire 
comprehensive 
budget analysis  
7 The amount of time informant spends on different 
media daily, and how often? 
Questionnaire 
8 Do you have broadband or use wifi, and are you 
satisfied with the internet speed?  
Questionnaire 
9 How many follow/ followers on Weibo? 
And average message length, frequency of posts? 
Questionnaire 
10 Do you have TV? and how many TVs do you have 
at home? 
Questionnaire 
11 How many social media friends do you have online, 
how many of them do you meet offline? 
Questionnaire 
12 Do you upload/download content: video, film, music, 
games? Do you share these among your friends? 
Questionnaire 
13 Do you have any automatic skype/ social media 
sign in when your computer/ mobile phone boots 
up? 
Questionnaire 
14 Do you have a smartphone? If yes, do you use 
social media/ listen to music/ check email/ read 
news/ listen to the radio/ watch TV on your 
smartphone? If not, do you want to have one? 
Questionnaire 
15 How many applications do you have on your 
phone? Which are most frequently used, and why? 
Questionnaire 
16 Do you think you know all the features that your 
phone/ PC has? Which feature do you like most, 
and why? 
Questionnaire 
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Follow-up questions 
 
No. Content  
1 Is there any medium you no longer use (or use less) because 
of the Internet/ social media? 
 
2 Do you normally IM or text people before you call them? If yes, 
with whom do you do this and with whom do you not do this? 
 
3 Whom do you not want to access your profile page? Whom do 
you call often but would never invite as a friend on social 
media? And Is there anything you won't tell on social media? 
 
4 Are you normally invisible/busy/available on your chat? And 
why? If your status is busy, do you normally take IM chats, and 
why? 
 
5 When were you annoyed by a posting/ wrong media type last 
time or when did your own media behavior annoy somebody? 
And why? 
 
6 When you stay on social media/ telephone call/ video call, do 
you engage in other kinds of communication with friends? 
 
7 Who is the most active person on your social media? And 
Why? 
 
8 Have you ever persuaded any of your friends/ relatives to use 
certain social media, or other digital communicative channel, 
or digital device and why? Or has any of your friends/relatives 
persuaded you the same? 
 
9 Will you check a friend’s social media profile before you meet 
them offline? 
 
10 When did you last lose a media device? What were the 
consequences? And how did you feel? 
 
 
  
17 Do you play any mobile/online/digital games? And 
how long you spend on it daily? 
Questionnaire 
18 Have you ever used the same social media/email 
user name sign in for all media connecting to the 
internet? 
Questionnaire 
19 Social media comprehensive analysis (posts, status, 
avatar, friends, album, comment, like, share, 
hyperlinks, tag, etc.) 
Key informants  
20 Draw up a timeline of two days Or, 
Keep a diary (2-3 days) of all forms of 
communications 
key informants  
 
21 Map position of all media in home 
Media used in bed; while eating; in the toilet, etc. 
Size of TV screen vs computer monitor 
key informants  
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Appendix 2 
Demographic Questionnaire225  
“社交媒介与社会科学”问卷调查 
Social Media and Social Science Survey  
 
Hello! We are doing a survey for University College London (UCL) and European 
Research Council ERC. We are researching the social impact of social media. We 
need 150 people from specific areas. The questionnaire will take about forty 
minutes, it is totally anonymous and we won’t give this information to anyone 
else. 
您好! 感谢您参与到伦敦大学学院（UCL）与欧盟研究基金会(ERC)的研究课题中
来。本次调查有关社交媒介的社会影响。我们需要 150 位受访者参与此次问卷调
查。问卷预计用时不超过 40 分钟，问卷采用匿名形式，我们郑重承诺严格保护
您所提供的一切信息。再次感谢您的配合与参与，谢谢！ 
 
问卷编号 Questionnaire number  
日期 Date  
研究对象的名字缩写（可不填） 
First Name or initials of the Respondent 
 
性别 Gender  
年龄 Age  
教育水平 Final/Present Education  
职业 Occupation  
宗教信仰 Religion   
社区／村庄 Neighbourhood  
                                                     
225 This demographic survey conducted among 238 rural migrants and 75 local people in 
GoodPath in June 2014.  
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研究员备注 Researchers note  
 
A: 社交网站的用户   Individual user of social media  
1. 您在哪里出生? ___________________________ 
 Where did your family live when you were born? 
2. 您在这里生活了多久? _____________________________ 
How many years have you lived in the current location? 
3. 请列举您所使用的社交媒体: (如：QQ、微信、陌陌、人人网、开心网、优酷视
频、新浪微博等) 
Please list the social media accounts you have: e.g. QQ/ WeChat/ MoMO/ 
Renren/ Kaixin/ Youku/ Sina Weibo 
社交媒
体 
您使用此帐
户有多长时
间？ 
此帐户拥有多少
联系人？ 
每天平均使用多长
时间 
(请填写一个数字) 
或，一
直上 
(请打勾) 
平均每天登陆多
少次 
(请填写一个数
字) 
Type 
 
 
How many 
years? 
Number of 
Contacts 
 
How many times a 
day/week/month  
do you look at it 
Or  
Always  
On 
How long on 
average do you 
spend on the 
site for each 
session? 
      
      
      
      
 
 4.  在上一个月中您使用下列功能的频率是多少？ 
How often did you in the past month? 
功能 
Activity Type 
频率（请填写一个数字） 
Frequency (Please list a number) 
更新状态 Update Status  
上传照片 Post photos  
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点“赞” Like  
评论 Comment  
圈人 Tag Photos  
拒绝圈人 Un Tag Photos  
@好友 @friends   
在线聊天 online chatting  
私信 private messaging   
转发 forward a post  
发表微博 post weibo  
转发微博 share weibo post  
上传视频 upload a video   
观看视频 watch a video  
评论视频 comment on videos   
使用“附近的人” people nearby  
使用“摇一摇” shake   
使用“漂流瓶” message in a bottle  
 
5. 您和您的家人朋友是如何样进行沟通的？（对于每一种通讯方式，请考虑三个
你最经常进行沟通的人） 
Personal – Individual Communication. For each type of media use, please 
consider the three people you most interact with, which type of relation 
they are and where they live.  
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通讯方式 
type 
 
使用频率 
In general 
how often 
do you 
use this. 
关系类型  
Type of relation 
A. 直系亲属（夫
妻，父母，儿女） 
Nuclear Family 
(Spouse/parents/ 
Child/sibling) 
B. 亲戚 
Other Family  
C. 同事 known 
from work 
D. 同学 known 
from education  
E. 邻里 known 
from 
neighbourhood 
F. 其他_____ 
Other (pls specify 
your choice) 
 
 
联系人所在地 
Location of 
the person 
A 同一个地方 
Same town 
B. 其他地方 
Diff. town 
C. 海外 
Abroad 
 
 
您在何地使用
该联系方式 
Where do 
you use it 
A. 家  
home 
B. 单位／学校  
Work/school 
C. 网吧 
Internet cafe 
D.随时随地
（使用智能手
机） 
Outside on 
smartphone 
 
 
社交网站 
（如 QQ 空
间，人人，
开心，微信
朋友圈等） 
Social media  
 
 1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
电子邮件 
Email 
 1. 
 
2. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
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3. 
 
3. 
 
3. 
 
手机短信 
SMS  
 1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
固定电话 
Land line  
 1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
手机 
Mobile 
phone 
 1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
其他形式 
请标明） 
other 
 1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
 
6．您是否更改过您社交网站的隐私设置（例如：仅限朋友）？ 
Have you changed your social media privacy settings (e.g. to friends only)?     
A）是 yes  B）否 no   
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7．您是否会反感一些商业机构使用您在社交网站上的信息？ 
Do you think the company that owns the SNS is using your data for purposes 
that harm you? 
A）是 yes   B）否 no 
 
8. 您是否会使用社交网站/或者其他媒介和您在异地的亲戚联系？ 
Do you use any social media and/or other media to communicate with relatives 
living abroad? Which is the main media that you use? 
A）是 yes   B）否 no 
 
9．在您社交网站上的朋友中，大概有________%是来自于___________________的
（请填写具体地方）同学。 
Roughly ________ per cent of your social media friends come from classmates 
from __________ (area of study)? 
 
B: 家庭信息 HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION 
12. 请问你们一家人都用什么手机（请分别说明） 
What kinds of mobile phones do people in the house have? (Please specify 
individually) 
使用者 User 手机种类 Type of mobile 
phone 
A 苹果 iphone 
B 三星 Galaxy 
C 黑莓机 Blackberry 
D 其他智能手机 （请写出品
牌）other smartphone  
E  非智能手机 non 
smartphone 
数量  
Quantity  
 
我 me   
伴侣 spouse   
父母 any of both parents   
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兄弟姐妹 siblings   
孩子 children    
其他 others   
 
13.请列举你的家庭中所使用的下列电子产品。（请标明使用者） 
What kinds of electronic gadgets do people in the house have? (Please specify 
individually)  
 
产品种类 type 数量 quantity  使用者（与您的关系） 
User (relationship to you) 
台式电脑 desktops   
笔记本电脑 laptops   
电子书阅读器 
E=readers 
  
平板电脑 
Tablets 
  
游戏机 
Play station/ video 
games 
  
其他数码产品（如 MP3
等）other digital 
devices (MP3, iPod) 
  
电视机 TVs   
收音机 Radio   
 
14．您在家是如何上网的？How do you connect to the internet at home 
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上网方式 Type 请勾选 Please tick a type 
不上网 no connection   
宽带上网 broadband   
无线上网卡 computer connected 
through USB dongle 
 
手机分享上网 computer connected 
through mobile  
 
 
15. 家庭成员基本信息  
（与您一同居住的人，如果你目前独居或住在旅店请略过本题） 
Family Member Information (living with you in the house. Please ignore if 
single/stay in hostel) 
 
与您的关系 
Relation to 
you 
性别 
gender 
年
龄 
age 
职业 
Occupation  
教育程度 
Education  
宗教 
Religion  
他们使用
的社交媒
介 
Do they 
use social 
media? 
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16．家庭设施 household Object Inventory 
类型 type 数量（如有，请填写具体数字） 
Quantity (pls specify a number in 
choice B) 
卧室 bedrooms A）不适用 N/A  B）_________ 
汽车 cars A）不适用 N/A    B）_________ 
电动车/摩托车 electric motor bikes/ 
motor bikes 
A）不适用 N/A    B）_________ 
固定电话 Landline A）不适用 N/A    B）_________ 
 
 
非常感谢您的耐心填写，接下来我们的研究员将和您进一步讨论您使用社交媒介
的情况。 
Next we would like to have a general discussion with you about your use of 
these social media 
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Appendix 3 
Painting book ‘Field Note’  
 
This painting book ‘Field Note’ (31.5cm * 
384cm) consists of 20 small paintings 
(31.5cm* 16cm), presented in a traditional 
Chinese rice paper folding booklet. Using 
classical calligraphy, I wrote the 
ethnographic field notes that explain the 
scenes that I painted. This painting book 
tells stories from an ethnographer’s point of 
view, including how to make local friends, 
how to deal with unexpected problems, get 
the information, keep a balance between 
work and life, etc. It illustrates the situation 
of doing field work in a small factory town 
in southeast China.  
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P1: Nowadays, when I look back, those days 
of reading books in the ivory tower were so far 
away. Books kept me company during the last 
few months before leaving for the field site.  
Besides books, I was so lucky to have a group 
of family-like colleagues, discussing research 
and enjoying life. However, I was not satisfied 
with the situation, I strongly felt that what I 
knew was so little, and I couldn’t wait for the 
D-day.  
                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P2: When I first arrived at my field site, 
everything just appeared so interesting and 
fresh in my eyes. I walked around without 
any specific purpose - just to embrace 
everything. I cherished such feeling of 
freshness so much because I know that I will 
soon lose such strong and fresh feelings 
about the place as I become familiar with it. 
It is always difficult not to take things for 
granted when you meet with them on a daily 
basis. Thus I kept many notes of all kinds of 
interesting and new things during that period 
of time.  
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P3: I got a temporary pass which allows me to 
visit the factory site without extra permission. 
The entrance to the factory looks like a huge 
and dark ‘Time Tunnel’. I felt I was inhaled into 
it. Even during the daytime, there is no efficient 
natural light inside the factory. The air is full of 
ceaseless loud machine noise and pungent 
smells of paint. When I first visited it, I really 
wanted to escape from there after half an hour.     
  
 
               
 
                  
 
 
 
P4: The logic of the assembly line is ‘humankind 
is a part of the machine’. Initially I wanted to work 
with the factory girls on the assembly line to get 
to know them and be taken as an ‘insider’ of the 
group. However, I soon gave up the plan. The 
reason was simple. The noise and the ceaseless 
assembly line deprived people from any 
conversation. Also, as long as I become an 
assembly line worker, I will be confined to my 
position all the time, which will further deprive me 
from visiting other places and other people at my 
field site. In the following months I visited and 
talked with assembly line workers mainly during 
their after work time.  
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 P5: Among all the jobs in the factory, forklift 
truck drivers enjoy the most flexibility. They 
work upon the demands from other sectors, 
so their working hour is intermittent. Thus I 
spent most of my time in the factory with 
forklift truck drivers, and I got to know them 
very well.  Sometime they let me sit on the 
forklift truck. However, for safety reasons, I 
have never really driven a truck by myself.     
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
P6: Breakfast booths are located along the 
sides of the street. Each booth has some old 
customers. Also it is always fine to share the 
table with strangers. Eating breakfast on the 
same table is a relatively natural way to 
make friends with strangers even though it 
won’t happen automatically without me 
taking the initiative. As a result, in order to 
know more people, sometimes I had several 
breakfasts in one morning with different 
people.  
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 P7: It is very normal that young mothers need to 
look after two or three young kids in my field site. 
Their husbands work in the factories, and they stay 
at home, looking after kids. They need to hold the 
youngest in their arms, thus they don’t have spare 
hands for the older ones. I helped them with the 
kids for a while and then I could join the chit-chat 
with young mothers naturally for an afternoon.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P8: Before long I found that asking people to 
fill in a questionnaire was an impossible task 
at my field site. Anthropology does not rely on 
questionnaires to collect data, however in 
order to conduct comparative study among 
different countries, our project decided to 
conduct one basic questionnaire among all 
the field sites. Most of the local people in my 
field site had never heard of questionnaires, 
let alone completed one. The majority of 
young workers on the construction sites and 
factories had middle school education, and 
the older ones only had primary school 
education. In the end, I decided to do an 
‘invisible’ questionnaire, that is to integrate all the questions on the questionnaire 
into very informal conversation with my informants and I do the questionnaire for 
each one during the conversation.  What is illustrated on the painting is during 
lunch break I am doing questionnaires with workers, lying in a temporary 
hammock made from protective net on a construction site.   
345 
 
P9:  There is a busy high street in the small 
town. It is not very easy to turn shop owners 
into my informants. In the beginning, I 
approached them with a clear statement that I 
was doing research, and many of them would 
take me as a promotion worker. So I learned 
from it, then I talked with others as if I was a 
potential customer, and gradually I let them 
know my study when they no longer had the 
heart to say no to me after the previous friendly 
talks. That is also the reason why 
anthropological field work takes a lot of time - 
time is a good investment to win people’s trust 
and people’s heart and to know the truth. I was 
very lucky to win a mobile phone shop 
keeper’s trust, and from time to time I helped 
out at the shop. The mobile phone shop on the 
high street has become a research spot outside of the factory.  
 
P10: A Smartphone which can take good photos is 
an indispensable tool during my field work. Photos 
taken by mobile phone are very important data. 
Using mobile phones to take photos is very 
common among people and won’t highlight the 
action of photographing. Whereas, taking a photo 
with a big camera always reminds people of being 
watched and being photographed. Thus using a 
mobile phone is relatively easier for me to capture 
some real scenes. Sometimes, I would sit in the car 
and take hundreds of photos of passers-by at 
different spots in my field site and analyse those 
photos on my laptop.      
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P11: Gradually, I got to know more and more 
people. And a special ‘social map’ emerged in 
my mind. When I walked around in my field site, 
the map popped up: The hairdresser where I 
can sit down for one hour in the morning when 
they are less busy, the internet cafes, the clinic, 
the newspaper kiosk, the mobile phone shops, 
the restaurants, the groceries, the nail shops, 
etc. Here in this small factory town, there is no 
cafe or tea house where people can sit down 
and talk, however those places function as a 
‘social hub’ where I came to meet up with 
people and chat with them.   
  
 
                                
 
 
P12: My field site is not a place that boasts 
pleasant weather. The local environment is also 
badly polluted by the nearby factories. In the 
summer, for four months the temperature rises 
above 35 degrees, and during the hottest period 
the temperature stays around 40 degrees. Given 
the humid air, one feels the temperature even 
higher to the degree that one cannot breathe. 
The worse thing is in most of the places there is 
no air conditioning. In the winter the temperature 
falls below zero and none of the indoor places 
are equipped with radiators. People’s social 
activity became limited given the extreme 
weather, so did my field work.   
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P13: In the field site, it is very difficult to 
differentiate one’s personal life from work given 
that ethnographers are supposed to immerse 
themselves in the local life and local social 
networks. Thus in a way, you are working 24/7. 
Even though it is impossible to view things 
absolutely from the ‘local people’s point of view’, 
an ethnographer needs to make a great effort to 
reconstruct his/her own life to fit into the field site 
scenario. A mature ethnographer must have 
good emotional self-control and self-regulation. 
To be sincere but not naive. I sometime have to 
decline video calls from my male informants at 
midnight or phone calls at 2 am.  
 
 
P14: In many cases I have learnt to say NO. 
People came to me for a job or simply to 
borrow money. I tried to help according to my 
own ability, but most of time I had to explain to 
them that being an anthropologist is different 
from being a policy maker, journalist or 
philanthropist. Our work is first of all to 
understand and to tell what is happening which 
is ignored or unknown to the outside world. 
Problems can be noticed and get solved in the 
end because of our work however it will take a 
long time and our work can’t guarantee any 
immediate solution. Disappointing as it may 
sound, it is better than distorting the research 
course and bouncing checks.  
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P15: All these Chinese characters are the surnames 
of people who I encountered in my field site. The 
majority of them belong to rural migrants and the local 
original surnames only account for 2 of them. Even 
though migrants live in the same place with the locals, 
they do not really have social connections with one 
another except for some functional interactions. I need 
to understand not only the locals, but also the migrants. 
Living in this small town which consists of a myriad of 
‘small circles’, I need to deal with different groups of 
people with patience and caution. Even though my 
identity as a researcher allowed me a lot of freedom in 
terms shuttling back and forth among ‘circles’, I still 
need to arrange my time to spend with different groups, 
keep proper distance and strike the balance in some subtle relationships.   
 
 
P16: Having meals or drinking together is 
always one of the best ways to know about 
people and make friends with them. Also here 
in China, restaurants are one of the most 
important social places.  With the help of 
alcohol, people became more relaxed, more 
talkative, and more open. I was sitting there, 
enjoying observing different kinds of people. I 
got a lot of valuable and interesting information 
from the dining table.   
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P17: Gradually, I found more and more people 
started to treat me as a friend rather than a 
researcher, or they kind of forgot my identity as a 
researcher even though I had clearly told them at 
the beginning. They like to chat with me and come 
to me to share stories with me. And from time to 
time they show me some interesting stuff on their 
social media via smartphones -- just as they 
normally do with friends. That’s the happiest 
moment for a researcher when your informants 
take the initiative, rather than you pushing them or 
inspiring them to get the information.  Also, more 
and more people like to introduce their friends to 
me. Getting to know people as ‘friend’s friend’ is 
always better than a strange researcher.    
 
 
P18: Even though I can work on a laptop, I 
prefer to write down my field notes with pen 
and paper after a day of field work. For me 
taking notes or recalling the scenes at the site 
is a very creative process in which I enjoy 
doodling on the paper which a laptop screen 
does not always allow.    
 
350 
 
P19: More often than not, people will feel 
freer to comment on others rather than talk 
about themselves. Compared to abstract 
concepts, specific stories have a much 
higher chance to lead to interesting 
discussions. Thus, I always use other’s 
stories and my own stories to trigger 
discussions among my informants. As for 
visual analysis of people’s social media 
profiles, I applied the same strategy - that is 
to invite people to comment on strangers’ 
(also my informants) online posts.   
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
P20: Social media is not only the research 
topic of this project but also the extremely 
important research tool. First, social media 
offers a private space for me to talk with my 
informants. Second, the social media 
profiles of my informants provide a huge 
amount of information. Third, on social 
media, I could keep contact with my 
informants, the floating population, even 
after they moved to other places during the 
field work. And I keep contact with some of 
them even after my field work. 
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Glossary 
 
 
ai  (love；爱) 
an fen (obedient；安分) 
 
bao di xiao fei (guaranteed 
consumption；保底消费) 
bao you (be blessed； 保佑) 
ben di ban (local class，本地班) 
bu xiao (unfilial，不孝) 
 
cai li (bride price；彩礼) 
cha xu ge ju (differential mode of 
association；差序格局) 
chao sheng (unplanned birth；超
生) 
chi ku (to eat the bitterness of 
tough life；吃苦) 
chuang shi jie (to venture into the 
world；闯世界) 
 
da gong (to work as migrant 
worker；打工) 
da lao ban (big boss；大老板) 
da guan (high officials；大官) 
da shi (master；大师) 
de zui (to offend；得罪) 
diao si (loser；屌丝) 
du chulai (to study one’s way out 
of the coutryside；读出来) 
duan zhang (section manager；段
长) 
 
fang huo qiang (the Great 
Firewall；防火墙) 
fei zhu liu/FZL (anti-
mainstream；非主流) 
feng huang nan (phenix man；凤
凰男) 
feng jian mi xin (feudal 
superstition；封建迷信) 
fu jin de ren (people nearby；附
近的人) 
fu li (welfare；福利) 
 
gao dang (high-end；高档) 
gao shuiping (high level；高水
平) 
ge xing (stylish and unique；个
性) 
geng chun (purer；更纯) 
gua ji (to log in on QQ for the 
purpose of upgrading to a higher 
level；挂机) 
gong gong zhang hao (public 
account；公共账号) 
gong hui (worker guild；工会) 
gong tong hao you (common 
friends；共同好友) 
gong you (fellow worker；工友) 
gua ji (to log in on QQ for as long 
as possible, purely for the purpose 
of upgrading to a higher level；挂
机) 
guanxi (social relations；关系) 
GuanYin (the mother Buddha；观
音) 
guo jia da shi (big affairs of 
state；国家大事) 
guo ke (passing traveller；过客) 
guo shi (out of fashion；过时) 
 
hao pai zi (good brand；好牌子) 
hao si (good death；好死) 
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hao xiong di (good brother；好兄
弟) 
hao yun (good luck；好运) 
he xie (harmony；和谐) 
he yue ji (contract mobile phone；
合约机) 
hen (hate；恨) 
hong bao (red envelop；红包) 
hukou (household registration；
户口) 
hui shuo hua (articulate；会说话) 
hui zuo ren (to be sophisticated in 
social life；会做人) 
hun (spirit；魂) 
huo po (lively；活泼) 
 
ji shi (paid by hour；计时) 
ji jian (paid by piece；计件) 
jia (family, home；家) 
jia xiang (homeland；家乡) 
jian guo shi mian (having seen the 
world；见过世面) 
jiang da dao li (to give idealistic 
speeches；讲大道理) 
jiang shi (zombie；僵尸) 
jiu de buqu, xin de bulai (without 
discarding the old, there would be 
no coming of the new；旧的不去
新的不来) 
 
lao jia (hometown；老家) 
lao ye zi (old grandfather；老爷
子) 
liao de lai (get along with well；
聊得来) 
ling (efficacy；灵) 
liu dong ren kou (floating 
population；流动人口) 
lv you (tourism；旅游) 
 
mei mengli (in lack of 
capability；没能力) 
mianzi (face；面子) 
ming (fate；命) 
 
nian nian you yu (to have ample 
surplus by the end of every year；
年年有余) 
nongmin gong (peasant workers；
农民工) 
nongmin fang (peasant flat; 农民
房) 
nv bo shi (female PhD; 女博士) 
 
peng you (friend；朋友) 
piao (floating around；漂) 
piao liu ping (message in a 
bottle；漂流瓶) 
ping an fu (amulet；平安符) 
 
qian dao (check in) 
qian yuan ji (smartphones with a 
price lower than US$ 150；千元
机) 
QQ hao (QQ number； QQ号) 
QQ ming (QQ name； QQ名) 
qun gonggao (group notification; 
群公告) 
qun xiangce (group album； 群
相册) 
 
re nao (bustling with noise and 
excitement；热闹) 
ren qing (human feelings, 
favour；人情) 
 
sa jiao (to deliberately act like a 
spoiled child；撒娇) 
shan zhai (knock-off, fake；山寨) 
353 
 
shao jiu (sprit wine；烧酒) 
she hui da xue (a university so-
called ‘society’；社会大学) 
shen ming (deity；神明) 
sheng nv (leftover women；剩女) 
sheng xiao (Chinese Zodiac；生
肖) 
shi se xing ye (the appetite for 
food and sex is human nature；食
色性也) 
shi wa (shit boy；屎娃) 
shuang ka shuang dai (dual SIM 
card dual standby；双卡双待) 
shui jun (paid followers；水军) 
suzhi (human quality；素质) 
 
tao yuan jie yi (the oath of the 
Peach Garden；桃园结义) 
tian di yin hang (the bank of earth 
and heaven；天地银行) 
tiao shi (arouse dissatisfaction；
挑事) 
tong xiang (fellow villagers；同
乡) 
tou lan (to be lazy；偷懒) 
tou sheng (to give unplanned birth 
in secret；偷生) 
tu (rustic；土) 
tu di gong (the god of the earth；
土地公) 
tu hao (nouveau riche；土豪) 
 
wai di ban (rural migrants only 
class, outsider class；外地班) 
wan zheng zhi (play politics；玩
政治) 
wang guan (internet monitor；网
管) 
wang jing (internet police；网警) 
wei wen (to maintain stability；维
稳) 
wei xin (WeChat；微信) 
wo (I；我) 
wu mao dang (50 cents party 
members；五毛党) 
 
xian hui (virtuous；贤惠) 
xiang ce (album；相册) 
xiao guan (local officals；小官) 
xiao kang (living relatively 
prosperous；小康) 
xin ling ji tang (chicken soup for 
the soup；心灵鸡汤) 
 
yao yi yao (shake；摇一摇) 
yishou (strange beings；异兽) 
yin shen fang wen (to visit other’s 
Qzone without leaving a 
footprint；隐身访问) 
yin si (privacy；隐私) 
you fu qi (be blessed；有福气) 
yu huang da di (Jade emperor；玉
皇大帝) 
yu lun dao xiang (channel the 
public opinion；舆论导向) 
yu shi jie tong bu (keep up with 
the world，与世界同步) 
yun (luck；运) 
 
zai (disaster；灾) 
zheng fu shang wang gong cheng 
(government online project；政府
上网工程) 
zhu dong (to take the initiative；
主动) 
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